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 Abstract 
 
Regionalism has become a major trend in economic development in 
Southeast Asia since the end of the Cold War. In the Lower Mekong   
Basin, riparian states use water for hydropower, which is one of           
important potentials of the river. This strategy supports the 
regionalization of economic activities that is promoted by policies of  
regionalism, which is aiming for more participation of the private sector 
and the creation of an integrated regional market. However, large-scale 
hydropower projects, especially on the transboundary watercourse of the 
Mekong mainstream, potentially have critical impacts – something that 
draws attention to the existing arrangements for transboundary water 
governance (TWG). The dissertation draws on fieldwork conducted in 
Laos and Thailand and a case study of the Xayaburi Dam in Laos, the 
first hydropower project on the Lower Mekong mainstream, to illustrate 
the relationships between TWG and regionalism.  
The research found that emerging marketization of water for energy 
through so-called ‘regulatory regionalism’ is an essential element of 
hydropower development in the Lower Mekong Basin, especially in 
Laos. The idea of regionalism is connected essentially to the           
transformation of the state, which implies that regional development 
policies have been incorporated into national governance without the 
creation of strong, centralized regional governance. This process enables 
states to embrace the political project of regionalism, without 
transferring power to regional institutions. Therefore, TWG of 
hydropower development in the basin seems to be more an aggregation 
of governance mechanisms, diffused across agencies of national 
governments, instead of a unified structure of regional institutions. By 
instituting new regulatory mechanisms, the states and their collaborating 
private developers can take advantage of regionalism as a strategy to 
achieve their goals of water nationalism and political legitimacy, while 
stimulating regional market building at the same time. 
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xi
 Samenvatting 
 
Regionalisme is sinds het einde van de Koude Oorlog een belangrijke 
trend in de economische ontwikkeling in Zuidoost-Azië. In de 
benedenloop van de rivier de Mekong gebruiken oeverstaten water om 
hydro-elektriciteit op te wekken. Ze benutten daarmee een van de 
belangrijke potentiële functies van de rivier. Met deze strategie wordt de 
regionalisering van economische activiteiten ondersteund. Het beleid van 
regionalisme is gericht op een grotere participatie van de particuliere 
sector en het creëren van een geïntegreerde regionale markt. 
Grootschalige waterkrachtprojecten, vooral op de grensoverschrijdende 
waterloop van de hoofdstroom van de Mekong, kunnen echter ernstige 
gevolgen hebben. In dit verband is het interessant om te kijken naar de 
bestaande regelingen voor grensoverschrijdend waterbeheer 
(transboundary water governance, of TWG). Dit proefschrift is 
gebaseerd op veldwerk in Laos en Thailand en op een casestudy van de 
Xayaburi-dam in Laos, het eerste waterkrachtproject in de benedenloop 
van de Mekong. Met dit onderzoek wordt de relatie tussen TWG en 
regionalisme geïllustreerd 
Uit het onderzoek blijkt dat de opkomende commercialisering van het 
gebruik van water voor energie door middel van het zogenaamde 
'regulerend regionalisme' een essentieel onderdeel is van de ontwikkeling 
van waterkracht in de benedenloop van de rivier de Mekong. Dit is 
vooral in Laos het geval. Het idee van regionalisme hangt wezenlijk 
samen met de transformatie van de overheid. Dit impliceert dat het 
regionale ontwikkelingsbeleid is opgenomen in het landsbestuur zonder 
dat er een sterk, gecentraliseerd regionaal bestuur is gevormd. Hierdoor 
kunnen overheden het politieke project van regionalisme omarmen 
zonder macht over te dragen aan regionale instellingen. Daarom lijkt 
TWG met betrekking tot de ontwikkeling van waterkracht in het 
stroomgebied meer een bundeling van bestuursmechanismen die zijn 
verspreid over de verschillende overheidsinstellingen, dan een homogene 
structuur van regionale instellingen. Door nieuwe         
reguleringsmechanismen in te stellen, kunnen de overheden en hun 
private ontwikkelingspartners profiteren van regionalisme als strategie 
om waternationalisme en politieke legitimiteit te realiseren, terwijl ze 
tegelijkertijd de regionale marktontwikkeling stimuleren. 
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1 
 
Introduction 
 
 
  
1.1 Research Background 
 
1.1.1 Research issues 
 
In the dry season of early 2010, a drought crisis exposed the vulnerability 
of the Mekong River and its riparian population. Extremely low levels of 
the Mekong mainstream not seen in decades in northern Laos and 
northern Thailand aroused more public concern than ever. This led to 
controversy in Thailand, where the first summit of the Mekong River 
Commission (MRC) was concurrently held in April 2010. The celebrated 
summit among governments in the Lower Mekong Basin - Cambodia, 
Laos, Thailand and Vietnam - gave unclear responses to the crisis. In the 
wake of growing hydropower development in the Mekong Basin, the 
crisis highlighted the contradiction between the objective of enhancing 
economic prosperity by expanding regional cooperation among states 
and the need to protect people from potential harmful transboundary 
impacts. This tension is the starting point of this study on current issues 
of international development in the Mekong Basin in the context of 
economic regionalism. 
 This introduction aims to identify three connected issues regarding 
the expansion of hydropower development and regionalism in the 
Mekong Basin. Firstly, the ongoing development of the hydropower 
sector exposes the connection between regionalization and regionalism, 
i.e., the process of using water resources to serve transnational/regional 
markets, and the international/regional institutionalization aimed at 
integrated water management and market building. Secondly, regionalism 
in hydropower development originates from the skewed power 
distribution between regional institutions, especially the MRC, and the 
states that try to manipulate regional governance in order to promote 
and protect their interests. This tension reveals a complex interplay 
between techno-managerial and power-based perspectives of 
transboundary water governance (TWG). Thirdly, the relatively weak 
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regional institutions reflect the weakness of regionalism, which is unable 
to provide a governance mechanism in the face of state transformation 
that involves the rearranging of market-state relations and the blurring of 
domestic and international affairs. This complexity limits the options for 
the TWG of the hydropower development that is currently being revived 
and expanded in the region. The case study of hydropower development 
in Laos serves to illustrate the limits to TWG.  
 
Regionalization of hydropower in the Mekong Basin 
 
The Mekong is the longest river in Southeast Asia and one of the longest 
international rivers in Asia. It flows southward for around 4,400 km. from 
the source in the Tibetan Plateau through southern China, Myanmar, 
Laos, Thailand, Cambodia and Vietnam before flowing into the South 
China Sea. The first half of the river, which flows within China, is called 
‘Lancang’, while the rest is internationally known as ‘Mekong’ (derived 
from its name in Thai and Lao) (MRC 2011a). The river is considered to 
be an international watercourse in Laos, Thailand, Cambodia and 
Vietnam, as reflected in an international agreement; this status is not 
legally recognized in China and Myanmar. Even though the Mekong is 
hydrologically integrated, its governance is politically fragmented among 
riparian states and between the upper and the lower basins.  
The Mekong Basin is the land surrounding the watercourses that flow 
into the Mekong; it covers an area of 795,000 km2. This huge basin is 
geographically divided into two parts. The Upper Mekong Basin (UMB) 
covers an area of around 186,000 km2 in southern China and a small part 
of northeastern Myanmar and northern Laos.  The Lower Mekong Basin 
(LMB) begins at the so-called Golden Triangle, where the Mekong meets 
the border of Burma, Laos and Thailand, and covers northern and 
northeastern Thailand, almost all of Laos and Cambodia, as well as one-
fifth of central and southern Vietnam. The total area of the LMB is three 
times that of the upper one: it is approximately 609,000 km2 or seventy-
seven percent of the total basin area (MRC 2011a).  
As one of the most important rivers in Asia, more than sixty million 
people or one-third of the population in Thailand, Cambodia, Laos and 
Vietnam reside along and depend on the Lower Mekong’s mainstream and 
its tributaries for consumption, irrigation, transportation and hydropower 
generation. The basin covers one-third of the cultivated area in Thailand 
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and almost all of Laos. It sustains the Great Lake (Tonle Sap) in 
Cambodia, which is one of the largest freshwater fisheries sources in the 
world. In the delta, the fertile plain generates more than half of total rice 
production in Vietnam (UNDP 2006). Because of these significant 
features, any large-scale development of water resources in the basin is a 
sensitive issue for both the livelihood of local people and the relations 
among riparian states. 
 
Map 1.1 the Upper Mekong Basin and the Lower Mekong Basin 
source: Mekong River Commission, http://www.mrcmekong.org 
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The Mekong Basin is one of the fastest growing economic regions in 
the world and is endowed with a high potential for hydropower.  So far, 
there have been hydropower projects on many tributaries of the Mekong 
as well as the mainstream of the Upper Mekong in China, but until 
recently there was none on the Lower Mekong mainstream. Although up 
to twelve dams have been planned, the Lower Mekong has never been 
dammed until the Xayaburi Hydroelectric Power Project formally started 
in 2012. The project is only one of several large dams recently started in 
Laos, a country endowed with the biggest hydropower potential in the 
LMB. This feature has led the  government to brand the country as the 
‘Battery of Asia’ – a power hub for hydropower generation and export to 
the country’s neighbors and the wider region.  
Several companies from Thailand, Laos’ neighbor and the biggest 
importer of hydroelectricity from Laos, mainly invest in the project in 
order to export electricity to their home country. Power export is not 
only a strategy of the government of Laos (GoL) to sustain economic 
growth and poverty alleviation: the developer stresses several other 
benefits of the dam, including efficient water utilization, reliable energy 
generation, global warming mitigation, and cooperation among countries 
in the Lower Mekong Subregion (XPCL 2012). The Thai government, 
meanwhile, claims that the sourcing of hydropower from its neighbor is 
a tool to achieve energy security because it leads to diversification, while 
the sources are secure, accessible and affordable (EPPO 2013).The dam, 
however, has become a regional issue because it is not only the first dam 
ever built on the Lower Mekong mainstream, where it is expected to 
produce transboundary environmental impacts, but also because it is the 
first project submitted to the international consultation process of the 
MRC. While the governments of Laos and Thailand have supported 
private companies that aim to develop the project for cross-border 
power trade, the governments of downstream countries (i.e., Cambodia 
and Vietnam), and civil society organizations have voiced concerns about 
the harmful impacts of the large dam, particularly on fisheries and 
sediment allocation. The construction of this dam is also seen as a 
starting point for other projects. The building of a series of dams would 
divide the Mekong into several parts and may lead, as Osborne (2011) 
has shown, to the transformation of the river into a series of 
unproductive lakes, and to serious  ecological degradation.  
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 Until well after the Second World War, the Mekong River was almost 
untouched by international politics. The Mekong Committee (MC), 
which included Cambodia, Laos, Thailand and (formerly South) 
Vietnam, was initiated by the United States in 1957 under the 
supervision of the United Nations Economic Commission for Asia and 
the Far East (UN-ECAFE). Damming the water channel in the Mekong 
Basin for electricity was a major objective of the MC as was control of 
flooding. However, political turbulence in those countries during the 
Cold War between the 1950s and 1980s stood in the way of any 
significant outcome of the committee. Only smaller domestic projects 
had been implemented, but not large dams on the Mekong mainstream 
(Tana 2008: 108-109).  
  The changing geopolitics of the post-Cold War period has driven 
regionalism and development in the Mekong Basin.  Since the 1990s, the 
regional context has changed dramatically, as chronic political conflicts 
have made way to dynamic economic cooperation (see Hirsch 2009; 
Goh 2007; Nguyen 2006, Sisowat 2006; Osborne 2004; Öjendal 2000). 
The Mekong Committee was transformed into an independent 
intergovernmental agency, the Mekong River Commission (MRC), in 
1995. Other international development schemes have been promoted 
under the regional framework, most notably the Greater Mekong 
Subregion Economic Cooperation Program (GMS), which is an initiative 
promoted by the ADB since 1992. By 2000, all of the Mekong riparian 
states, except China, had acceded to the Association of Southeast Asian 
Nations (ASEAN)1  
Several studies on that context of regionalism observe increasing 
engagement of new actors in the hydropower sector with participation of 
transnational firms, private financiers, and social movements, especially 
from within the region, since the late 2000s (Merme et al 2014; Myint 
2012; Molle et al 2009; Middleton et al 2009). Meanwhile, the state-
centric approach to intergovernmental cooperation, which offered only 
limited public participation, has continued to dominate public policy 
making in the region and has led to fragmented regional governance and 
weak regulatory power of the MRC (Dore et al 2012; Suhardiman et al 
2011; Foran et al 2010; Sokhem et al 2007; Hirsch and Jensen 2006).  
The studies on regionalism and hydropower all seem to reach the same 
                                                          
1ASEAN currently comprises ten member states: Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, 
Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam. 
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conclusion on the issue of the overexploitation of water and the 
underdevelopment of institutions of transboundary water governance 
(TWG). 
 
Contested TWG in the Mekong Basin 
 
As noted by Molle et al (2009), intensifying water development makes 
the Mekong waterscape increasingly contested, because it involves issues 
of economic interests, livelihoods, food security and so on. These issues 
do not concern only the technical aspects of water governance but also 
relate to fundamental issues reflecting the international political economy 
of regional development and economic integration, particularly in case of 
the transboundary watercourse. The pioneer Xayaburi project on the 
Mekong mainstream is challenging TWG as its transnational 
characteristics have mirrored dynamics of regionalism that somehow 
impede the supranational governance of water resources. 
 The recent revival of hydropower development on the Mekong 
mainstream has increased the tension between TWG and regionalism. 
Existing regional integration schemes are promoting the use of 
transboundary water resources for economic purposes, especially by 
producing tradable electricity to meet growing regional energy demands 
and support related economic activities. The ‘region’ is essentially 
constructed by states and international development agencies to 
transform the river basin into a developmental area and a regional 
market, supported by the rearrangement of regional institutions and the 
rescaling of geographical boundaries (Glassman 2010; Sneddon and Fox 
2006; Bakker 1999). Although there is the MRC that promotes the joint 
management of shared water resources, Hirsch and Jansen (2006) have 
noted that the role of the Commission is essentially limited to providing 
technical support rather than directly intervening in decision making. 
The Xayaburi case challenges both the raison d’être of the MRC and the 
domestic governance in the Mekong states, as it puts into question how 
states manage economic, social, and ecological issues, as well as serve 
national and regional interests.  
International cooperation in transboundary basins does not address 
water issues neutrally. Although international armed conflicts about 
water resources are rare and usually result from territorial disputes and 
global politics (Katz 2011; Turton and Earle 2005; Allan 2000; Wolf 1998, 
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1999), the absence of water wars does not mean there are no water 
conflicts: on the contrary, these conflicts are widespread because of the 
impact of water issues on power relations (Zeitoun and Warner 2006). 
Cascao and Zeitoun (2010: 29-30) identify two important issues attached 
to the international cooperation on water. Firstly, there is a question 
regarding the distribution of water, which is directly linked to both 
quantitative and qualitative aspects of water management, i.e., water 
allocation among users and sectors as well as the control of water-related 
pollution. Secondly, there is the issue of how to cope with the fluid 
nature of water, which passes through several territorial entities and 
thereby fuels competing interests of actors to control the use of water. 
The second issue is relevant to this study, as we focus on hydropower 
development across multiple layers of governance, which is a feature that 
makes the control of water resources more complicated.  
A focus on the technical aspects of water governance is insufficient to 
answer the question. As Allan and Mirumachi (2010) have shown, 
attempts to implement regional/basin cooperation often overemphasize 
technical solutions to water flows derived from hydrology and 
engineering, as well as legal solutions for the regulation of shared water 
resources. Demographic pressures and consumption practices often 
make the mobilization of water flows for food production in water 
scarce countries more difficult when governments try to manage water 
within national boundaries. In response to this, Allan and Mirumachi 
(2010) argue that trade in virtual water, which reflects the embedding of 
water volumes in food products and hydroelectricity, may be a solution 
to problems of water scarcity and thereby reduce unnecessary 
international conflicts.2  
Based on that idea, developers including state agencies and private 
firms could consider water in the form of hydroelectricity as a tradable 
good that encourages the expansion of trade and investment in regional 
markets. This development needs some kind of regional governance, 
such as regional/basin-wide planning, information sharing, prior 
consultation, transboundary assessment and other integrated regulations, 
to realize not only the efficient use of water but also the creation of an 
organized and predictable transnational market where states are not the 
                                                          
2 One of the cases is the absence of armed conflict over transboudary water in the 
Middle East during the 1970-80s when Egypt could silently import grains to relieve 
water scarcity and avoid more expensive war (Allan and Mirumachi 2010: 24). 
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sole players because water experts, private companies, international 
donors, and NGOs have an increasing role.  
Ideally, TWG requires that regional governance mechanisms manage 
common resources with a view to the equitable sharing of benefits over 
riparian countries (Huitema and Meijerink 2014). According to Hirsch 
(2012), better integration of activities among states would accommodate 
TWG at the regional basin-wide level, as well as produce integrative 
governance across sectors such as in the water-food-energy nexus. 
However, it is good to realize that hydropower projects tend to produce 
uneven benefits and costs for specific actors or areas and tend to favour 
those actors that dominate water governance. For this reason, 
technocratic approaches to TWG do not respond sufficiently to the 
political tensions that exist among riparian states, as well as between state 
and non-state actors, because these approaches are too much focused on 
producing efficient solutions that are expected to be beneficial to all. 
 
Problematizing regionalism and TWG in the Mekong Basin 
 
The rearrangement of international relations in the Mekong Basin has led 
to a form of TWG that evolved along with the process of regional water 
marketization. Marketization is not only about the commodification of 
water as tradable hydroelectricity but also about transferring domestic 
resources into private and foreign hands, frequently through public-
private partnerships, in a region where most states have recently replaced 
their centrally planned economic system by systems that aim to connect 
and integrate with global and regional markets. The state has 
concentrated on regulatory roles, by creating and controlling rules that 
facilitate private developers to expand regional markets (Jayasuriya 2015, 
2013; Jarvis 2014; Carroll and Jarvis 2013). In Laos, for instance, the 
state enterprise, Electricité du Laos, has worked closely with private 
firms from neighbouring countries in the development of hydropower 
projects for export using the regional scheme of cross-border power 
trade. 
 Nonetheless, neither the regional supranational institutions nor the 
TWG body, the MRC, directly rule over regional water-related 
developments, since decisions are ultimately taken by the national 
governments. As a consequence of this, the influence TWG is often 
overlooked because of the weak and informal nature of regional 
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institutions. This is the case particularly for the relatively new riparian 
states in the LMB, which became independent and underwent political 
regime changes during their recent history.3 Narine (2002: 3) has argued 
that this circumstance has created a tension between the creation of 
regional institutions in Southeast Asia and nation-state building, because 
the very member states of the regional bodies are highly attached to their 
sovereignty and committed to non-interventionism.  
This argument is applicable to the case of Laos, where state building 
has been a top priority of the incumbent regime because the power of 
the state in Laos had collapsed and has been re-built only after the 
revolution in 1975. Hydropower development seems to play a significant 
role in the control over natural resources and the population in remote 
areas as well as for the provision of infrastructure and public welfare. 
Regionalism of hydropower development in Laos cannot be studied 
separately from national governance because of the state’s water 
nationalism - the belief that the nation-state obtains its strength from its 
ability to control water resources for development and to affirm national 
sovereignty over water in its territory (Allouche 2005: 114). In the case of 
Laos, it seems that water nationalism is inseparable from regionalism, 
which is a strategy for gaining political legitimacy, as it provides a 
justification of the right to rule by the state. 
Weigand (2015: 16) has argued that two sources of legitimacy 
essentially relate to state building. These are instrumental legitimacy that 
derives from the perceived effectiveness of service delivery by the state, 
and substantive legitimacy that supports the right of the state to exercise 
social control on the basis of factors such as cultural traditions or legal-
rational authority. In the case of Laos, the state may acquire instrumental 
legitimacy by focusing on regionalization that leads to the attraction of 
foreign investment and expansion of the energy market, while it may 
claim substantive legitimacy through engaging with regional schemes that 
provide normative frameworks for regional policies and regulations.  
                                                          
3 Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam formally gained independence from France in 1953-54, 
but revolutions changed the political regimes of all three countries towards communism 
in 1975, while market-oriented economic reforms started in the late 1980s. Unlike the 
other countries, Thailand has never been colonized and its current state dates back to 
the nineteenth century. Thailand allied with the US during the Cold War and rapidly 
developed a market system since the 1960s.  
525758-L-bw-Chattranond
Processed on: 29-10-2018 PDF page: 21
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 1 
 
10 
This thesis argues that when strong authority and efficient governance 
for development are lacking at the national level, the state tends to 
depend on regional governance and regional resources for strengthening 
its own relevance in national development. Technocratic forms of TWG 
accommodate marketization and transformation of the state; regionalist 
institutions, in their turn, promote the deepening of transnational 
relations among private developers and state agencies by regionalizing 
power trade and facilitating cross-border investment in the hydropower 
sector. In this way, regionalism becomes a strategy of the state to 
underpin its water nationalism and strengthen legitimacy in national 
development. Exploring transboundary hydropower development from 
this perspective, therefore, potentially contributed to explaining the 
relationship between regionalism and TWG in the Mekong Basin.  
 
1.1.2 Research relevance 
 
This thesis purposely views hydropower development as a reflection of 
the existing regionalism that does not only produce a rearrangement of 
international relations among states but deeply relates to the 
transformation of the state itself. The thesis argues that hydropower 
development on the Mekong mainstream changes transnational relations 
between public and private actors, domestic and international forces, and 
economic and socio-ecological interests. Hydropower development leads 
to a particular form of regional governance, and this exposes three 
important matters of development in the Mekong Basin. 
First, the Mekong Basin is not only the biggest transboundary basin in 
Southeast Asia but it is located in one of the fastest growing economic 
regions in the world. Its regional cooperation has even been cited as a 
successful model for developing countries (Jacobs 2002; Phillips et al 
2006). Although the basin is divided between the Upper and the Lower 
Mekong, its fragmented governance has not halted economic 
development in both parts, linked with regional economic integration 
frameworks such as ASEAN and the GMS. This development, however, 
has consequences that can be seen as two sides of the same coin. While the 
development promises shared prosperity and deeper economic 
cooperation, it also intensifies the transnational exploitation of water 
resources and produces international tensions as potential transboundary 
social-environmental impacts are becoming one of the regional concerns. 
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Second, the Mekong mainstream hydropower projects have been 
controversial and they attract much attention from the public because of 
the potentially large transboundary impacts. Regarding governance, the 
Xayaburi project may be a pioneer for both regional governance in the 
MRC and national governance for managing the effects of mainstream 
dam construction, which significantly affects the livelihoods of millions 
people in the basin. Certainly, studying this highly dynamic case is 
challenging, but the findings may contribute to a better understanding of 
this kind of transboundary development, which is increasingly prevalent 
not only in the region but around the world.  
Third, this is not only a study of hydropower development, but also 
an effort to overcome the theoretical limits of the traditional division 
between international and domestic affairs in the discipline of 
International Relations (IR). Hammier (2013) argues that most IR 
approaches are based on so-called methodological nationalism, which 
creates an analytical duality between foreign/international and 
domestic/national affairs, and that this characteristic discourages a 
fruitful debate on regionalism beyond issues of form and 
institutionalization. As noted by Söderbaum (2012), theoretical 
approaches to regionalism mostly focus on formal regional institutions, 
and are dominated by state-centric and problem-solving perspectives. 
These characteristics often leave us with debates that focus excessively on 
the transfer of power from states to supranational institutions, and 
underrate the influence of regional governance on national or local 
development. Hence, there is a need for alternative explanations of the 
process of changing regional governance that is emerging in the Mekong 
Basin, which is mixed up with public and private interests, and is blurring 
the boundaries between domestic and international/regional affairs. 
 
1.2 Research Objective and Questions  
 
This study intends to understand how political-economic relations, 
involving regionalism and TWG, relate to the transformation of the state 
and its relations to other actors, as seen in the ongoing hydropower 
development on the Mekong mainstream. Instead of focusing on 
institutionalization of the region, which usually ends up with an 
explanation of ineffective TWG, this study attempts to understand the 
existing regionalism in the Mekong Basin from international political 
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economy and governance perspectives, following the structure and 
process of hydropower development across international and national 
levels.  
Although this is a study about the ‘state’, which seems to be a crucial 
element in the building of market-led regionalism in Southeast Asia, it 
does not exclusively view the state as a unified or independent actor in 
IR. The research project focuses on hydropower development and its 
related TWG that combines state and non-state actors and is taking 
shape both in between and within the ‘space of the state’. Following 
Jayasuriya (2015) and Hameiri (2012) we focus on the process in which 
regional policies, shaped by global and regional forces such as capitalism 
and marketization, are operationalized through economic and 
governance systems in transforming, rather than reducing, state power. 
This may explain the relationship between TWG and regionalism as a 
part of regional market building and state transformation, which are 
processes that ultimately change the relations between states and non-
state actors. Based on this objective, the research questions are as 
follows: 
 
Main question:  
How does hydropower development on the Lower Mekong mainstream 
influence the relations between transboundary water governance and 
regionalism in the Mekong Basin? 
 
Sub-questions: 
1) Which are the dynamics of hydropower development that shape the 
pattern of transboundary water governance in the Mekong Basin? 
 
2) Which are the linkages between the regionalist frameworks of GMS, 
ASEAN and MRC, particularly their implications for the transboundary 
water governance of hydropower development in the Mekong Basin? 
 
3) How and why does the state, especially in the case of Laos, and related 
actors define and pursue their interests in hydropower development 
under the structure of existing regionalism?  
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4) Which opportunities and threats does regionalism create for state and 
non-states actors regarding the issue of transboundary water governance 
of hydropower development? 
 
1.3 Research Methodology 
 
To study regionalism, we need to be clear what it means, especially when 
the study purposefully applies a perspective of international political 
economy (IPE) that focuses on the transforming market-state relations. 
According to (Hettne 2005), IPE perspectives on regionalism perceive 
the current wave of the creation of regional groupings as a phenomenon 
related to the transformation of the world economy, which is making 
regional integration projects market-driven and outward looking. Such 
interpretations differ from, neoliberal views that focus on the revival of 
protectionism in economic policies.  
 Further, there are important differences among terms related to 
regionalism, although such terms are often used interchangeably in the 
literature. While cooperation simply refers to collective action by states to 
solve specific problems or achieve some goals, regional integration implies 
changes to sovereignty as a result of the decision of individual states 
within a given geographical area to join a larger whole and establish 
regional agreements, rules and institutions. Regional integration is related 
but not similar to regionalization. The latter is the formation of a region 
through increasingly complex cross-border activities, consisting of 
commercial and human transactions in a defined geographical area, 
whether consciously planned or not. Such processes may be based on 
the idea of regionalism, which is a tendency and a political commitment to 
organize the world in terms of regions; more narrowly, regionalism refers 
to a specific regional project. It may express a common sense of identity 
and purpose, which guides the creation and implementation of 
institutions for collective action within a region (Hettne 2005: 545). 
It should be noted that regionalism and regionalization are usually 
distinguished on the basis of their driving forces. Whereas 
regionalization is a process that brings about integration and is driven 
and primarily carried out by private individuals acting on their own, 
regionalism refers to a political movement based on awareness of and 
loyalty to a region and is driven by government policies and actions of 
political authorities (Frost 2008: 14-15). This dissertation purposely 
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employs the term regionalism to underscore the regional market building 
policies led by state agencies and the existing process of regionalization 
driven by market forces.  A form of state-led regionalism that heavily 
promotes and facilitates regionalization of the market would produce a 
particular kind of regionalism and engender state transformation (see 
diagram 1.1).  
 
Diagram 1.1 Pathway of regionalism and regionalization 
 
 
 
 
Diagram 1.2 Degree of regionness in relation to regionalization and 
regionalism 
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Diagram 1.2 shows Hettne and Söderbaum’s (2002: 39-45) 
classification of forms of regionness. These authors note that the 
relationship between regionalism and regionalization expresses regionness - 
the degree of regional capacity to tackle common problems. The 
evolution of regionness in specific regions is not always hierarchical, but 
can be uneven across areas or sectors, and relates to the degree of and 
balance between regionalism and regionalization. An increasing degree of 
regionalization, such as may result from intensifying economic 
transactions, could transform a regional space – a bounded geographical 
and ecological unit – into a series of interdependent communities that 
make up a regional complex. It needs political will and an 
institutionalization of regionalism to create a regional society based on 
formal cooperation among states.  Deeper regionalization, as a reflection 
of shared values among states and societies, enhances the regionness to 
the degree of a regional community, which may ultimately evolve into a 
regional state and a new supranational community. The evolutionary 
process of regionness could result in state transformation, with the state 
adopting a regulatory role in the process of regional market building 
(further details will be discussed in chapter 2).  
On the basis of the conceptual framework sketched in this section, 
this study attempts to analyze interactions among actors in the TWG of 
hydropower development in order to explain the transformation of the 
state and the nature of relations between states and non-state actors that 
influence regionalism, and vice versa. We can empirically study 
hydropower development and regionalism by focusing on existing 
physical projects, investment volumes, as well as written policy 
documents and regulations. However, a deeper understanding requires a 
theoretically informed interpretation of the governance processes 
involved,  with attention for their conceptual and historical background. 
Thus, we attempt to uncover the mechanisms of social relations that can 
explain the empirical events, including through a case study.  
 
1.3.1 The case study 
 
This research project uses a case study of transboundary hydropower 
development on the Lower Mekong mainstream in Laos, in particular 
the Xayaburi HPP. This approach is “an empirical inquiry that 
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investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its current context 
when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly 
evident; and in which multiple sources of evidence are used” (Yin 2009: 
18). According to Sayer (2000), this is a type of intensive research that 
aims for the causal explanation of certain events like the decision making 
process on the Xayaburi HPP, which illustrates the governance of 
hydropower development in the region. The case is selected because of 
four reasons. 
In the first place, the recent pattern of transnational hydropower 
development is reflected well in the case. By 2012, it was the first and 
only dam that was being developed on the Lower Mekong mainstream. 
Although the Xayaburi dam is located in Laos, it is substantively a Thai 
project. The government of Thailand, through the state-owned 
Electricity Generating Authority of Thailand (EGAT), has agreed to 
purchase most of its electricity while Thai banks have financed the 
project and a Thai company, Ch. Karnchang, has been building the dam 
(Bangkok Post 2012). Hence, the Xayaburi’s consultation process in the 
MRC as well as its governance – i.e., regulations and investment patterns 
– could be a pilot for following projects on the Lower Mekong. 
Secondly, The Xayaburi project is a milestone for regional 
cooperation, because it is the first project on the Lower Mekong 
mainstream for which the MRC’s consultation process has been used. 
According to the Procedures for Notification, Prior Consultation and 
Agreement (PNPCA) of the Mekong Agreement 1995, member 
countries must at least notify the MRC’s Joint Committee when they 
want to develop any major infrastructure such as hydropower dams on 
the Mekong mainstream or its tributaries, particularly if that 
development may cause significant transboundary impact on people or 
the environment downstream (MRC 2011). When this research design 
was originally developed in 2011, the project had been hotly debated by 
downstream governments because of their concerns about 
transboundary impacts as well as by civil society, which brought this 
issue to the attention of a regional forum of ASEAN. 
Thirdly, Laos is a distinct case for the study of regionalism from both 
international political economy and governance perspectives. Firstly, 
although it is the smallest country both in terms of population and 
economy in the region, Laos is the biggest source of water flowing into 
the Mekong. The country’s great hydropower potential, in particular, has 
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made it much more important in terms of water and energy 
development. Secondly, Laos is landlocked, centrally located in the 
region, and surrounded by China, Vietnam, Myanmar, Cambodia and 
Thailand, which are among the fastest growing economies in the world. 
Therefore, its political economy highly depends on its regional location, 
and forces the government of Laos to employ regionalism as a grand 
strategy for development. Thirdly, as a relatively new state, which has 
implemented capitalist economic and governance reforms since the late 
1980s, the transformation of the state and the market in Laos is 
obviously dynamic.  
Finally, the case is seen as a good candidate to demonstrate how the 
transforming roles of the state and its relations with other states and 
non-state actors – i.e. international/regional organizations, transnational 
companies, NGOs and local communities – reflect processes of 
governance and regionalism. The case study approach emphasizes a 
detailed contextual analysis of a limited number of events by focusing on 
how and why these state and non-state actors have interacted around the 
project, especially in its decision making process. 
 
1.3.2 Data collection and data analysis 
 
Although the research focuses on hydropower development, data 
collection does not only follow the construction of the dam itself but 
also focuses on policies, decision making processes, and signs of support 
and resistance in government agencies, international organizations and 
civil society concerning the growth of hydropower. The data required for 
this research was predominantly qualitative, and was obtained from 
documents, interviews, and field observations, which were supported by 
secondary quantitative data on variables such as energy demand and the 
rate of economic interdependence, reflected in trade volumes and levels 
of foreign direct investment. Because the research project has spread 
over several years, and fieldwork was conducted mainly in 2013–2014, 
statistical data is included only until 2016. 
Data collection includes documentary research, involving the 
interpretation of key legal and policy documents, press releases, related 
books, and academic articles. Because some primary data was unavailable 
or was not reflected fully in available documents, qualitative (semi-structured 
or open-ended) interviews were held to gather information about policy 
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implementation, norms, and perceptions about the subjects. This 
research project also employed direct observation to collect more contextual 
data on physical settings as well as informal interaction, e.g., with staff at 
the secretariat of the Mekong River Commission, the Xayaburi dam’s 
construction site and in resettled villages. Further, data were collected 
about the symbolic representation of hydropower development in local 
media in Thailand and Laos. Such observations supported the proper 
interpretation of documents and interviews. Fieldwork comprised 
interviews and observation in Thailand and Laos including in: 
 
1) Bangkok, Thailand 
-  Energy Policy and Planning Office, Ministry of Energy  
- Department of Treaties and Legal Affairs, Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs 
- Department of Water Resources, Ministry of Environment and 
Natural Resources 
- Electricity Generating Authority of Thailand (EGAT) 
- Mekong Energy and Ecology Network (MEE-NET) 
- Institute of Asian Studies, Chulalongkorn University 
- International Rivers representative  
2) Chiang Mai, Thailand  
- Living River Siam Association (formerly known as Southeast 
Asia River Network) 
3) Chiang Rai, Thailand 
-Institute of Natural Resources and Environmental Management, 
Mae Fah Luang University  
4) Chiang Khong, Thailand  
 - Rak Chiang Khong Group (a local NGO) 
- Chiang Khong District Office 
- Vieng Chiang Khong Municipality 
- Vieng Municipality 
5) Mahasarakham, Thailand 
 - Mahasarakham University 
6) Vientiane, Laos 
- Mekong River Commission (MRC) 
- ADB Resident Mission 
- Electricité du Laos (EdL) 
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- Department of Energy Policy and Planning, Ministry of Energy 
and Mines (MEM) 
- Department of Energy Business, MEM 
- Lao National Mekong Committee Secretariat (LNMC) 
- Department of Water Resources, Ministry of Natural Resources 
and Environment 
- Faculty of Law and Political Science, National University of 
Laos (NUOL)  
- Xayaburi Power Company 
- PT Development Company 
7) Xayaburi, Laos 
       - Xayaburi Hydroelectric Power Project (construction site) 
- Resettlement Management Unit (RMU) 
- Ta Lan village 
- Na Tor Yai village  
 
The interviews aimed to trace the actors that were involved and the 
ways in which they engage each other, particularly in the development 
process of the Xayaburi project. Forty-two formal interviews were 
conducted during this research project. Most of the interviews took from 
thirty minutes to one hour, but some discussions lasted for three to four 
hours, while some informants were visited several times. Only when the 
informants gave their explicit permission, the conversation was digitally 
recorded and identified in the dissertation. Some informants, especially 
in government agencies, preferred off-the-record interviews or requested 
anonymity for some part of the interview – a circumstance that reflects 
the sensitivity of the ongoing project. I posed at least three common 
questions in a semi-structured interview, including: 
1) What are the goals and roles of your agency in the decision making 
process on hydropower development, especially related to the 
Xayaburi HPP? 
2) How do you work with other agencies in this case? 
3) Do you know about and what do you think of the regionalization 
of hydropower through regional power trade and transnational 
investment in the framework of GMS and ASEAN? 
These main questions aimed to get a deeper understanding of three 
points: the roles of actors in hydropower development, the relations 
among these actors and actors’ perspectives on regionalism in relation to 
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their agencies. Moreover, various specific questions, related to 
background stories and current issues, generally followed on the three 
main questions in order to obtain more details from each informant.  
The researcher was a visiting researcher at the Initiative for 
Sustainable Hydropower Unit (ISH) of the Mekong River Commission 
Secretariat (MRCS) in Vientiane from March to April 2014. The ISH is a 
crosscutting hydropower policy and planning unit that coordinates 
related MRC programs in the field of fisheries, environment, flood 
management and basin development planning. The position at ISH was 
useful for understanding the practical perspective of professionals in an 
international organization on water governance. The researcher was 
introduced to staff of other units that were relevant to this study, 
including the International Cooperation and Communication Section 
(ICCS), which is the focal point in the public consultation process on the 
Xayaburi dam, and the Basin Development Plan Program (BDP), which 
is the MRCS’s coordinator for policy planning, and is responsible for 
integrating water and energy sectors as well as other regional 
development frameworks.  
Data was processed through interpretative analysis, on the basis of 
which perceptions and practices of actors related to the case study were 
interpreted (Andrade 2009; George and Bennett 2005). Based on the 
conceptual framework, the analysis identified actors involved in 
governance, with a focus on decision-making processes. Secondary data, 
including statistics and excerpts from books and articles, were used to 
validate the interpretation of interviews and observations. Historical 
analysis proved helpful for interpreting the structure of relations among 
actors and the causal mechanism underlying empirical events.  
 
1.4 Structure of the dissertation 
 
The dissertation is organized into six chapters. After this introduction, 
the second chapter presents a discussion of various theoretical 
approaches and discusses three groups of concepts. The first section 
presents the political economy of water nationalism and marketization in 
relation to TWG and its application to hydropower development. The 
second section discusses the transformation of state and the way in 
which the state facilitates market building. This discussion focuses on the 
concept of the regulatory state, especially in developing countries. The 
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third section explains how emerging regionalism and regionalization 
provide the conditions for market building and state transformation. 
Finally, the chapter concludes with the formulation of an analytical 
framework, which integrates the concepts in order to understand the 
relations between TWG and regionalism in the Mekong Basin. 
The third chapter presents the political economy of hydropower 
development, with a focus on the Mekong Basin. It firstly gives some 
background on the global trend of large dam construction and 
hydropower development and shows why this particular sector has 
recently met support from some actors and opposition from others, 
especially in the developing world. The next part describes the Mekong 
Basin as a region with fast growing hydropower development. The case 
of the Upper Mekong dams in China is mentioned in order to 
understand its influence on projects on the Lower Mekong. The 
background, perceptions and potential impacts of the Xayaburi project 
are discussed to demonstrate how the global trend of hydropower 
development is reflected in recent developments in the Lower Mekong 
Basin.  
The attention to dam construction in the Lower Mekong Basin is 
linked to broader discussions of regionalism and regional water 
governance, particularly in hydropower development – this is the theme 
of the fourth chapter. Chapter 4 contextualizes regionalism in the 
Mekong region, referring to the notions of old and new regionalism, but 
argues that existing Mekong regionalism is mixed and has developed in 
its own way. The chapter discusses three major regional institutions in 
the basin: the GMS, ASEAN, and the MRC. The chapter presents the 
roles of the former two institutions, and their emphasis on regional 
market building, especially in the energy sector. The MRC, the sole 
TWG framework in the region, is discussed with regard to its 
governance and its significance for the hydropower sector. The particular 
case of the regional consultative process of the Xayaburi project is 
presented in the final part to illustrate how existing regional governance 
frameworks deal with the increasing importance of transboundary 
aspects of the dam.  
The fifth chapter presents an analysis of Laos and the Xayaburi 
project as an illustration of how state and non-state actors pursue their 
interests through regionalism. The chapter starts by presenting the great 
hydropower potential in Laos encompassing and the relations between 
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Laos and its biggest partner in power trade, Thailand. The next section 
explains the structure and process of hydropower governance, both at 
national and regional level.  The final part of the chapter discusses the 
role of the state in decision making on the project and the relations of 
the state to non-state actors involved in the project, which are 
increasingly involved in governance issues across borders as a result of 
expanding transboundary development. 
The last chapter concludes this dissertation and consists of three 
sections. The first one answers the research questions by paying 
attention to the revitalization of hydropower development, the building 
of regulatory regionalism, the transformation of market-state relations, 
and the opportunities and threats of ongoing processed of regionalism. 
The second part draws implications from the findings and formulates 
some lessons learnt for theoretical and policy perspectives that relate to 
regionalism and the TWG of hydropower development. The third part 
proposes a potential research agenda by focusing on the implications of 
the research findings presented in this dissertation. 
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Theorizing Transboundary 
Hydropower Governance 
and Regionalism  
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
International relations have gradually been transformed as a result of the 
increasing influence of private firms and social movements, which seems 
to have limited the role of the state as prime mover of development. In 
various regions, rapid economic growth and high capital accumulation 
have led to the expansion of investments by transnational firms in 
neighbouring countries because of geographical proximity or the 
availability of cheap labour and natural resources. The growth of 
economic transactions caused by that investment has intensified 
regionalization, and this is often supported by policies of states that favour 
market-led regional economic integration.  
While this process seems to reflecting the globalization of the market 
system, based on a common set of economic policies, including 
liberalization, privatization and deregulation, the role of the state is not 
necessarily in decline, but is being transformed. Some states deliberately 
limit themselves in the execution of developmental functions and focus on 
providing facilities for the market and for capital mobility, especially by 
liberalizing the financial system, as reflected e.g., in the securitization of 
mortgage debt and the creation of derivative markets (Harvey 2010: 85). 
This global phenomenon, however, has developed unevenly,   
particularly in developing countries. In order to overcome the crises 
resulting from political conflicts, economic downturns or post-socialist 
reforms in the 1970s and 1980s, many states have accepted international 
assistance for structural adjustment, which came accompanied by a set of 
market-oriented policies. The transformation of the state, reflected in its 
facilitating role for the market, inevitably changes the state’s role in the 
development of natural resources, including water.  
In the Mekong Basin, both inter-state institutions such as the ADB and 
states – national government and their agencies – have eagerly promoted 
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the involvement of the private sector in hydropower development. One 
would expect that hydropower development on the Mekong mainstream, 
as a transboundary watercourse, may lead to international tensions that 
require transboundary water governance (TWG). Nonetheless, as was 
discussed in the former chapter, regional governance in the Mekong Basin 
remains fragmented and loosely organized, despite the rapid growth of 
economic transactions in the region.  
This study attempts to develop an alternative explanation about the 
relationship between the TWG of hydropower development and 
regionalism. In order to arrive at such an explanation, this dissertation uses 
a combination of governance and international political economy 
perspectives for exploring the structure and process of social interactions 
and their driving forces in the highly politicized context of regionalism and 
TWG. Such politicization derives from several forces, from global 
capitalism to regional economic interdependence, to nation-state building. 
The governance approach focuses on basic issues in hydropower 
development, i.e., what are the rules, who creates them, and why and how 
are they exercised. By focusing on governance processes, for instance 
related to decision making on hydropower projects, we may transcend the 
rigid dichotomy between domestic and international affairs that separates 
debates on regionalism from those on the nature of the state.  
 This thesis assumes that an interpretation of regionalism in the Mekong 
Basin needs to be connected to the dynamics of state transformation, as 
this brings about changes in power relations affecting hydropower 
governance. Three interconnected questions guide the analysis of state 
transformation in this study. Firstly, why and how does the transformation 
of water into tradable hydropower change a river basin into a 
regional/international market? Secondly, because the state plays an 
important role in that process, how is the state transformed to facilitate 
market building, especially in developing countries? Thirdly, why and how 
is the transformation of the state related to regionalism, which ultimately 
shapes the TWG in the region? The latter is the primary question of this 
study. 
The chapter discusses the answers to those questions in four sections. 
The first section presents the political economy of water nationalism and 
marketization and its influence on TWG, particularly in hydropower 
development. The second part discusses the rise of the regulatory state. 
The third section highlights the emergence of regionalism and contrasts 
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the two waves of old and new regionalism, showing that the latter 
provides favourable conditions for market building and state 
transformation. The final part synthesizes for the various elements into 
an analytical framework for understanding the relations between the 
TWG of hydropower development and regionalism in the Mekong Basin. 
 
2.1 Transforming water for energy 
 
2.1.1 Water nationalism and marketization  
 
Attempts to Control watercourses with dams and reservoirs have been 
part of human civilization for a long time. However, the global 
expansion of large dam construction has begun in the middle of the 
twentieth century after significant improvements had been achieved in 
engineering skills, construction technology and hydrologic analysis. 
Noticeably, that expansion occurred at the same time as the growth of 
nation-states. Governments have traditionally taken a leading role in the 
decision-making on and development of large dams because their 
construction usually involves complex projects that require large-scale 
funding, sophisticated technologies, a large amount of labour and 
complicated governance arrangements (McCully 2001).  
Moreover, the construction of large dams may be considered as a tool 
in the process of nation-state building; this understanding may help to 
explain  the interconnected roles of the state in domestic and 
international politics. At the domestic level, ruling elites may portray 
mega-infrastructural projects including dams as symbols of national 
identity and progress, and use this to support their claim to legitimacy on 
the right to rule the state. At the international level, the damming of 
transboundary watercourses may lead to tensions among riparian states 
not only because of the  impact of such projects, but also because of the 
conflict about the sovereignty over water resources that is the result of 
these activities (Menga 2015, 2016).  
 Seen in this perspective, transboundary hydropower development on 
the Mekong mainstream may be influenced by water nationalism, which 
may be understood as the belief in the state’s ability to control and 
confirm national sovereignty over water. According to Allouche (2005: 
14), two processes essentially drive water nationalism. First, the process of 
nation-building involves the proclamation of sovereignty and the will to 
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make territory and natural resources national, or in other words, to 
exclude them from control by other sovereign entities. Second, the 
process of state-building fuels the desire to gain control over natural 
resources and territory for economic and security reasons. State-building is 
connected to the control over water in three ways: it changes water from a 
local into a national issue, it leads to the centralization of water governance 
with the establishment of a national administration, and it legalizes water 
ownership to affirm the legality of the state (Allouche 2005: 115). These 
processes transform water into a strategic resource for national 
development. 
 Water nationalism, however, does not simply lead to a state monopoly 
over power, nor does it automatically confirm its legitimacy. On the 
contrary, some states are outward looking and need external actors to 
support their national ambition, particularly when they are poor and face 
serious limits in controlling and developing their water resources. In the 
Mekong Basin, for example, states have reacted to that difficulty by 
creating regional frameworks for the exchange of resources beyond 
national borders. As noted above, the government of Laos has portrayed 
itself as the Battery of Asia and is aiming to export hydroelectricity. At 
the same time, the government of Thailand launched the Green Isan 
policy, which aims to develop the drought-prone northeastern region, 
among others by the development of a water grid that will channel water 
from Laos (Molle and Floch 2008). Through these dynamics, a 
transnational market of water is being created.  
The transformation of water, from a publicly or freely accessible 
resource into a tradable commodity, starts from a traditional view on 
water. Many people are used to see water as renewable and plentiful; 
however, fears over freshwater scarcity and environmental degradation 
have increased the awareness about the use of water. Fears are fed by the 
concept of the tragedy of the commons, which was developed by Garrett 
Hardin (1968). Hardin argued that that the assumption of the open access 
of resources by individuals in the pursuit of self-interest leads to the 
overexploitation of shared resources such as water. Advocates of water 
marketization argue that the market can respond to the problem by 
creating more efficient allocation among water users than political units 
such as states or provinces (Iyer 2008: 27-28). The World Bank (2015a) 
has argued that effective and efficient water governance mechanisms 
525758-L-bw-Chattranond
Processed on: 29-10-2018 PDF page: 38
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 2 
  
  
27 
should be put in place, including the pricing of water and the financing 
of water services.  
 According to McCully (2001), the market entered relatively late into 
debates of large dams, which typically used to be dominated by struggles 
of social movements against state-led hydropower development projects. 
Management of water through the market is only one of four major 
approaches to water governance, which can be classified on the basis of 
the perspectives and interests of actors. First, water can be seen as a 
human right, which implies that it should be equitably and affordably 
accessible as a basic need to all human beings. Second, water as a socio-
ecological good is not only crucial for human beings but also for the 
environmental integrity of other living creatures that share the ecosystem. 
Third, water can be seen as an economic good that should be tradable in a 
market and commoditized for maximum efficient use.  Fourth, water may 
be considered to be a sector in natural resources management, which 
focuses on the integrated, effective and efficient management of water in 
relation to other sectors such as land and fisheries, and to natural systems, 
for instance watersheds or transboundary basins (Miranda et al 2011). The 
fourth approach of integrated management, which is popular among water 
experts in river basin organizations, including the MRC (Hirsch 2012), is 
also influenced by other approaches, particularly the market one. 
The marketization concept has become increasingly influential in the 
water sector as one of the pillars in Integrated Water Resources 
Management (IWRM), a dominant paradigm of water governance 
launched at the International Conference on Water and Environment in 
Dublin as a planning process for the 1992 Earth Summit. The fourth 
guiding principle of the Dublin Statement on Water and Sustainable 
Development stated that: 
 
Water has an economic value in all its competing uses and should be 
recognised as an economic good…Past failure to recognize the economic 
value of water has led to wasteful and environmentally damaging uses of the 
resources. Managing water as an economic good is an important way of 
achieving efficient and equitable use, and of encouraging conservation and 
protection of water resources. (Salman and Bradlow 2006: 170-71) 
 
Conca (2006: 215-216) explains that water marketization does not simply 
refer to the privatization or pricing of water but broadly covers the 
process of providing economic and policy infrastructures for treating 
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water as a commodity. He notes that there are visible elements to 
identify water marketization, including (1) the establishment of private 
property rights over water use; (2) the pricing of water to recover the full 
costs of the operation, infrastructure, production, treatment and delivery 
of water; (3) the creation and utilization of market mechanisms for the 
exchange of water-related goods and services; (4) the growth of private 
actor involvement and enhancement of their investment in water-related 
sectors; (5) the policies of liberalizing or facilitating water trade and 
transfer across natural basins or international borders; (6) the declining 
roles of the state in some traditional functions, for instance water service 
provision, regulation and maintenance.  
The process of water marketization is impossible without intervention 
by the state, at least through regulation. The state, which used to be seen 
as a traditional water supplier and a provider of public welfare,4 is crucial 
for the implementation of those market elements. Water marketization 
has not only been accommodated by private sectors; in contrast, it has 
been pushed and supported by regulations and governance of the state 
agencies, e.g., legislative and judicial bodies, state enterprises, and local 
authorities. Water marketization can be seen as form of capitalist 
expansion across social relations, including international affairs. Even 
though the role of the state may have become less important for delivering 
welfare and development, the state has become a crucial mechanism in 
driving marketization. 
There are three significant reasons explaining this changing role of the 
state, especially for governments in developing countries (Conca 2006: 
219-226). Firstly, many countries with limited developmental capacity 
need to attract capital and technology from private and foreign investors 
to realize their development goals. Secondly, states have become subject 
to the external influence from international financial institutions (IFIs) 
such as the World Bank Group, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
and the Asian Development Bank (ADB), which have consistently 
pushed their neoliberal economic approach of structural adjustment.  
                                                          
4According to Edgar (2005: 861) traditional state functions performed by a government 
or its subcontractors basically have three purposes, including: ensuring public access to 
essential goods and services; ensuring compliance of service providers to public 
expectations and constitutional rules; and preventing (private) actors with market power 
from exploiting their consumers or the public. 
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The third reason is the liberalization of trade and investment, pushed 
by both the World Trade Organization (WTO) at the global level and 
regional integration agreements. This process facilitates the international 
transfer of goods and services by allowing transnational companies 
(TNCs) access to domestic markets. Such TNCs have thus become both 
local providers of electricity and, through their cross-border activities,  
regional suppliers of exportable hydropower. Price guarantees, 
investment area promotion, tax exemption and full-cost recovery for 
provided services are standard instruments of host governments to 
attract domestic and international private investment in water-related 
development. 
The international water market, where water resources are tradable 
across national borders, has become increasingly important. 
Traditionally, water is fundamental for food production and livelihoods 
in all societies, so it represents a basic source of welfare and national 
security. Although fresh water is abundant and renewable across the 
world, the uneven geographical distribution of water causes water 
deficits in one area and surpluses in another.  Without the international 
market, any country  is dependent on local water for the production of 
food, energy, and related goods. Allan and Mirumachi (2010: 24) note 
that: 
 
The invisibles – trade/development and politics – actually underpin and 
shape political economy of water resources and of international relations 
over water. Trade in water intensive commodities reduces conflict over 
water with neighboring riparians and makes armed conflict 
unnecessary….Water scarce economies have found solutions in global 
markets. The extent to which an economy can mobilize socio economic 
development that enables international trade determines its water security 
and the nature of inter-riparian contention over transboundary water in the 
world at peace.  
 
The situation is more complicated when a downstream country relies 
on the water flowing from its neighbour upstream. It makes the 
domestic management of water more difficult and creates international 
tensions. To avoid such tensions, a country may choose to improve the 
efficiency of water use and the productivity of less-water consuming 
crops, generate water by using technologies like desalination, divert 
watercourses, or import food or water from other areas (Wachtel 2007: 
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147). In the eyes of the advocates of the market, trade among countries 
with different endowments and needs could lessen water tensions and 
prevent international conflict.  
However, the assumptions related to the building of an international 
market for water are problematic because of some fundamental 
characteristics of water. Firstly, because water is basic to welfare and 
customarily attached to the survival of societies, transboundary water 
trade sounds threatening to national security and the political legitimacy 
of the state. Secondly, the water system recognizes no borders. Both 
surface and ground water often runs across political boundaries and 
make property rights over international watercourses often unclear.  
Thirdly, originating from the former two problems, states typically 
provide their people free or affordable access to water at subsidized 
prices (or indirectly through agricultural subsidies), and this makes it 
difficult for market-based water pricing to precisely express domestic 
scarcities (Wachtel 2007: 149-151). Fourth, as commented by Ballabh 
(2008: 8), water is a bundle of rights that mixes private and public uses. 
This implies that marketization, which emphasizes the economic value of 
water, may threaten public access to water when the state enables foreign 
private developers to exploit water for profit. 
The World Bank has embraced a so-called multi-stakeholder 
approach to natural resources and the environment, which leads to the 
inclusion of ministries, international organizations and NGOs into its 
policy networks, and has incorporated ‘green’ ideas on conservation and 
sustainability into national governance and development projects. 
Nonetheless, on the basis of a case study in Laos, Goldman (2005) 
concluded that the World Bank employs the notion of the ‘green 
economy’ to legitimize its development hegemony and neoliberal 
reforms. Büscher and Fletcher (2014) have argued that, over the last two 
decades, both public and private actors have increasingly used the 
environment as part of accumulation strategies in conservation and have 
claimed that this is a way to counter the negative impacts of capitalism 
itself. Hydropower, promoted by the World Bank, governments, and 
private firms as a low-carbon and renewable source of energy, also seems 
to be an illustration of this trend. 
The discussion above illustrates that the complex of interests involved 
in water infrastructure developed has increasingly blurred the 
dichotomies of public and private , and of domestic and international 
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affairs. Increasingly, infrastructure projects show that private companies 
take over functions that previously were performed by governments, 
while state agencies serve the commercial interests of companies across 
national borders. The explanation of such trends is complicated when, as 
in hydropower development, one has to engage with transboundary 
practices, as these bring in the dimension of regional governance.  
 
2.1.2 Hydropower development and transboundary water 
governance 
 
The management of natural resources is one of the traditional functions 
of the state, and it is here that the command and control approach has 
been prominent. As argued above, however, the market has increasingly 
become important to water governance. Governance is a complex and 
contested concept, but two early definitions provided by global 
organizations signify its influence in international development. While 
the World Bank (1992: 1) proposed a definition of public sector 
governance as “the manner in which power is exercised in the 
management of a country’s economic and social resources for 
development”, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP 
1997: 2-3) defined governance as “the exercise of economic, political and 
administrative authority to manage a country’s affairs at all levels. It 
comprises the mechanisms, processes and institutions, through which 
citizens and groups articulate their interests, exercise their legal rights, 
meet their obligations and mediate their differences.” While these 
definitions are relatively old, they are still widely used by influential 
global institutions. The World Bank emphasizes development as an 
objective of governance, whereas the UNDP’s version focuses more on 
the scope, scale, and actors involved with governance beyond the state.  
 Compatible with the Bank’s and UNDP’s definitions of governance, 
the Global Water Partnership defined water governance as “the range of 
political, social, economic and administrative systems that are in place to 
develop and manage water resources, and the delivery of water services, 
at different levels of society” (Rogers and Hall 2003: 16).  In a narrower 
sense, water governance is the complex of  interactions among actors in 
decision-making processes on the development and management of 
water resources in order to serve their different or competitive interests. 
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Understood in this way, water governance appears to be much more a 
political rather than a technocratic issue (De Stefano et al 2014). 
 These definitions illustrate the basic dilemma of water governance, 
which combines a concern with the maximization of benefits from water 
use and with attention to management in order to control water usage in 
recognition of water scarcity. Both dimensions are not clearly separable 
but this study makes an analytical distinction between water governance 
and water management, in the sense that the former is more related with 
political processes of decision making at policy levels, while the latter is 
more focused on the technical implementation of those policies at 
operational levels.  
As discussed in the last section, IWRM is a mainstream concept in 
water governance that advocates more involvement of the private 
sectors: this involves the use of technical tools such as cost-benefit 
analysis and information sharing; water pricing mechanisms; and the 
promotion of public participation, local engagement and international 
collaboration. Gat (2007) has argued that regional cooperation is 
preferred because the optimal and sustainable use of transboundary 
water needs a holistic approach for water management, which requires 
shared planning, scientific analysis, and operation by stakeholders who 
share the water system. Whereas watersheds or river basins would be the 
logical object of water governance, most watersheds are subjected to 
fragmented jurisdictions and governance of states. Many authors have 
argued that, therefore, integrated regional governance for the watershed 
should be created (Schlager and Blomquist 2008: 1 as cited in Huitema 
and Meijerink 2014: 5). 
Nonetheless, the approach of IWRM encounters a traditional state-
centric approach, the so-called ‘hydrological mission’, according to which 
the building of a modern state requires large-scale infrastructure 
development and centralized national-state based governance. The 
emphasis on more integrated social and ecological aspects in IWRM also 
emphasizes economic development pushed by the state (Jaspers and 
Gupta 2014; Gupta 2009). An important issue is, that while IWRM 
promotes a participatory and multi-stakeholder approach, the existing 
fragmented governance in the Mekong Basin requires more centralized 
and integrated management among states. Yet, such management is 
often a top-down process, which is very focused on technical best-
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practice approaches, and neglects the political and cultural aspects of 
social relations (Hirsch 2012).  
While many international organizations and governments promote 
the marketization of water, national policies on water governance are 
usually state-centric. Jaspers and Gupta (2014) argue that river basin 
organizations (RBOs) have evolved from local regulatory bodies to 
transboundary arrangements, such as in supranational agreements of the 
Water Directive Framework in the European Union and the United 
Nations Convention on the Law of Non-Navigational Uses of 
International Watercourses 1997. However, most of the RBOs are 
intergovernmental cooperation mechanisms that provide technical and 
decision-making support, while real decisions are usually made through 
diplomatic channels between governments. This characteristic of 
international cooperation mechanisms exposes the limitations to TWG 
in two ways, i.e., through scale mismatch and capacity mismatch.  
According to Karkkainen (2005: 75-76) the two mismatches are 
deeply related to the state system. The scale mismatch relates to the 
state’s political boundary that usually does not correspond with the 
natural boundary of resources such as watersheds or fresh water basins. 
Since sovereign states may share only part of a basin, the governance of 
waters may depend on collective action and therefore be weak or absent. 
By contrast, large states may find that just a part or a region shares the 
international basin, and for that reason the central government may have 
less interest in and concern for environmental problems that occur 
mainly at the local level and affect only part of the population. 
Capacity mismatch is another fundamental problem. It implies that 
states lack the resources and knowledge to manage ecosystems located 
within or beyond their own boundaries. Following conventional 
regulatory approaches to governance, it is relatively easy to establish rules, 
but it may be more difficult to enforce them.  
 Huitema and Meijerink (2014: 1-3) have argued that, since governance 
of modern states is usually organized spatially at local, national, and 
international levels or functionally through bureaucratic departments, it is 
always difficult to achieve integrated water governance within such 
systems. There are a few exceptions, such as the water boards in the 
Netherlands that predated the modern state system that came into being 
between the eighteenth and the twentieth century. While the state has 
traditionally claimed a formal monopoly in water governance, and its role 
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expanded after the Second World War, this role seems to have been 
changing since the 1980s, with non-state actors, including private 
companies, civil society and international organizations, taking a more 
important place.  
Although it is unquestionable that non-state actors increasingly play an 
important role in water governance at all levels, it is the change in power 
relations between state and non-state actors that actually matters. The 
rising importance of water marketization, which influences the mainstream 
approach to TWG, has not only challenged state control over resources 
and territory but has also impacted on the transformation of the state. As 
discussed earlier, there are reasons why some states may support the 
transformation in market-state relations – for instance, because of the 
influence of international donors, limitations experienced in domestic 
governance, or the changing context of economic liberalization and 
regional integration. The transformation in market-state relations may 
eventually change the traditional role of the state in development. The 
next section discusses the transformation, which involves an increasing 
role of the market in the delivery of public goods, while purposefully 
limiting the role of state actors to the regulation of development. This 
transformation leads to the rise of the so-called regulatory state, which 
seems to be an emerging model in developing countries, and particularly in 
the case of Laos that is central to this study.  
 
2.2 Transforming the state for the market 
 
2.2.1 The emerging regulatory state  
 
In order to pursue its goals of water nationalism with a regionalist 
strategy built on the marketization of hydropower, the state needs to 
internalize regional governance precepts into domestic policies and 
regulations. This process of state (re)building requires a kind of 
governance that involves networks of public/private and  
domestic/international agencies that operate in transnational markets, 
while meanwhile safeguarding the domestic legitimacy of the state. This 
connects to the observation made by Netelenbos (2016: 256) that 
political legitimacy increasingly has to be achieved in a network society, 
where many actors participate in forms of transnational governance that 
cannot be understood only in terms of legal domination.  
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 This research applies the concept of the regulatory state to explain the 
form of regionalism, driven by market forces and lacking supranational 
power, that is embraced by a state with limited governance capacity like 
Laos. The regulatory state model reflects how the state deliberately 
constitutes the market (Jayasuriya 2013: 187) with a rule-based, 
technocratic and legal approach to economic governance, which  
emphasizes institutional self-regulation (Philips 2006: 24). The model is 
linked to neoliberalism, as an ideology or policy of economic 
development in favour of creating as many conditions as possible for 
free markets by removing as many restrictions as possible on 
competition and the empowerment of market agents (Gamble 2001: 
132). In a nutshell, it is a model of limited government that puts 
administrative and economic efficiency first and provides public services 
but does not produce them (Seidman and Gilmour 1986: 119 as cited in 
Levi-Faur 2011: 7). 
Though the regulatory state conceptually follows the principle of ‘less 
government, more efficiency’ and signals the decline of Keynesian 
interventionism, of its practices do not imply that the state has handed 
over all responsibility for development. Market reform is embedded in 
regulatory institutions that impose market rules and norms on the private 
sector. Thus, the changing role of the state in the economy implies re-
regulation rather than de-regulation. Moreover, the regulatory state 
framework is theoretically linked to the Neo-Weberian approach, which 
considers the state as a strong steering mechanism in society and not 
really as a burden to the market. Participation of the private sector is not 
automatically prioritized but selectively employed by the state, which 
steadily transforms and continues to regulate the economy and society as 
a partner or guarantor of economic and social development (Pollitt 2008: 
14).   
It should be noted that the concept of the regulatory state has 
different meanings at different moments and places.  It was launched in 
the US in a study of federal governance,5 and then applied in the EU as a 
                                                          
5 In the US, the term was originally used in studies of administrative law and public 
administration before the Second World War for the system of decentralized agencies 
that were responsible to Congress and operated under specific legislation with clear 
mandate and power. However, the distinction between regulatory governance and 
service provision by federal agencies in the US became unclear because they decided 
increasingly to outsource administrative functions (Levi-Faur 2011: 5-6).  
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principle of regional–national governance relations. The European 
perspective of the regulatory state, dating back to the 1980s, is relevant 
to some aspects of regionalism in this study. Majone (1996) argued that, 
because the EU has a limited budget and taxation capacity compared to 
its member states, it has difficulties to implement non-regulatory policies 
such as subsidies and welfare delivery. Therefore, the EU has instead 
focused on its regulatory roles to respond to the demands of its 
stakeholders that national governments cannot meet. Private companies 
tend to support the EU’s regulations to reduce the costs of inconsistent 
and varying national standards for their transnational business. Civil 
society may prefer regional level regulation when their demand for 
environmental protection is not met by national governments. Even EU 
member states may feel they can better serve their national interests in 
negotiations with other countries via regional regulation making. 
To understand the transforming state in Asia it is useful to contrast 
the regulatory state to the developmental state model, which has been 
used to explain the rapid growth in East Asian economies in the 1980s 
and 1990s. Johnson (1982) made one of the earliest comparisons 
between the developmental state and the regulatory state in a study of 
Japanese industrial policy. In his view, Japan’s state-guided capitalism 
prioritized development and employed the bureaucracy to reign in 
business activities. He made the following observation on Japan’s 
‘economic miracle’: 
 
The issue is not one of state intervention in the economy. All states 
intervene in their economies for various reasons…The United States is a 
good example of a state in which the regulatory orientation predominates, 
whereas Japan is a good example of a state in which the developmental 
orientation predominates. A regulatory, or market-rational, state concerns 
itself with the forms and procedures –  the rules if you will – in economic 
competition but it does not concern itself with substantive matters (Johnson 
1982: 17-19). 
 
In a more recent observation, Jarvis (2014: 72) explained the 
difference between the regulatory and the developmental state in the 
following way: 
 
Unlike its predecessor, the regulatory state is a more circumspect 
 one, focused on the efficient management of monetary policy, the 
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 stabilization of inflation and interest rates, balancing national fiscal 
 accounts, and setting in place the parameters for market expansion 
 through private sector capital formation and efficient market operation.  
 The discourses of national politics reflect this change with political 
 elites judged on the basis of their abilities to ‘manage’ the economy, 
 create optimal investment conditions, attract investment capital, 
 secure the blessings of rating agencies, and make markets work by 
 sustaining private sector interest. 
 
In Southeast Asia, the emphasis on the regulatory state is a reflection 
of the weak capacity of regional institutions for policy implementation, 
interests of private firms to reduce market barriers, demands from civil 
society for alternative political platforms, and efforts of member states to 
formulate regional policies and regulations in order to combine their 
individual interests. The rise of the regulatory state in Southeast Asia has 
taken place against the background of the market-oriented reforms 
introduced by the socialist states of the Mekong region (Laos, Cambodia 
and Vietnam) since the late 1980s and the relative decline of the 
developmental state model in other parts of the region (notably, 
Singapore, Malaysia and Thailand) after the Asian financial crisis of 1997, 
when these countries faced pressures for reform (Stubbs 2012: 95). 
 
2.2.2 The regulatory state in developing countries  
 
Although the concept of the regulatory state was rooted in the 
governance models of the US and the EU, the idea later trickled down to 
developing countries, which lacked the capacity to provide public welfare 
and implement socio-economic development policies. Some developing 
countries have been labelled as ‘non-developmental states’, and are 
characterised by dominant patron-client relations, high dependence on 
foreign aid and natural resource revenues, as well as undemocratic 
political systems that lacking checks and balances. The colonial legacies 
and relations with developed economies often contribute to the weak 
governance of newly independent states (Moore 2001). Some of the 
characteristics of the non-developmental state reflect the syndrome of 
what Evans (1995) has called the ‘predatory state’, where any form of 
Weberian rational-legal bureaucracy is absent and positive ties between 
the state and private actors are lacking. For Evans, while a 
developmental state intervenes in the market and promotes its private 
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sector with a view to long-term economic transformation, the predatory 
state tends to serve only the short-term self-interests of the elites. 
Dubash and Morgan (2012: 267-275) have identified three driving 
forces for the transfer of the regulatory state to developing countries. 
Firstly, external pressures, especially from international financial 
institutions (IFIs), have pushed developing countries to adopt the model 
of regulatory agencies as public authorities, ideally independent from 
other arms of government, which regulate and supervise some specific 
sector on behalf of the state, especially for infrastructure development 
that usually involves private investment and state intervention. The 
establishment of regulatory agencies has often been part of the loan 
conditions imposed on developing countries as part of dominant 
neoliberal policies during the period of the Washington Consensus in the 
1980s and 1990s (Williamson 1990). The conditions deliberately 
transplanted some norms and standards, such as the ‘greening 
governance’ model advocated by the World Bank for the transparent, 
accountable and independent regulation of environment-related sectors 
(Goldman 2005). Such mechanisms have spread out through networks 
of international consultants and technocrats who tried to push ‘apolitical 
and technocratic’ institutional reforms to facilitate privatization and 
liberalization in the recipient countries. 
 Secondly, some developing countries experienced a limited capacity to 
implement the demand for regulatory reform. There are two dimensions 
of this limited capacity: the so-called ‘thin’ and ‘thick’ issues (Dubash and 
Morgan 2012: 272-275). The thin issues include limited budget, technical 
and human resources, while the thick issues relate to the growing 
pressure on the state to manage multiple forms of engagement with 
diverse stakeholders in order to balance competing concerns of growth, 
efficiency, and redistribution. The evolution of the regulatory state can 
be seen in infrastructure development in sectors such as 
telecommunications, electricity and water. As a result, developing 
countries often find foreign capital and resources desirable to 
compensate for this shortage; the state tends to provide the regulatory 
framework to facilitate foreign involvement.  
Thirdly, in settings of poor or even non-existent infrastructure, the 
regulatory state is tasked with redistribution through governance by 
independent agencies, which claiming their legitimacy on the basis of 
depoliticized expertise. The model is based on a separation between 
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independent, depoliticized regulatory agencies that implement policies 
based on technical knowledge – e.g., regulatory boards for public 
services and administrative courts – and executive bodies and 
government agencies that are responsible for political, redistributive 
policies and are held to account politically by oversight institutions such 
as parliaments.  
After the discussion of the characteristics of the emerging regulatory 
state in the developing world, a critical question is whether state power is 
inevitably declining in view of the increasingly important role of the 
market. As argued by Jayasuriya (2013), regulatory reform seems to have 
significantly ‘reshaped’ but not essentially ‘diminished’ the power of 
state. He argued that: 
 
Under the impact of transnational markets and regimes, regulatory state 
leads to varied patterns of class formation. Such transnational regulation not 
only gives rise to new interests but also helps to protect existing patterns of 
interests and power within new configurations of regulation. (Jayasuriya 
2013: 190) 
 
The formation of the regulatory state signifies the transformation of 
the state in response to marketization in several ways. Firstly,  in market-
state relations, public and private affairs cannot be clearly separated 
because some state functions, such as the provision of public goods, are 
shared with or transferred to private actors. Secondly, in relation to 
TWG, when water systems and water markets operate transnationally, 
domestic and international governance become overlapping and it 
becomes difficult for any state to effectively regulate them within the 
national boundary. Thirdly, however, any state can still claim legitimacy 
on the basis of its roles in rule making and market regulation, 
theoretically in the public interest. A weak state with limited governance 
capacity may partially fulfil the state’s developmental function with 
private involvement. Finally, the external influence of IFIs and foreign 
aid may promote the regulatory state approach in compliance with global 
and regional norms that stimulate globalization and regionalization.  
The global spread of economic and governance reforms since the late 
1980s, related to privatization, deregulation and liberalization, may not 
have led to the decrease of the role of the state as is often assumed. 
Braithwaite (2005) has argues that the neoliberal policy package may 
ideologically have promoted ‘freer markets, smaller government’ but may 
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practically have caused ‘freer markets, more rules’. The argument then is 
that the state has become less central in the provision of public goods 
and services, but that it has kept control over the expanding market, 
especially beyond its national borders, through extensive regulation that 
has transformed the relations between public and private affairs and 
favoured transnational economic interests. Yet, one cannot assume that 
the regulatory state has effectively replaced other models of governance. 
As argued by Levi-Faur (2013), the transformation of the state in a 
regulatory direction has mainly privileged national and international 
capital; hence, the dichotomy between the regulatory and the 
developmental state is not very clear-cut. 
While the regulatory state is an approach to governance pushed by 
global development institutions to further marketization, at the same 
time it seems to be a strategy for governments and state agencies to 
counter the declining role of the state. Attempts to push the regulatory 
state in developing countries creates a tension between the aim to 
transform the state and accommodate market building for achieving 
developmental goals, and the wish to maintain the  legitimacy of the state 
as the institution in control of national development, for which it 
requires a particular kind of regional governance. This study argues that 
the TWG of hydropower represents a form of regionalism that is 
modelled  by that tension. The enforcement of regionalization of the 
market by using the transformation of the state may facilitate the 
building of regional markets but at the same time may minimize the 
likelihood of power transfer to regional institutions that would lead to  a 
loss of power of the national governments. These are the building blocks 
of  a perspective to understand regionalism among developing countries.  
 
2.3 Transforming the state towards regionalism 
 
2.3.1 New regionalism and regionness 
 
Discussions of regionalism outside Europe are often overshadowed by 
the experiences of the European Union. This is caused possibly by the 
fact that most classical theories of regionalism, such as functionalism 
(Mitrany 1946), neo-functionalism (Haas 1970), inter-governmentalism 
(Hoffman 1966; Moravcsik 1993) and international regimes (Haas 1980; 
Krasner 1983), tend to focus on the institutionalization of inter-state 
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relations and the transfer of power from the national to the 
international/regional level – aspects that are primarily derived from 
Western European experiences. The Eurocentric bias of analyses of 
regionalism leads to prejudice against the informality of regionalism in 
Asia, which is usually based on non-legally binding cooperation, loosely 
structured organization, consultation and non-intervention, although 
these are the very aspects that have significantly contributed to the 
survival of regional institutions such as ASEAN (Acharya 2001;  
Söderbaum 2012).   
The end of the Cold War and the expansion of economic 
globalization have encouraged Asian regionalism (Beeson and Stubbs 
2012). Because of the importance of these turning points, this research 
employs the notion of ‘old and new regionalism’ in order to focus on the 
continuity and change of forces driving regionalism and the regional 
political economy. As was  introduced in the last chapter, the historical 
process of the Mekong Basin has turned the geographical area of river 
basin into an economic sub-region in Southeast Asia,  where a 
combination of old regionalism, which was initiated in the 1950s, and 
new regionalism, which  evolved since the mid-1980s, has influenced the 
nature of its regionalization. 
Old regionalism took shape in the bi-polar world order of the Cold 
War that led to the establishment of many regional groupings for 
political-security-military reasons. The US hegemonic role in the 1950s 
determined the characteristics of the early wave of regionalism in 
Southeast Asia, which saw the creation of the Mekong Committee (MC) 
and the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO). The MC was one 
of the attempts to contain communist expansion in Asia by promoting 
economic development in the LMB. The political motivation was 
obvious from the exclusion of communist China and isolated Burma 
(Nguyen 2006: 61). Hettne (1994) has argued that the objectives of the 
old type of regionalism were mainly related to trade and security. Such 
regionalism tended to be introverted and protectionist, based on 
exclusivity of membership, in the form of state-dominated 
intergovernmental organizations and usually imposed from the outside.  
The new regionalism6 is a global phenomenon, which is diverse in 
forms and degree of integration (Fawcett and Hurrell 1995). It is 
                                                          
6 It should be noted that there is a distinction between new regionalism as a topic of 
international political economy (IPE) here, and the new wave of regional economic 
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different from the old wave because of the transformation in the global 
political economy since the 1980s. According to Hettne and Söderbaum 
(2002: 33), its major driving force primarily was the move from the 
bipolar system of the Cold War to an increasingly multipolar world, 
which led to a redistribution of power and a changing division of labour 
in the world economy. The new type of regionalism was also partly a 
result of the growing economic interdependence that was gradually 
undermining the nation-state system, as well as of the changing attitudes 
towards neoliberal economic and political development in developing 
countries, including socialist and post-socialist states. 
The new regionalism has frequently resulted in deep economic 
integration with political elements of multilevel governance, occasionally 
combined with devolution within states, and a strong international legal 
framework and international cooperation across a variety of dimensions 
(Thakur and Van Langenhove 2008: 30). Unlike the old regionalism, the 
new wave has mostly emerged from regions themselves. Moreover, to 
some extent the new regionalism presupposes the growth of a regional 
civil society opting for regional solutions to local and national problems. 
It generates not only economic but also social and cultural networks, 
which are possibly developing faster than the formal political 
cooperation among states (Hettne 1994). The globalization of 
communication technologies and norms also seems to have driven the 
increasing integration of economic and social networks shaping new 
regionalism.  
Since there are no natural or given regions, regions are socially 
constructed and therefore always politically contested. Thus, regionalism 
needs to be understood as a political project (Hurrell 1995; Payne and 
Gamble 1996; Hettne 2005). Regional integration may be understood as 
the creation of a territorial unit that links socio-economic and natural 
systems like as river basins by refocusing territorial scales through 
multilevel governance (Conca 2006). In such situations, however, 
                                                                                                                                        
groupings as interpreted in neoliberal economic theory. The neoliberal interpretation 
perceives the new regionalism as a revival of trade promotion policies based on regional 
arrangements rather than global multilateralism. The latter, represented by the WTO, is 
seen as the best option for a wealthy world economy. New regionalism could either be 
a stepping-stone toward globalism or signify a revival of protectionism or 
interventionism that is considered undesirable to neoliberal advocates of globalization 
(Bhagwati 1998).   
 
525758-L-bw-Chattranond
Processed on: 29-10-2018 PDF page: 54
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 2 
  
  
43 
development is usually uneven among sectors. Glassman (2010: 40-
41)has argued that the regional framework in the Mekong Basin has 
brought together a group of countries with unevenly and selectively 
developed infrastructural sectors rather than resulting in  a coherent 
group tied together by the vicinity of all units to the Mekong River.  
Studying the ‘process’ of existing regionalism through the lens of 
regional governance in a particular sector is potentially a proper way of 
understanding the contested nature of the socially constructed region. 
The new regionalism approach does not just view the existence of an 
increasingly interdependent group of states as a sign of regionalism, but 
pays attention to how the region is defined.  
The emergence of a region implies that a relatively coherent territorial 
system emerges in a particular area and can be distinguished from other 
parts of the world. Hettne and Söderbaum (2002: 38) have attempted to 
capture this by introducing the concept of ‘regionness’, which is “the 
process whereby a geographical area is transformed from a passive 
object to an active subject, capable of articulating the transnational 
interests of the emerging region.” Regionness is categorized on a 
continuum with five levels with a certain evolutionary logic (Hettne and 
Söderbaum 2002: 39-45: 
1) Regional space - the geographical and ecological unit that is delimited 
by natural physical barriers and that forms the territorial basis for a 
functioning society. It needs increasing interaction among isolated 
societies to form a new social system.  
2) Regional complex - the social system which implies trans-local 
relations of a social, political, cultural and/or economic nature between 
human groups. This system may form a security complex in which 
constituent units are dependent on each other. In the nation-state system, 
when a state opens up to external relations, economic and social 
interaction tends to increase. However, the system cannot evolve if the 
interaction is based only on the self-interest of actors that cannot rely on 
a more rule-based and organized structure to serve collective and long-
term interests. 
3) Regional society - the rule-based and organized cooperation in any 
field that can be defined by the membership of a regional organization. 
Without such organized cooperation, the idea of regionalism does not 
make much sense. This level of regionness gives rise to the participation 
of non-state actors such as TNCs, NGOs and social movements.  
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4) Regional community - the regional civil society takes shape when 
formal institutional frameworks promote social communication and 
convergence of values and informal organization throughout the region. 
The community usually has a shared culture and a collective identity, 
which creates mutual trust among actors and turns the region into an 
active subject with the capacity to tackle regional issues in the formal 
community of states and the transnational community of civil society. 
5) Regional state - the region becomes an international actor on its own 
with a distinct identity, actor capability, legitimacy and decision making 
structure. Crucial areas of regional intervention are conflict resolution 
within and between states, the management of ecological systems and 
social welfare.  
As all regions are constructed, social processes such as nation-
building, political conflicts, economic downturns, ecological degradation, 
or globalization may cause the region to become more integrated or to 
disintegrate.  Regionness in Southeast Asia probably is attaining the level 
of regional society, thanks to the existence of many intergovernmental 
agreements and several formal cooperation schemes for regional 
development. However, most of agreements and institutions are not 
legally binding and it is unclear how social communication has 
converged in the region, since states are still dominating decision making 
processes in international affairs. While most states have embraced the 
globalization of the financial, investment and  trading systems pushed by 
‘the three sisters’ – the IMF, the World Bank Group, and the World 
Trade Organization (WTO) – regionalism is probably seen as an 
alternative for states to counter the global forces that are threatening to 
weaken their roles and power.  
Whereas the pressure from globalization seems to have led to a 
declining role of states, regionness in Southeast Asia has obtained 
distinct characteristics, which underlined the highly dominant role of 
states in regional governance arrangements. As noted by Hout (1996: 
173), “regionalism is the opposite tendency to globalization, since it 
involves the joint effort of several governments to recapture their 
sovereignty over economic policy, which has been eroded substantially 
by the globalization of business, production and finance.” Regionalism 
has become a strategy pursued by governments to deal with increasingly 
transnational issues and their interests at the regional level. In the 
context of Southeast Asia states are transnationally sharing their 
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developmental functions with the private sector but domestically 
expanding their regulatory power at the same time. Focusing on the 
Mekong Basin, this dissertation adopts this perspective in its search for 
the relationship between TWG in hydropower development and 
regionalism. The form of regional governance that has emerged in this 
context can be understood as regulatory regionalism.  
 
2.3.2 Regulatory regionalism and the state transformation 
 
Regulatory regionalism may be understood as a response against IR 
approaches that tend to overemphasize regional institutionalization and 
the transfer of power from states to supranational institutions. Those 
approaches tend to overlook the process of regionalization of 
development projects, where the role of the state has transformed from 
being a provider to being more of a regulator and system maintainer for 
expanding regionalization. Regulatory regionalism is not just about 
implementing economic reforms in favour of creating the best 
conditions for marketization, but also involves a transformation of the 
state under capitalism in line with increasing transnational interests and 
regulations (Jayasuriya 2015: 518-19). 
According to Hameiri and Jayasuriya (2012: 179) this transformation 
affects three interrelated dimensions of state power, including ‘shifts’ in 
the location of actual governance structures and the space where state 
power is exercised; in the kinds of actors who exercise that power; and in 
ideologies employed to legitimize it. They argue that the governance lens 
helps us identify the relevance of the regional order for market building 
processes and state transformation (seen as changes in the way in which 
political power is produced, reproduced and distributed within the state) in 
individual countries. This transformation leads to an explanation of 
regionalism that focuses more on regional policies applied at the national 
level rather than on inter-state interactions in supranational institutions. 
They define this kind of governance as regulatory regionalism as: 
 
a process of internal transformation that creates the appearance  of regional 
frontiers within the state’s policy and governance apparatuses. Regional 
governance, from this perspective, is not an agglomeration of national 
territorial and political units at a higher regional level. It is a more 
fundamental regionalization of economic and security issues. Emerging 
forms of regional regulation rely more on the active participation of national 
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agencies in the practices of regulation, than on formal international treaties 
or international organizations for their enforcement. (Hameiri and 
Jayasuriya 2012: 179) 
 
Jayasuriya (2015) has identified some examples of regulatory 
regionalism developed in Asia-Pacific. On migration issues, the 
Australian government has initiated regional agreements to externalize its 
border and security control by founding detention centres for migrants 
within other island countries. On financial matters, Asian countries 
agreed to share information with the regional financial surveillance 
framework developed by the ADB and the IMF under the Chiang Mai 
Initiative, a liquidity fund created in 2000 after the Asian financial crisis. 
In the Mekong Basin, the ADB has pushed its plan for regional market 
building, through incorporation into national policies and regulations, via 
its GMS program. The Chinese government also set up a national 
coordination group for the GMS, which has brought together various 
national agencies to foster the internationalization of business in the 
hydropower industry through the activities of state corporations attached 
to local governments. According to Hameiri (2013: 323), this is an 
important process that transforms the developmental state into a form 
of regulatory state. 
The transplantation of regional governance and policy making into 
domestic rules is crucial for the creation of a market-led regional 
economy, as well as for hydropower development in particular. This 
thesis argues that adopting regionalism for market building and 
expanding regional production systems, while minimizing power transfer 
to regional institutions, is a sound option for state actors that need to be 
in control of national development. This regional governance approach 
may provide an explanation of developments in the Mekong Basin where 
regulatory regionalism becomes a major strategy to realize and legitimize 
the marketization of transboundary hydropower.  
The case study of hydropower development in Laos reflects these 
elements. Although it is the smallest country in the region, both in terms 
of population and size of the economy, its hydropower industry has 
made the country very important for the development of the regional 
water and energy sector.  The ongoing extensive regulatory reforms in 
Laos coincided with the emergence of the market economy, which was 
highly dependent on foreign aid from the IFIs, most notably the World 
Bank and the ADB, and on investment from transnational private 
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companies, especially from neighbouring China, Vietnam and Thailand. 
The development of hydropower as Laos’s backbone industry 
demonstrates the logic of regionalism and the changing pattern of the 
intra-regional political economy, especially in the case of transboundary 
projects on the Mekong mainstream.  
 
2.4 Regulatory regionalism and transboundary water 
governance: an analytical framework 
 
A significant assumption linking regulatory regionalism to hydropower 
development is that regionalism has the potential to overcome two major 
problems of TWG.  These are: the distribution of water by the regional 
market mechanism, and the territorial control over water by regional 
governance institutions. In theory, regionalism promises to create a more 
integrative regulatory framework to facilitate regional market 
transactions. Alan and Mirumachi (2010) note that this process 
potentially reduces water tensions because countries may benefit from 
regional trade in water to reduce their reliance on domestic water supply. 
This research argues, however, that the process shaping regionalism is 
not only based on the technocratic logic of efficient water management. 
Although the basic principle of market efficiency was an important 
factor in the emergence of the regulatory state both in developed and 
developing countries, some characteristics of the latter group – such as 
the lack of capital, external economic dependence, and limited 
governance capacity – have created a different dynamics behind the 
formation of the regulatory state, which deviates from its original 
purpose. Because regionalism potentially meets the developmental needs 
of some countries, especially the weaker and smaller ones, the model of 
the regulatory state offers more benefits to them than the developmental 
state model. With state activities mainly focused on the introduction of 
forms of regulation that attract and facilitate national and foreign 
investors, the ensuing results in the form of transnational trade and 
investment are expected to trickle down to their population.  
In this case, state actors take advantage of the expansion of 
regionalization that encourages the growth of capital flows. The political 
project of regionalism, which supports marketization, enhances political 
legitimacy by contributing to stronger decision making and regulation in 
the case of development projects. So-called regulatory regionalism tends to 
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influence TWG in the Mekong Basin by technically strengthening regional 
governance for integrated water management; yet, it is dominated 
politically by state-led regionalism aimed at the marketization of water in 
the form of hydropower. The states and state-led regional institutions 
such as ASEAN and the GMS together create policies and regulations in 
order to facilitate and control the regionalization of economic 
transactions that are driven, as is the case in hydropower development, 
by the private sector This process is supposed to lead to an increased 
inflow of capital that creates economic growth and fulfils the 
development purposes of the state. Both regionalism and regionalization 
may affect the relationship between the state and civil society – such as 
NGOs and local community organizations – because they may create 
unclarity about the responsibility of public and private developers and 
about legal jurisdictions, particularly in relation to the transboundary 
impacts of the projects developed by transnational companies in foreign 
territories (see diagram 2.1).  
 
Diagram 2.1: Analytical framework of regulatory regionalism  
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Regarding the level of governance, regulatory regionalism potentially 
takes shape at the international level when the forces of regionalization 
are stronger than those of regionalism. It means that the expansion of 
regional capital through transnational investment and trade develops 
faster than the institutionalization of regional governance among states, 
which prefer to maintain their regulatory power over development 
projects. Hence, at the domestic level, the regulatory state is shaped not 
only by the globalization of the market, pushed by global institutions, but 
also by regional capitalists and state actors who want to integrate their 
national economy, in this case by exploiting water as an economic good, 
into the emerging regional market. 
The concept of regulatory regionalism is compatible with the 
framework of regionness that was discussed above. In this case, a 
regional space is constructed on the basis of the geographical features of 
a river basin. The usage of water, including for hydropower, creates a 
regional complex of transnational relations among users, developers, and 
regulators in the area. Intensifying regionalization may stimulate the 
organized cooperation among states in the form of a regional society, 
which is a tangible foundation of regionalism.  
However, as discussed in section 2.3.1, regionness does not 
necessarily evolve hierarchically but is shaped by the relationship 
between regionalism and regionalization. A regional society does not 
necessarily require rule-based international or regional institutions, but 
may develop from shared principles of regional marketization that are 
transplanted onto the domestic governance arrangements of each of the 
states in the region. One may expect that, in this way, state actors will be 
able to control intensified regionalization through regulations that serve 
their specific interests and that may transform into hybrid forms of 
governance such as public-private partnerships.  
Growing regionalization may transform a regional space into a 
regional complex in a particular sector such as hydropower. Increasing 
regionalism may obtain some features of a regional society, but this does 
not need to result in the establishment of a regional community because 
the latter would necessarily require a political project. The emergence of 
regulatory regionalism possibly replaces the need for such a political 
project because it may provide the state with the tools to influence other 
actors to participate in development projects, via its regulatory power, in 
the form of the making and the enforcement of rules. 
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Eventually, this transformation changes the power relations within a 
state, because regionalization makes national policy makers increasingly 
dependent on foreign capital. The creation of regional institutions may be 
seen as an attempt to install regional governance to strengthen the 
regionalized role of capital within the state apparatus, something which 
Jayasuriya (2015: 521) has called the ‘internationalization’ of the state by. 
This thesis argues that the dominant technocratic approach to TWG and 
market-driven regionalism in the Mekong Basin will likely result in a 
legitimation of state-centred institutional arrangements and decision-
making processes with regard to transboundary hydropower 
development.  
The following chapters will apply this framework in the analysis of 
hydropower development in the Mekong Basin and the role of the state 
in Laos. The third chapter highlights the changes in hydropower 
development as part of the global trend, and discusses the revival of the 
hydropower industry and the regionalization of the energy market 
through transnational investment and cross-border electricity trade in the 
Mekong Basin. The chapter explains why and how the state is an 
important factor in the marketization of hydropower, as well as how the 
changing power relations between states and non-state actors plays a role 
in the uneven development in the region. 
The fourth chapter analyses regionalism in relation to hydropower 
development and its regional governance. It focuses on the new 
regionalism in the Mekong Basin and on the way this has been shaped by 
the state-centric nature of regional governance, rooted in the old 
regionalism of the Cold War era. The contradictions of TWG, which 
result from its combined focus on water development and water 
management, is discussed in order to show how the market has 
influenced the emerging ‘regionness’ in the Mekong Basin and has led to 
the rise of regulatory regionalism. 
The case study of Laos and the Xayaburi hydropower project in 
chapter 5 illustrates how several actors have been pursuing their interests 
through regionalism. The chapter describes the context of hydropower 
development in Laos, as well the relations with Thailand, its biggest 
partner in the hydropower trade. This chapter analyses why and how 
Laos has adopted the model of the regulatory state, as well as its 
implications for state transformation and the tendencies to regionalism. 
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 3 
Transformation of water for energy:      
Hydropower  development on the 
Mekong Mainstream 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Among different forms of water usage, hydropower is notably different 
from others.  Although power generation usually affects water quantity 
and quality, the physical change involved is not as obvious or noticeable 
as in case of the diversion of water for irrigation or water supply. The 
transmission of hydroelectricity water is tradeable across borders without 
subtracting substantial volumes out of the natural system. As a portion 
of electricity is lost during long-distance transmission and cannot be 
stored in warehouses, the efficiency of hydroelectricity transport relies 
on the possibility of instant exchange in a wide and steady market with 
secured access and predictable prices as well as proximity of power 
sources and users. A regional market comes is relevant for matching 
differential energy demands and supply between neighbouring countries.  
Some states have limited resources and capacities or lack the intention 
to invest in the development of dam infrastructure. As a consequence of 
this, private developers, especially transnational companies, have been 
the main investors in large hydropower projects, frequently sponsored by 
international financial institutions (IFIs) that promote the participation 
by private actors in development. Particularly in Southeast Asia, large 
dams and hydropower development have recently been high on the 
agenda at the regional level. In the Mekong region, although the 
marketization of the water sector is taking place relatively slower than 
elsewhere, we have recently witnessed growing transnational markets 
that provide greater opportunities for private firms concentrating on 
transportation, telecommunication and energy (Conca 2006: 227). 
Private developers have become active in the hydropower sector 
because of three major reasons. First, while many developed countries 
built hydropower dams a long time ago, presently most projects 
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concentrate in developing countries with limited financial and technical 
capacities – this is a situation where transnational banks and companies 
see opportunities for investment and infrastructure construction. Second, 
the economies of scale and the monopolistic character of large dam 
projects lead to potentially high profit margins, making the projects 
attractive to private investment. Third, market-oriented reforms and 
economic liberalization promoted by IFIs and Western donor 
governments have encouraged the expansion of the market system and 
the private sector.  
A unique characteristic of hydropower development is that demand and 
supply of water for energy production work mainly between 
neighbouring countries because trade in hydroelectricity usually operates 
on a cross-border or regional basis, because energy is not suitable for 
long-distance international trade as is the case for other goods. This 
chapter first explores the global trend of large dam and hydropower 
development in order to explain why this particular sector has been 
widely promoted and met much opposition, especially in developing 
countries. The second part presents the Mekong Basin as a region with 
fast-growing hydropower development. The case of the Upper Mekong 
dams in China is mentioned to understand their significant influence in 
the Lower Mekong Basin. Finally, the setting, perceptions and potential 
impacts of the Xayaburi Hydroelectric Power Project (HPP) are 
presented to demonstrate the complexity of hydropower development 
on the Lower Mekong mainstream.  
 
3.1 Large dams and hydropower development 
 
3.1.1 Global development of large hydropower dams  
 
Many societies have a long history of water management with dams and 
reservoirs; however, it is not until the middle of the twentieth century 
that the development of large dams began after important breakthroughs 
in engineering and hydrologic technology. The World Commission on 
Dams (WCD 2000: 8) estimated that there were more than 45,000 large 
dams7  in over 140 countries at the end of the last century.  The number 
                                                          
7 These are dams with a height of at least 15 m. from the foundation as well as dams 
with a height between 5 and 15 m. and a reservoir with a volume of more than 3 
million m3. 
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of dams had increased rapidly from the 1950s to the 1980s but fell since 
the 1990s. Still, the total number of large dams worldwide is increasing. 
Recently, the International Commission on Large Dams (ICOLD 2015) 
estimated that there are 58,402 dams classified as large dams globally. 
Around 20% of all large dams in the world are built for hydropower. 
Among them, around 5,727 dams are single-purpose hydropower dams. 
These are primarily designed for the generation of hydroelectricity, 
although they often serve other subordinate purposes, including flood 
and drought management, irrigation, navigation, and water supply. 
  
Table 3.1 Top ten countries with large dams in 2015 
Source: International Commission on Large Dam (www.icoldcigb.org) 
 
Country Number 
China 23,842 
USA 9,265 
India 5,102 
Japan 3,108 
Brazil 1,392 
Korea (Rep. of) 1,306 
Canada 1,170 
South Africa 1,114 
Spain 1,082 
Turkey 972 
 
 It seems that the growing demand and promotion of renewable 
sources of energy provide a major justification for the expanding 
hydropower industry today. Increasing energy demand caused by the 
rapidly growing world population and increase of economic activities, 
the reduction of conventional fossil fuel sources – i.e. oil, coal and 
natural gas – as well as concerns about greenhouse gas emission have 
encouraged the exploitation of renewable energy sources including wind, 
solar, tide, wave, geothermal, biomass, and hydropower. Hydropower 
accounts for 16% of total electricity generated in the world and is the 
most common form of renewable energy, roughly accounting for 80% of 
all renewable sources (World Bank 2015).  Hydropower development in 
the world may expand by 73% with the exploitation of all current 
potential capacity; only 19% of the total global potential had been 
developed by 2008 (IEA 2010). However, the relative share of 
hydropower in global electricity production may not rise rapidly – 
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estimates suggest it will increase from 16% in 2011 to 18% by 2040 – 
because global energy demand tends to increase at the same pace (Zarfl 
et al 2015: 166).  
Even if hydropower may not substitute conventional energy sources 
such as oil, gas, coal and uranium at the global level, it is being promoted 
widely. Both developers in governments and private companies who 
support hydropower argue that it provides a source of economic 
development that is not only renewable but also relatively clean. 
Hydropower leads to significantly less carbon emission and no direct 
waste, especially compared with conventional fossil fuels. The costs of 
hydroelectricity are relatively low and hydropower can be applied for a 
variety of domestic and industrial uses. Hydropower is also a flexible 
source of electricity because it is possible to adjust the amount of water 
for power production to power demand. These rationales are praised in 
the community of developers such as the International Commission on 
Large Dam, founded in 1928 and comprising around 10,000 hydropower 
experts including engineers, hydrologists and geologists from 
government agencies, universities, consultancy firms and construction 
companies worldwide (ICOLD 2015).  
The report by the WCD (2000: 15-16), however, concludes that while 
large dams, including hydropower ones, have made a significant 
contribution to human development, the costs to uphold them are too 
high in many cases. The impact of dams usually includes the physical 
transformation of rivers, which has so far led to modifications in 46% of 
world global primary watersheds. The degradation of watershed 
ecosystems leads to dangers for fish species, nutrient recycling, soil 
replenishment and flood control. The construction of dams has caused 
the displacement of 40 to 80 million people globally; many of them have 
lost access to natural resources, livelihoods and cultural heritage.   
Because large dams always require huge investments and potentially 
create wider impacts, environmental problems cannot be understood in 
isolation from the political and economic contexts in which they emerge 
(Bryant and Bailey 1997). At least two trillion US dollars were invested in 
the construction of large dams over the 20th century and sometimes 
were the biggest investment ever in some developing countries (WCD 
2000: 14). The majority of large dams was financed directly by the public 
sector and frequently were supported by foreign aid and loans provided 
by international development agencies such as World Bank Group (WB) 
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and Asian Development Bank (ADB). Multi-national banks, such as 
Mizuho (Japan), Fortis (Netherlands, integrated into ABN-AMRO in 
2010), ING Group (Netherlands), ANZ (Australia), and Citigroup (USA) 
have also played an important role as lead financiers or co-financiers in 
large infrastructure projects worldwide, as well as in the Mekong region 
(van Gelder et al. 2010). 
The widespread negative impact of some projects has stimulated 
protests from social movements against large dams since the 1980s and 
discouraged the sponsoring of large dams by international development 
institutions, especially the World Bank (Goldman 2005; Khagram 2004). 
Case studies in the WCD report (2000), such as the Tarbela Dam in 
Pakistan, the Tucurui Dam in Brazil, and the Pak Mun Dam in Thailand, 
highlight the power of anti-dam movements. After the peak investment 
in hydropower in the 1970s the World Bank’s global share in financing  
and co-financing hydropower projects dropped from 4% to 1% in the 
1990s and to 0.6% by 2003 (Shannon 2012). Nonetheless, the 
construction of dams and the investment in hydropower development 
has been increasing in developing countries, concurrent with the 
implementation of economic reforms and regional integration, which 
encourage more international investment, energy demand, and cross-
border power trade. 
 
3.1.2 Hydropower development in the developing world 
 
It seems that the development of large dams, especially for hydropower, 
has been revitalized recently. Around two-thirds of all large dams in the 
world are concentrated in developing countries and emerging economies. 
The expansion of large dams has concentrated in South America, Africa 
and Asia, mainly in China and India. In Southeast Asia, declining support 
from the IFIs since the 1990s has not halted the expansion of 
hydropower development, as new developers within the region from 
China, Thailand, Malaysia and Vietnam, which have all enjoyed high 
economic growth since the 1980s or 1990s, have increased their activities 
in the hydropower industry (Middleton et al. 2009). 
This trend is in contrast to the situation in Europe and North 
America where the construction of new dams has decreased. There are 
various reasons for this difference in trends. In Europe and North 
America, where most hydropower dams were built decades ago, costs of 
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maintenance have become too high, both in a financial and an 
environmental sense. In the US, where dams were developed rather early 
on, the rate of dam decommissioning outpaces that of dam construction 
because of safety and environmental considerations (McCully 2001).  
Meanwhile the IFIs, especially the World Bank, have adjusted their 
policies in response to pressures from social movements against dams 
since the 1990s. The Bank has started to include multi-stakeholder 
approaches into its ‘green policy’ by including ministries, international 
organizations and NGOs into the policy networks on natural resources 
and environment. Several international agents were commissioned to 
develop new regulations, redesign state governance and redefine local 
production with global norms (Goldman 2005). Regarding the energy 
sector, the green policy encourages ‘clean’ and ‘renewable’ sources of 
energy, with hydropower being considered among other sources, such as 
wind, waves, tides, solar, biomass and geothermal energy. 
 World Bank financing of hydropower has been constantly increasing 
since 2003 and has been focused on Sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia, 
where basic infrastructure and investment are most scarce. The basic 
idea of the revival may be expressed in a comment by the Chief 
Technical Specialist on Hydropower at the World Bank, who argued 
that: 
 
The Bank had withdrawn from the hydropower sector for about 10 years 
from the mid-1990s before gradually revising its strategy since about 2003. 
Now however, the Bank has acknowledged that not to fully engage with 
hydropower would impact its ability to meet its objectives.  The Bank has 
now pledged some one billion US dollars in funding for hydropower 
projects in the world’s poorest countries. In addition, the agency aims to 
place hydro higher on the political agenda, including large-scale projects. 
Hydro of all scales is vital in affecting the impact of climate change; it also 
has the highest potential for clean energy development and is abundant in 
the poorest regions of the world where the needs are greatest. (Hydro 
World 2013) 
 
This policy change has encouraged developers in other regions than 
Africa and South Asia, even with less support from the World Bank and 
other IFIs, because hydropower is regarded as a source of renewable 
energy, which is strongly promoted by the Bank (World Bank 2009). To 
implement its policy, the World Bank grounds its strategy in three steps; 
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first, direct support for basic infrastructure needs; second, invest in a 
secondary/higher level of  infrastructure and seek out cooperation with 
more partners including middle income countries and regions; third, 
diversify financial support to include private sources in the form of 
public-private partnerships (Shannon 2012).  
In other words, the reform tries to transplant a political doctrine, 
economic programs and regulatory practices, which considers nature as 
capital, commodity or eco-services (Bakker 2005, 2010). The term 
‘natural capital’ is employed by the ADB to promote its policy on 
economic integration by focusing on the negative impacts of over-
exploitation and making a case for market-driven ideas for natural 
resources development in the Mekong region: 
 
A natural-capital approach is the economic reflection of the value that 
natural assets and services contribute to human economies. It represents a 
fundamental shift away from traditional approaches to natural resource 
management and counters the widespread perception that natural resources 
are either valueless or unlimited merely because they are available for “free” 
(without market prices). Properly assessing and valuing natural capital (both 
stocks and ecosystem services) and capturing that value in a natural-capital 
accounting framework can provide decision makers with essential 
information about the trade-offs involved in development decisions (ADB 
2015: ix). 
 
Next to supporting hydropower projects financially, IFIs and donor 
governments often have promoted a greater involvement of private 
developers when implementing programs on governance reform in the 
public sector. They aimed to strengthen the role of the private sector in 
development, especially in large-scale projects such as those in the 
hydropower sector. As stated by a World Bank official, “[The Bank] can 
promote good practice as well as leverage private investment to mitigate 
commercial risks. Help our clients do the right projects, and do the 
projects right (Hydro World 2013).”   
The advocates of hydropower usually include coalitions of state 
agencies, engineering companies and academics as well as financial 
institutions. The opponents typically are social and environmental 
NGOs, academics and local people who are affected by hydropower 
projects. However, more complex coalitions may come into being: for 
example, a government that promotes hydropower dams on its territory 
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may strongly oppose a project upstream in another country. Those 
actors form coalitions, domestically and internationally, in order to 
strengthen their position and influence the planning and implementation 
of development projects based on their viewpoints and cultures (Nusser 
2003, Baghel and Nusser 2010).  
Currently, governments and private developers often jointly 
implement hydropower projects via public-private partnerships as a so-
called ‘Independent Power Producer (IPP)’, replacing mainly state-
owned developers. The private party has the responsibility to raise the 
funding for the project, is often entitled to retain all revenues generated, 
and owns the facility during the concession period. To secure the 
revenue of the project, a purchaser or off-taker, usually a state-owned 
agency and a private power producer will conclude a Power Purchase 
Agreement (PPA) to guarantee the market and price of the product. 
Without such a PPA, the project may not be viable and attractive to 
foreign investors. Finally, the IPP will transfer the facility to the 
government at the end of the concession agreement (World Bank 
2014b).  
Practically, IFIs and other international donors have eagerly 
promoted this strategy to realize the marketization of water and other 
resources: as part of the approach, they propose lending agreements that 
require recipient countries to implement Public-Private Partnership (PPP) 
approach in national policies and development projects. The PPP is a 
typical term for collaboration between the state and non-state actors, 
which transforms public to private goods. It aims to reorient the state 
away from its major developmental functions to be more focused on 
regulatory ones as defined by the World Bank (2014a): 
 
PPPs combine the skills and resources of both the public and private sectors 
through sharing of risks and responsibilities. This enables governments to 
benefit from the expertise of the private sector, and allows them to focus 
instead on policy, planning and regulation by delegating day-to-day 
operations. 
 
The approach assumes that the involvement of more stakeholders in 
public affairs, including private companies and civil society, would create 
more knowledgeable, efficient and democratic governance for 
development, as well as reconcile potential conflict between public and 
private interests (McDonald & Ruiters 2005). While the market approach 
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leads to greater involvement of private actors in hydropower 
development, and assumingly leads to better ways of providing energy, 
generating income, boosting industry and employment linking to poverty 
eradication, etc., this often overshadows that water has other functions, 
such as contributing to ecological balance, food security, and local 
livelihoods. (O’Rourke 2004: 226).  
Focusing on the state as a developer of hydropower projects, the 
government traditionally plays a pivotal role in decision making in the 
name of the national interest that reflects its water nationalism. 
According to Hirsch and Jensen (2006) the national interest is used in 
transboundary water governance in two ways. First, it is used to identify 
the assumed benefits or costs brought upon a particular country rather 
than others. Second, references to the national interest are made to 
affirm the legitimacy and development gains at the national level over 
local or smaller groups in the country. However, the definition of the 
national interests always depends on who represents, evaluates, and 
prioritizes the diverse interests of actors into national public policy. 
Hence, the  power of actors in a development project essentially depends 
on the political regime type and the socio-cultural status of groups in a 
particular society. For example, the World Bank withdrew its support to 
the Sardar Sarovar project on the Narmada River after international 
networks of social movements strongly opposed it in the highly 
democratic political system of India in 1993-94 (Khagram 2004).  
In short, the global trend shows the increasing development and 
concentration of hydropower projects in developing countries, which is 
driven by their socio-economic growth and their attractiveness to 
international investors, as well as by their alignment with the global 
development policies supported by the IFIs. The promotion of private 
sector participation in hydropower development has significantly 
changed the role of state actors. Further, the critics of ineffective and 
inefficient state-led projects emphasize that the role of the state in large 
and complex infrastructure development should be reduced. This is also 
relevant in the context of the Mekong Basin where the Mekong 
mainstream, one of the few relatively untamed international rivers, has 
recently become a growth area for hydropower development. 
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3.2 The Mekong Basin and hydropower development  
 
3.2.1 Hydropower in the Mekong Basin 
 
Hydropower generation is one of the biggest potentials of the Mekong 
River and its tributaries. The estimated hydropower potential of the LMB 
is 30,000 Megawatts (MW) while that of the UMB is 28,930 MW (MRC 
2010). With the ongoing economic growth in the countries of the region, 
power demands are expected to rise by around 7% per year over the next 
20 years, yielding a substantial and potentially profitable energy market 
(Graecen and Plettu 2007). In the 1950s this great potential was 
recognized by the MC’s initiative for large hydropower dams. During the 
1960s and 1970s, the MC studied and proposed seven mainstream dams 
on the Lower Mekong. After the long regional turmoil during the Cold 
War had brought discussions about dam construction to a standstill, the 
mainstream projects were reconsidered in the 1990s. In 1994 the MRC 
released a study of twelve proposed mainstream dams on the Lower 
Mekong with heights ranging between 20 and 50 m. from the riverbed 
(ICEM 2010: 27).  
Hydropower is attractive to developers in the Mekong countries that 
mostly have limited fossil fuel resources but abundant seasonal water 
flows. In the Mekong Basin during the monsoon or the wet season, rivers 
swell to over ten times the dry season flow. The natural setting is suitable 
for dam construction to capture and store water during the wet season for 
release during the dry season (WCD 2000: 11). This logic is applied to 
dams in the Mekong Basin which are mostly designed for various 
purposes, for instance irrigation, flood control and hydropower. All of 
them are or would be large dams. In 2011, the installed capacity – the total 
power output of turbines per dam – in the LMB was estimated at 29,684 
MW. Around two-thirds of the capacity would be located in Laos, as 
shown in table 3.2. 
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Table 3.2 Installed capacity (in MW) of hydropower projects in the LMB 
Source: Planning Atlas of the LMB, Basin Development Plan Programme, MRC 2011, p. 81 
 
Country Mekong 
mainstream 
Tributaries Total 
Planned Existing Under 
construction  
Planned Tributary 
total 
Laos 
Thailand 
Cambodia 
Vietnam 
 
Total 
10,417 
 
4,280 
 
 
14,697 
738 
745 
1 
1,204 
 
2,688 
2,764 
 
 
1,016 
 
3,780 
6,847 
 
1,309 
363 
 
8,519 
10,350 
745 
1,310 
2,583 
 
14,987 
20,767 
745 
5,590 
2,583 
 
29,684 
 
 
On the Lower Mekong mainstream, early versions of dams promoted 
by the MC included large storages of conventional dams. More recent 
plans include scaled-down versions, commonly referred to as ‘run-of-river 
dams’, 8 which depend on the seasonal flow of the river to generate power 
without storing more than a few days’ flow. The MRC’s 2011 plan was 
based on a more even flow of water from the Upper Mekong dams in 
China, with more regulated water available during the dry season and less 
during the wet season. The prospects for year-round power generation are 
better than those of an unregulated monsoonal flood regime (Hirsch, 
2011).  
Unlike the Upper Mekong, the Lower Mekong mainstream was not 
dammed until 2012 when the construction of the first project, the 
Xayaburi HPP, started in Laos. One major reason is that the situation in 
the upper part of the river differs very much from that in lower parts. The 
Upper Mekong is considered as a domestic river, the Lancang, by the 
government of China, and several hydropower projects have operated on 
the mainstream since the 1990s. The dynamic development on the Upper 
Mekong certainly has implications for the recently revived plans for 
downstream dams on the Lower Mekong.   
   
3.2.2 China and dams on the Upper Mekong  
 
Around 22,000 dams or half of all large dams in the world are in China 
(WCD, 2000: 9). China is by far the largest hydropower producer and 
                                                          
8 These are hydropower dams with a small or no reservoir that generate electricity from a 
consistent annual water flow, which is either natural or regulated by a storage dam 
upstream (International Rivers 2016). 
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continues to lead global consumption of hydroelectricity, representing 
around 17 % of all domestic use (World Watch Institute 2012).  Among 
large dams in China, the series of hydropower projects on the Lancang 
or the Upper Mekong in Yunnan Province is prominent. Comparing 
China with other countries in the Mekong Basin, Magee (2006) has noted 
that the annual hydropower generating capacity of the Lancang only 
within Yunnan is estimated to be more than 100 TWh, slightly more 
than the capacity of Laos, and between two and twenty times more than 
that of Cambodia, Myanmar, Thailand, and Vietnam.  
Although the dams on the Upper Mekong have attracted less 
attention than the gigantic ‘Three Gorges Dam’ project on the Yangzi 
River, the projects have generated much criticism of the disorganized 
resettlement of residents near the dams and particularly the 
transboundary impacts on the Lower Mekong in neighbouring Southeast 
Asia. Although China claims that it on average shares only 16% of the 
water flow in the mainstream Mekong, in the dry season around 40% of 
the total flow comes from China and this has a significant effect on the 
volume of water in the Mekong downstream (Osborne, 2004: 2).   
Dam building in Yunnan is supported by a policy, the so called ‘Open 
up the West’ campaign, officially launched in 1999. This campaign has 
aimed to utilize the resource-rich areas of western China to fuel the 
economic growth of eastern China, which in turn should provide rural 
electrification and lead to poverty alleviation in the poorer western 
regions. Moreover, Yunnan is framed as an electricity provider in the 
ADB’s development framework of the Greater Mekong Subregion 
(GMS), which emphasizes the construction of a regional power grid 
(Magee 2006: 24-26). 
Chinese Mekong hydropower development began in 1986 with the 
construction of the Manwan dam, which was a solution for the power 
shortage in Yunnan, and subsequently led to the construction of other 
cascade projects. Until 2012, four dams have been built on the Mekong 
upstream – Manwan, Dachaosan, Jinghong and Xiaowan – while another 
four are planned. These projects were developed by Chinese state-owned 
companies and most of the electricity was generated for domestic 
demand, but could potentially be exported to the neighbours in South 
and Southeast Asia (Deetes 2009). Nevertheless, these dams have created 
concerns and criticism from both academics and civil society within and 
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outside the region especially because of their transboundary impacts to 
the areas downstream. International Rivers (2009) notes:  
 
China’s dam construction on the Upper Mekong has changed the Mekong 
River’s natural flood-drought cycle and blocked the transport of sediment, 
affecting ecosystems and the livelihoods of millions living downstream, 
especially along the Thai-Lao border where communities have suffered 
declining fisheries and changing water levels that have seriously affected 
their livelihoods….this construction has proceeded without consultation 
with China’s downstream neighbors and without an assessment of the dams’ 
likely impacts on the river and its people. 
 
Although this statement has been contested among scientists (see 
Rasanen et al 2012; Li et al 2011; Lu et al 2008), Chinese unilateral 
actions on the upstream Mekong are incontestable. Some NGOs and 
local villagers, especially in Thailand, believe that the upstream Chinese 
dams have caused unusual drought and flood in the Mekong. This 
sceptical feeling towards China is not new, witness the campaigns of 
Thai social movements against dams in China since the early 2000s.9 
Although China has shown a willingness to cooperate internationally by 
submitting data on the rainy season to the MRC since 2005 and 
continually accepting MRC members’ visits of its dams, the Chinese 
government has insisted that the dam building is its sovereign right. In 
the case of the severe drought in 2010, the Chinese Foreign Ministry 
declared that China also suffered from the drought and insisted that the 
quantity of water flowing from the Lancang River into the Mekong was 
only 13.5% of the total flow (Mineta 2011: 8). Although China has 
appeared more cooperative in recent years than before, there has been 
no sign from Beijing that it would wish to join the membership of the 
MRC.  
Nonetheless, economic ties clearly contribute to the expanding 
engagement between China and countries in the Lower Mekong. In 2010, 
China and ASEAN established the ASEAN-China Free Trade AreaChina 
currently is the biggest trade partner of ASEAN with a share of 15.2% of 
total intra-regional trade (ASEAN statistic 2016). Jalilian and Flower 
(2013: 17-18) have noted that China has been well integrated into the 
                                                          
9 Personal interview with Jeerasak Inthayos, Rak Chiang Khong Group, Chiang Khong, 
13 March 2013. 
525758-L-bw-Chattranond
Processed on: 29-10-2018 PDF page: 75
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 3 
  
  
64 
production network of Southeast Asia though trade relations. It mostly 
imports primary products from and exports manufactured goods to the 
Mekong countries. Chinese FDI concentrates in garment manufacturing 
and natural resource extraction such as mining and hydropower, especially 
in Laos and Cambodia where China has become the biggest investors.  
China has recently played a more proactive role in Mekong regional 
governance by establishing the Lancang-Mekong Cooperation (LMC), an 
intergovernmental mechanism for multifunctional cooperation in the 
Mekong region. The LMC was initially proposed by Chinese Premier Li 
Keqiang in November 2014 at the China-ASEAN Summit in Myanmar, 
encouraged by Thailand’s 2012 initiative for a closer cooperation 
mechanism among the Mekong countries. Besides cooperation on the 
development of economic infrastructure, technical exchange, capacity 
building and border economic zones and so on, the issue of water 
governance has also been added into the framework. A tangible plan is to 
establish a centre for water resources of the Lancang-Mekong Basin in 
China (MFA, PRC 2016).  
The mentioned attempts to further collaboration may seem redundant 
in light of the existence of the MRC – yet, China has never had the 
intention to join the Commission. Although the MRC per se is not a party 
to the LMC at this stage, all members of the MRC participate in the 
framework. The government of Thailand supports the LMC initiative as it 
may play an important role in infrastructure development across the 
region. Moreover, Thailand has become frustrated with the MRC, since 
planned water diversion project for domestic use in the northeastern 
region has been impeded by the Mekong Agreement 1995 and the MRC 
for a long time. More than for other members, the LMC framework seems 
to be an option supportive to Chinese and Thai interests. 
To conclude, developments in China have significantly contributed to 
the revival plan of the Lower Mekong dams in the late 2010s at least for 
four reasons. First, from a technical point of view, a more regulated flow 
from the Upper Mekong dams would contribute to more predictable and 
all year-round available water for hydropower production, thus making 
the projects on the Lower Mekong more feasible. Second, their domestic 
experience and capital have heightened the interest of Chinese state-
enterprises to expand their investments in the hydropower industry in 
neighbouring countries. Third, the Lower Mekong countries depend on 
both the hydrological control of Chinese dams and investment from 
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Chinese companies. Fourth, the development of dams in the Upper 
Mekong would seem to encourage more hydropower development on 
the Lower Mekong, where the governments of Laos, Thailand, 
Cambodia and Vietnam may derive legitimacy from their claims that they 
are keeping changing water flows under control, providing increased 
economic growth and poverty reduction, and protecting their sovereign 
rights in the same way as the Chinese government did.  
 
3.3 Hydropower development on the Lower Mekong  
 
3.3.1 The revival of the Lower Mekong mainstream dams 
 
Since the mid-2000s, the Lower Mekong countries – Laos, Thailand, 
Cambodia and Vietnam – have revived the plan for mainstream 
hydropower projects that would attract investment from Thai, Chinese, 
Vietnamese, and Malaysian companies (International Rivers 2013). 
Twelve mainstream dams on the Lower Mekong are proposed, two of 
them are planned to be located in Cambodia, and the rest would be in 
Laos and on the Lao-Thai border (ICEM 2010: 27). The Lower Mekong 
flowing through Laos and its border with Thailand is the longest part in 
the LMB. Moreover, around 50% of total flow in the Mekong originates 
from watercourses in this area. Table 3.3 identifies the proposed projects 
with their current status and developers. 
Table 3.3: Proposed hydropower projects on the Lower Mekong mainstream 
Adapted from:  ICEM (2010), MRC Strategic Environmental Assessment (SEA) of Hydropower 
on the Mekong Mainstream. Hanoi: International Centre for Environmental Management. 
No. Project Installed 
capacity 
(MW) 
Status (2018) Country Developer 
1
  
Xayaburi 1,285 Under 
construction 
- planned 
commission, 2019 
Lao PDR Ch. Karnchang 
(Thailand) 
2 Don Sahong 240 Under 
construction 
Lao PDR Mega First 
(Malaysia) 
3 Pak Beng 1,230 MRC consultation 
2017 
 
Lao PDR Datang 
International 
Power Generation 
(China) 
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4 Pak Lay  1,320 
 
MRC consultation 
2018 
 
Lao PDR CEIEC and Sino-
Hydro (China) 
 
5 Luang 
Prabang 
1,410 Planned Lao PDR PetroViet Nam 
Power 
Corporation (Viet 
Nam) 
6 Sanakham 700 Planned Lao PDR Datang 
International 
Power Generation 
(China) 
7
  
Lat Sua 686 Planned Lao PDR Charoen Energy 
and Water Asia Co 
Ltd. (Thailand) 
8 Pak Chom 1,079 Planned Lao PDR 
- Thailand 
n/a 
9 Ban Kuom 1,872 Planned Lao PDR 
- Thailand 
Italian Thai Asia 
Corp. Holdings 
(Thailand) 
10 Strun Treng 980 Planned Cambodia Song Da 
Construction Co. 
(Viet Nam) 
11 Sambor 2,600 Planned Cambodia China Southern 
Power Grid 
(China) 
12 
 
Thakeo 
(River 
diversion – 
not dam) 
50 Planned Lao PDR CNR & EDL 
(France/Lao) 
 
Four driving forces are significant for a proper understanding of this 
plan in the current context. First, as discussed in the previous section, 
Chinese projects on the Upper Mekong have urged the downstream 
countries to exploit their own resources because of two rationales. 
Technically, the Mekong flow may be more predictable and all year-
round available for electricity generation because of the dams in China. 
Economically, this feature seems more convincing for international 
investors, including experienced developers from China.  
Second, the urbanization and industrialization in the Lower Mekong 
countries has led to a higher demand for energy. Though the population 
growth rate has been declining, the total population of the four countries 
is expected to increase to 33 million by 2025, 30% of whom will be 15 
years old or younger (PRB 2010: 8). Thailand and Vietnam are expected 
to account for 96% of total energy demand in the LMB by 2025 (ICEM 
2010: 45; ASEAN Secretariat 2012a: 1).  Laos and Cambodia hope that 
hydropower projects will lead to domestic poverty reduction as a result 
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of the  export of electricity to and the attraction of more investment 
from their neighbours.  
Third, although major IFIs, such as the World Bank and the ADB, 
have toned down their enthusiasm for large dams, they are still in favour 
of hydropower as a renewable source of energy, as this would respond to 
fears of climate change by decreasing uses of fossil fuels. And fourth, 
economic integration frameworks such as the Greater Mekong 
Subregion Economic Cooperation (GMS) promoted by the ADB and 
ASEAN have supported regional integrated plan for investment in 
electricity infrastructure and trans-border links to support the 
development of other sectors (see ICEM 2010; Lee and Scurrah 2009; 
Symon 2009).  
The MRC’s strategy for the 2011-2015 period praised the many 
advantages of hydropower as follows: 
 
 Mekong Government policies promote the use of water resources to 
generate electricity, not only for national consumption but also for export to 
earn foreign exchange for funding the country’s socio economic 
development objectives. It also catalyses the mutually beneficial expansion 
of cross-border power trade to support regional economic integration and 
the attainment of energy security goals (MRC 2011b: 13). 
 
The MRC’s plan also mentioned the importance of the completion of 
dams in China for making hydropower development on the Lower 
Mekong more viable as well. The plan also contained an endorsement of 
several global norms of development as promoted by the World Bank. 
These included renewable and clean energy as a response to climate 
change, economic efficiency, regulatory reform and participation of the 
private sector: 
  
Hydropower has recently attracted more support, since not only is it a 
renewable technology, but it also generally emits far less greenhouse gas 
than fossil fuel power plants. Furthermore, the increased fluctuations in gas 
and oil prices have made hydropower more economically competitive. This 
coupled with the predicted increase in dry season flows in the mainstream 
resulting from the dams on the Lancang-Mekong upstream and availability 
of private sector finance is driving a rapid regional expansion of 
hydropower. The introduction of national regulatory systems to encourage 
investment in strategic infrastructure for water and energy has also led a 
significant private sector response to propose new large hydropower 
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schemes on both the tributaries and mainstream of the Mekong River. 
(MRC 2011b: 17) 
 
Since 2010, the debate about dam projects has not focused exclusively 
on the Chinese dams in the UMB but also on expected projects in the 
LMB. After many dams had been built on the tributaries, the government 
of Laos (GoL) proposed the first project on the Mekong mainstream, 
named ‘Xayaburi’ after the province where it would be located. The 
project caused opposition from governments of downstream Cambodia 
and Vietnam as well as civil society, especially in Thailand, which is 
concerned with the project’s transboundary impacts. The Xayaburi project 
is not only significant in that it would be the first dam on the Lower 
Mekong mainstream, but it was also the first project for which an 
international prior consultation process was implemented. 
According to the Agreement on the Cooperation for the Sustainable 
Development of the Mekong River Basin 1995, any development on the 
Mekong mainstream is prohibited without consultation with the riparian 
countries. The Procedures for Notification, Prior Consultation and 
Agreement (PNPCA), an extension of the 1995 agreement, state that 
member countries must notify the MRC’s Joint Committee when they 
want to start any major infrastructure development – such as the 
construction of a hydropower dam on the mainstream Mekong or on 
tributary rivers – particularly if those projects could have significant 
impacts on people or the environment downstream (MRC 2011c).  
This provision excludes upstream China which is not a MRC member 
and which has already built dams on the Upper Mekong. Moreover, 
domestic tributaries were not included in this agreement, although projects 
on those tributaries could also cause problems since they contribute 
significantly to the water volume in the lower basin mainstream.  
Although the focus of this dissertation is on the political and governance 
aspects of hydropower development, ecological and socio-economic 
impacts are usually interwoven with and inseparable from the former 
issues. It is, however, quite difficult to obtain an authoritative assessment 
of the possible transboundary impacts of the mainstream dams on the 
Lower Mekong because of two main issues. First, there are no 
comprehensive studies available about the seasonal water crisis on the 
entire Mekong mainstream. According to Grumbine and Xu (2011: 178-
79), the planning of mainstream hydropower projects in the Mekong 
Basin has proceeded with limited analyses and unreliable data because of 
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difficulties in data collection and lack of government capacity and 
transparency. According to one expert, this lack of knowledge is related 
both to the weakness of civil society, who are unable to monitor 
development, and to the inadequate capacity of governments to manage 
transboundary hydropower projects.10 An NGO expert on the energy 
sector commented that the governments in the region should promote 
recognition of and learning about energy and natural resource 
management among their citizens beyond small the circle of scientific 
and engineering technicians.11 
Second, because the only dams that are operational are located in the 
Upper Mekong in China, most studies on the ecological impacts focus 
on them (Rasanen et al 2012; Li et al 2011; Lu et al 2008). For instance, 
one study indicates that the downstream flow in the dry season has 
become much weaker since the construction of Manwan dam, but 
indicates that other factors such as increasing water consumption, land 
use and climate change could also have affected the water flow (Lu et al 
2008). In the wet season, the dams may also cause excessive flooding 
when water is released quite suddenly after the dams have reached 
maximum holding capacity (Osborn 2004). Unnatural water flows are 
expected with higher levels in the dry season and lower levels in the wet 
season (Kummu and Varis 2007). International Rivers (2009) indicates 
that mainstream dams in China have changed the seasonal flood and 
drought cycle and block the transportation of sediments, which serve as 
natural fertilizers for agriculture, and affect fisheries. Such impacts seem 
to have an unavoidable effect on the livelihoods of millions of people 
who live downstream and depend on the Mekong ecosystems.  
 With regard to the Lower Mekong, the Strategic Environmental 
Assessment of Hydropower on the Mekong Mainstream (SEA) 2010 is 
one of the most frequently cited documents on the impacts of the 
mainstream dam. The report was prepared by International Centre for 
Environmental Management (ICEM) for the MRC Secretariat in order to 
implement the Mekong Agreement 1995. The SEA involved a variety of 
                                                          
10 Personal interview with Apisom Intralawan, Institute of Natural Resources and 
Environmental Management,  Mae Fah Luang University, Chiang Rai, 16  
March 2013. 
11 Personal interview with Witoon Permphongsachareun, Mekong Ecology an Energy 
Network (MEE-NET), Bangkok, 9 April 2013.  
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stakeholders, including the MRC Secretariat, the national governments of 
the four member countries as well as civil society and the private sector. 
This report was published in the same year that the first Lower Mekong 
mainstream dam, the Xayaburi project, was proposed to the MRC. 
 The SEA’s main findings show that the construction of Mekong 
mainstream dams would reduce fisheries, cause inundation of riverbank 
gardens, and lead to a loss of nutrients for floodplain agriculture, 
equivalent to 500 million US dollars a year, and turn 55% of the lower 
mainstream into reservoirs with slow-moving water. Despite the 
migratory nature of fishes in the Mekong, only three of the proposed 
eleven dams in the Lower Mekong incorporate fish ladders, and none of 
the designs are adequate for local species. Approximately 50-75% of 
total river sediments would be trapped behind the dams and would be 
prevented from moving downstream to support river productivity and 
floodplain farms. The SEA projected that roughly 2.1 million people 
would suffer direct and indirect losses to their livelihoods (ICEM 2010; 
Grumbine and Xu 2011).  
As mentioned earlier, developers usually claim that run-of-river model 
of dams will not significantly divert or block the flow of water and 
sediment, and will cause much less negative environmental impacts than 
conventional dams. Nonetheless, International Rivers (2016) noted that 
run-of-river dams are often built in a series or cascade along a river so 
that upstream dams may regulate the flow in order to maximize potential 
and enable more efficient power generation further downstream. However, 
because power generation needs regular water regulation, hydropower 
dams potentially pose a risk to downstream water levels, especially 
during the dry season in the delta, and may lead to increasing salinization 
from sea water intrusion. 
 For these reasons, the impacts of the dams cannot be counted 
individually but need to be studied cumulatively – yet, this is often lacking 
in the decision-making process of governments and private developers 
that exclusively focus on their specific projects. The SEA recommended 
that the immensity of the risks was “beyond the current capacity of the 
members to address and all mainstream dam building in the Lower 
Mekong should be deferred for 10 years” (ICEM 2010: 19-20). Although 
many academics and activists refer to this renowned document in their 
525758-L-bw-Chattranond
Processed on: 29-10-2018 PDF page: 82
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 3 
  
  
71 
studies and campaigns, it has never been endorsed by the member states 
of the MRC.12  
 Presently the commission is preparing another study namely the 
Study on Sustainable Management and Development of the Mekong 
River, or the Council Study. It assesses the impacts resulting from 
different water resource uses, including mainstream dams, by employing 
various development scenarios. The study was commissioned by the 
ministerial meeting of the MRC Council in 2011 and was expected to be 
published in 2018. Vietnam, which is situated in the Mekong delta and 
probably is most vulnerable to ecological changes in the mainstream, has 
also conducted its own study, called the Delta study, issued in 2016. 
Vietnam’s study claims that if there is no proper mitigation of potential 
impacts from planned and constructed  mainstream dams, environmental 
resources and people in Vietnam and Cambodia would be severely 
affected (MRC 2016). The contested nature of the impact studies shows 
the weakness of regional water governance, which lacks capacity to 
provide trust and comprehensive knowledge to the member states and 
especially their people. 
Beyond their social and environmental impacts, dam projects have 
often been questioned because of their political-economic aspects. 
Around two trillion US dollars were invested in the construction of large 
dams over the 20th century; sometimes these projects represent the 
biggest investment ever in some developing countries (WCD 2000: 14) 
The majority of large dams were financed directly by the public sector 
and frequently were realized with the help of foreign donors and 
international development agencies, as a consequence of which some 
countries accumulated serious debts. Bakker (1999: 211) commented that 
hydropower development is often not a very transparent process for the 
public because the projects require the collection and analysis of 
hydrological data, which take place within the technocratic space of 
international consultants, engineering firms, and capital providers.  
 
 
 
 
                                                          
12 Group discussion with Thongthip Chandalasang, Viengsay Sophachan, and 
Luckdavone Valangoun, Lao National Mekong Committee Secretariat (LNMCS), 
Vientiane, 13 May 2014. 
525758-L-bw-Chattranond
Processed on: 29-10-2018 PDF page: 83
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 3 
  
  
72 
3.3.2 Xayaburi: the pioneer dam on the Lower Mekong  
 
Controversies are not exclusive to Chinese dams anymore, but are also 
associated with the coming project on the Lower Mekong. The GoL 
proposed the first hydropower dam project on the Mekong mainstream 
in 2010. This caused a lot of protests, particularly from the downstream 
governments of Cambodia and Vietnam as well as from NGOs and civil 
society, especially in Thailand. Although, as discussed above, the MRC 
proposed that all projects on the mainstream should be delayed for at 
least ten years, the GoL, which is expected to receive up to 30% of the 
project’s revenue, confirmed to push ahead with the Xayaburi dam 
project (Vaidyanathan 2011).  
Most parts of the Mekong River in Laos and Thailand constitute the 
natural border between the two countries. Yet, the Xayaburi dam is built 
entirely on Lao territory, in the Xayaburi province, around 300 km. 
northwest from the Lao capital, Vientiane, and 1,931 km. upstream from 
the Mekong delta in Vietnam. By choosing this specific location, it seems 
that sensitive border issues between Laos and Thailand could be avoided 
and direct opposition by active Thai civil society could be neutralized.  
Although the project is legally within the territorial sovereignty of 
Laos, the Xayaburi HPP is also very much a Thai project. The 
government of Thailand, through the state-owned Electricity Generating 
Authority of Thailand (EGAT), has agreed to purchase 95% of the 
dam’s electricity production. The construction of the Xayaburi Dam is in 
the hands of Ch. Karnchang Public Company Limited (CK) from 
Thailand via its subsidiary, Chor Karnchang (Lao) (CHK) and has a 
value between 1.7 and 1.8 Billion US dollars (Bangkok Post 2012). Once 
the construction will be completed, the dam will generate 6,000 GWh of 
electricity per year for EGAT. The project was partly financed by an 80 
Billion Thai Baht loan from the four main financial institutions in 
Thailand, including the Siam Commercial Bank, Kasikorn Bank, 
Bangkok Bank and state-owned Krung Thai Bank (Save the Mekong 
2013). The Xayaburi Project is fundamentally driven by EGAT’s need to 
purchase electricity in order to provide secure and affordable electricity 
for Thailand (EPPO 2013). 
The operator, the Xayaburi Power Company Limited (XPCL), 
obtained the concession to construct the electricity generation project 
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from the GoL. CK, through its holding company, CK Power13, holds the 
biggest share in XPCL (30%). Minor shareholders are Natee Synergy 
Company Limited (NSC), Electricity Generating Public Company 
Limited (EGCO), which is a subsidiary of EGAT, Bangkok Expressway 
PCL (BECL), and PT (Sole) Company. All companies are Thai except 
PT, which is from Laos. Electricité du Laos (EdL), on behalf of the Lao 
government, also holds 20% of shares transferred from CK since 2013 
to comply with the Common Term Agreement and Concession 
Agreement (XPCL 2014: V).  
 
Table 3.4 Roles of Developers in the Xayaburi HPP  
 
Roles Actors Relations with XPCL 
Grantor GoL Concession Agreement 
Shareholders CK, EdL, NSC, EGCO, BECL, PT Shareholders’ Agreements 
Lenders BBL, SCB, KBank, TISCO, KTB 
EXIM14 
Credit Facilities Agreements 
Contractor 
and supplier 
CHK Engineering, Procurement and 
Construction Contract 
Engineering 
Consultants 
Pöyry, CNR, AF Consult,  
TEAM Group, SEAN15 
Engineering Service Agreements 
Off-takers EdL, EGAT Power Purchase Agreements 
 
The roles of those developers and their relations with XPCL are 
shown in table 3.4. While CHK, the subsidiary of CK in Laos, has 
carried out the construction, international consultants have engaged 
extensively in the development process, from the feasibility study to the 
engineering work. To respond to the concerns of downstream countries 
about negative impacts, two consulting companies – Pöyry and 
Compagnie Nationale du Rhône (CNR) – were hired by the GoL for 
reviewing the design and giving advice on the adjustment of the design, 
particularly the improvement of fish passages and the sediment flushing 
                                                          
13 CK Power was founded in 2011 as a holding of CK. Next to holding shares in 
XPCL, CK Power possesses a majority  share of 75% in the Nam Ngum 2 HPP.  
14 Lenders are all Thai banks comprising Bangkok Bank (BBL), Siam Commercial Bank 
(SCB), Kasikorn Thai Bank (KBank), TISCO Bank, Krung Thai Bank (KTB),  and 
Export-Import Bank of Thailand (EXIM). The last two banks are state-owned. 
15 International consultants comprise Pöyry and AF Consult from Switzerland,  
Compagnie Nationale du Rhône (CNR) from France, TEAM and Southeast Asia 
Energy Limited (SEAN) from Thailand. SEAN works as the Owner-Engineer because 
it is a subsidiary of CK, the major shareholder. 
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system (Vientiane Times 2012). Finally, EdL and EGAT, the state 
monopolies for energy transmission in Laos and Thailand, will be off-
takers purchasing 5% and 95% of hydroelectricity respectively.  
Compared to other commodities, the revenues from hydropower 
export are relatively stable because they usually are agreed in advance 
contracts and power purchase agreements; most financial risks from 
loans and operations would be borne by private developers. The 
Xayaburi HPP is expected to generate 135 million USD per year or 3,913 
million USD for the whole concession period (29 years) for the GoL. 
This includes 1,897 million USD in royalties, 637 million USD in taxes, 
and 1,379 million USD in dividend for the 20% share held by EdL in 
XPCL (MEM 2012: A3).  
In relation to the resettlement, the developer claims that 458 families 
have been directly affected by the construction of Xayaburi HPP (XPCL 
2012). According to a retired Lao government official who has become 
an executive of PT Development16, one of the shareholders of XPCL, 
the project would increase the average total income in resettled villages 
from 1.2 billion Lao Kips (approx. 109,000 Euros) to 2.7 billion Lao kips 
(approx. 246,000 Euros) per year. He described the social mission of the 
Xayaburi HPP: 
 
The resettlement program is based on three principles, including the 
provision of secured and permanent dwelling, constant improvements in the 
quality of life, and a sustainable environment. Whereas foreign trade 
between Thailand and Laos is sometimes impeded by political tensions, the 
border has never been closed for electricity.17  
 
As observed during fieldwork in 2014, 48% of around three thousand 
people affected by the construction had been resettled or relocated and 
around 30% of the construction of civil works had been completed. At 
the time, half of the river was blocked for the construction and the flow 
was still passing through the other half until completion of the first part. 
In March 2014, the total workforce of the Xayaburi HPP at the site was 
9,604. The workforce comprised 6,104 Laos (including most of the 
                                                          
16 PT is the only Lao private company holding shares in XPCL. It mainly deals with the 
project’s social affairs, especially in the resettlement. 
17 Personal interview with Soukhan Phongsawath, Director of Government Relations, 
PT Development, Vientiane, 13 May 2014 
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relocated villagers)18; 2,782 Thais and 1,018 nationals from other 
countries. Of these, 4,191 worked directly for CHK, while the rest was 
employed by several subcontractors. The project has been running well 
on schedule and is expected to be completed on time in 2019. The 
operation by XPCL will last for twenty-nine years until 2048 when the 
dam will be transferred to the GoL (XPCL 2014: 21). 
 
Figure 3.1 the Xayaburi dam in 2014 
Photo by Ome Chattranond 
 
 
 
Apart from electricity generation, the developer claimed that the 
Xayaburi project will contribute to other purposes including navigation, 
fisheries and flood control. The dam will feature a navigation lock with a 
120 meter long and 12 meter wide lock chamber to facilitate 
transportation vessels. It will also be equipped with a 10 meter long fish 
pass on the left side to allow the migration of fish and other aquatic 
animals through or around the dam. The additional emergency spillway 
gates are designed for the passing of seasonal overflowing water and 
flood prevention. The reservoir head level is kept largely constant and 
inflowing water is constantly released either through the turbines or the 
spillway, in order to not block the water and maintain natural mean daily 
                                                          
18 During the field observations in 2014, the relocated villages were almost empty 
during the daytime. According to a village chief, most people were at work at the dam 
construction site. 
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flow all year round (XPCL: 2012). As noted by Cronin and Weatherby 
(2015: 4), “According to the Porgy representative (the main consultant 
for the project), parent company Ch. Karnchang has spent 200 million 
USD on fish research and passage redesign alone, more than any other 
major project globally.”  
Although Thai, Cambodian, Vietnamese and Lao governments agreed 
that on the necessity to conduct additional research on the impact to the 
Lower Mekong Basin, the proper study has never been delivered and the 
Xayaburi dam construction project still has no clarity on the real impacts. 
The Mekong related NGOs point out some governance problems related 
to the Xayaburi dam: in particular, the project lacks transparency as 
information from the reports on the Environmental Impact Assessment 
(EIA) and Strategic Environmental Assessment (SEA) has not been 
released.   
To date, no transboundary or cumulative impact assessment has been 
published on the influence of the Xayaburi and other proposed projects 
beyond the immediate/local project area or on the potential damage to 
fisheries or livelihoods downstream (Cronin and Weatherby 2015). 
Moreover, construction of the project was approved before proper 
research on the impact on the whole basin was conducted.  In relation to 
other Mekong dam projects a Vietnamese academic commented that:  
 
…the Xayaburi and other mainstream projects pose a serious threat to the 
Mekong Delta, the source of half of Vietnam’s national rice production... All 
hydropower dams in China are operated by the Chinese government or 
Chinese private investors, meanwhile the construction of 12 hydropower 
dams proposed for the mainstream in the Lower Basin will be financed, 
built, and operated by companies from at least 5 different countries: 
Thailand (4 dams), China (3-4 dams), Vietnam (1-2 dams), Malaysia (1 dam), 
and France (2 dams). A common agreement among and between these 
owners and governments for the coordinated operation of these reservoirs 
remains a fantasy…(Those dams) directly benefit the investors and the 
countries owning the projects, while many of the most severe negative 
impacts will fall on the Mekong Delta (Dao Trong Tu, 2011). 
 
The quotation aptly depicts the complexity of hydropower 
development in the Mekong Basin, which is highly regionalized in the 
sense that capital flows in this industry have been transnationally 
concentrated within the less-restricted regional market among private 
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firms and state agencies that promote hydropower development. The 
case of Xayaburi obviously represents the changing trend in hydropower 
development, challenging regional water governance in the Mekong 
Basin. In the past, most funding for river basin planning and dam 
construction came from multilateral development institutions, e.g., the 
ADB and the World Bank Group. Now these agencies, with their greater  
commitment to some level of environmental and social impact 
assessment, are being replaced by investments from private and state-
owned banks that likely focus more on profits and may not adequately 
consider recommendations of the World Commission on Dams or other 
corporate social responsibility guidelines (Grumbine and Xu 2011; 
Hirsch and Jensen 2006).   
Moreover, the projects on the Mekong mainstream are more sensitive 
to riparian states than dams on the tributary rivers. This is not only 
because of their larger transboundary impacts, but also because the 
mainstream dam development may become part of regional politics in 
several ways, including by creating border disputes along the river, 
enhancing dependence on foreign aid and investment, as well as 
heightening political tensions when impacts are experienced. Not only 
state actors work together in this process, but also private companies and 
civil society organizations play their respective roles as project 
developers and campaigners for the monitoring of the impact of dams. 
This elevates the issues to the regional/international level and eventually 
leads to more complex games within new arenas.  
 
3.4 Conclusion 
 
In the Mekong Basin, both global and regional forces have affected 
ongoing trends in the hydropower industry, especially in Laos. Firstly, 
the issue in the Mekong Basin is consistent with the global trends in 
hydropower industry. After the widespread negative impacts of some 
large dams stimulated social movements against the construction of large 
dams in the 1980s, international development institutions such as the 
World Bank Group and the ADB were discouraged to sponsor this kind 
of projects. Nonetheless, the number of dams and hydropower projects 
has still been increasing in developing countries. The growing demand 
for energy in developing countries, which have recently opened their 
markets and which experience higher growth rates than developed 
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economies, as well as the promotion of renewable sources of energy 
provide a major justification for the expansion of the hydropower 
industry. 
Secondly, developments in China affect the hydropower industry in the 
Lower Mekong Basin in two ways. In an economic sense, the growth of 
Chinese consumption and production stimulates the demand for products 
from Mekong Basin countries. The growth of the Mekong countries also 
expands the market for exports from China. In a hydro-engineering sense, 
the hydropower projects in China, which are technically able to control 
available water flows all year round, have made proposed projects along 
the Lower Mekong, including the Xayaburi HPP, more feasible and 
attractive to developers. 
Thirdly, because of the regional economic boom and the experiences 
with hydropower development, private or state-owned companies from 
the region itself have increasingly become major players in the Mekong 
hydropower projects. The policies of IFIs, such as the World Bank and 
the ADB, to keep a low profile in am development, but at the same time 
encouraging the transition to renewable energy and fighting climate 
change, provide a favourable ground for construction companies of 
hydropower projects as well as financial institutions from emerging 
economies in the region such as Thailand, Vietnam, and China. Whereas 
the IFIs and other international donors have pushed regulatory reforms 
related to such aspects as environmental standards and transparency of 
the hydropower industry, their influence seems to be limited in 
comparison to transnational companies that operate with fewer 
regulations on social and environmental safeguards.   
Finally, the hydropower projects favour the formation of a regional 
market. The market provides a space for tradable water in the form of 
hydroelectricity, which is technically more efficient when implemented at 
a regional scale, unbounded by national borders. For instance, the power 
trade planned for the Xayaburi HPP is expected to generate relatively 
stable incomes for the host state of Laos because of the long-term 
concession and power purchase contracts; meanwhile it intensifies the 
exploitation of water resources to serve the market in other states. This 
development needs a facilitating structure that creates and sustains the 
transnational market, and it is here that regionalism seems to provide a 
sensible strategy.  
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 Hydropower development is, therefore, far beyond the work of 
engineering and hydrological technology and is deeply involved with 
global and regional political economy. The increase in the construction 
of large dams in developing countries implies a need for transforming 
governance to regulate this complex industry, in accordance with 
international norms and practices induced by the global development 
agenda of the IFIs such as the World Bank and the ADB.  
 The high potential alone, nevertheless, is not enough to convince 
developers to invest in hydropower development. External promotion of 
the market system of renewable energy by international institutions, 
higher demand for energy from growing economies and increased 
foreign investment facilitated by economic liberalization have 
contributed to the revitalization of hydropower projects planned many 
decades ago. The discussion in this chapter explains how the market 
logic leads to the exploitation of water as natural capital – something 
which would not be possible if there is no market water in the form of 
hydroelectricity.  
 However, this process has happened in the context of fragmented 
water governance in the region. The changing role of the state, which 
collaborates with private developers in the hydropower industry, has 
facilitated marketization but does not adequately address the potential 
problems generated by the revitalization of the large-scale hydropower 
on the Mekong mainstream. This emphasizes the need for more 
integrated planning and cooperation among government agencies as well 
as private developers (MRC 2011b: 15).  
 Hydropower development provides both opportunities and threats 
for further regionalism. Potential impacts have urged some non-state 
actors, including social activists and affected local people, to oppose 
large-scale hydropower projects. Limited participation and access to 
information produce more distrust in hydropower development. The 
transboundary impacts create even more tensions among governments 
and between governments and their own people. On the one hand, this 
possibly impedes closer regional integration and water governance in the 
long term. On the other hand, common threats of transboundary 
impacts may generate more public awareness on hydropower 
development and demand for regionalism. To understand this tension, 
the following chapter will discuss existing frameworks of regionalism, 
especially in relation to hydropower development in the Mekong Basin. 
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 4 
 
Regionalization of The Mekong 
Hydropower Development  
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Long before the creation of modern states during the period of 
colonization in the nineteenth century, French colonizers arranged 
expeditions along the Mekong in search of a route from Indochina – 
now Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam – to China, and finally occupied the 
area. The British colonial authority in Burma, as well as the Chinese and 
Siamese (Thai) governments also had developed infrastructure (roads, 
rails and communication systems) as well as regulations to access and the 
routes, natural resources, and people and claim of their over them (Hill 
1998; Samnieng 2012; Reungsri 2014). Nowadays, with the development 
of infrastructure and facilitation of the market system, the ADB (2014) 
claims that its projects in the region have revived the ancient regional 
market from the time when the Mekong and its basin were important 
water and hinterland trading routes between southern China and the 
communities of mainland Southeast Asia.  
 This description illustrates how the process of intensifying economic 
and social transactions concentrated in a specific geographical area, 
which actors tried to control for serving their interests. Declining 
support from major powers and the end of the Cold War have led to 
adjustment of the states in the basin by implementing reforms related to 
marketization and globalization (Stubbs 2012: 91-93). Currently, each 
state in the Mekong Basin commits to a development strategy of 
regionalism, enhancing international cooperation within the growing 
regional economy as well as providing natural resources for regional and 
global markets (Goh 2007). This is the result of an historical process in 
the region, ranging from US hegemony during the Cold War to regional 
reconciliation and the rise of China (Hirsch 2010).  
This chapter presents the evolution of regionalism in Southeast Asia, 
particularly in relation to hydropower development in the Mekong Basin. 
Regarding regional governance, the focus is on three regional 
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institutions, including the Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
(ASEAN) as the major formal regional organization; the Greater 
Mekong Subregion Economic Cooperation (GMS) as the main 
economic integration framework for the entire basin; and the Mekong 
River Commission (MRC) as a regional body for transboundary water 
governance (TWG). Because these institutions are the most prominent 
frameworks for regional development in the Mekong Basin, relations 
among them represent major characteristics of regionalism.  
The chapter starts with contextualizing  regionalism in the Mekong 
region, using the concepts of old and new regionalism in order to explain 
continuities and change. The second section discusses the roles of major 
regionalist frameworks in the basin, the GMS and ASEAN, which 
emphasize the building of a regional market, especially in the energy 
sector. The third part focuses on the MRC, the sole TWG framework in 
the region, and details its structure, its process of governance and the 
implications of these for the hydropower sector. The particular case of 
the MRC’s consultative process for the Xayaburi hydropower project is 
presented in the final part to illustrate the working of existing regional 
governance that is dealing with the expanding transboundary issues of 
hydropower development.  
 
4.1 Mekong Regionalism 
 
4.1.1 Old regionalism: the iron curtain 
 
Although transboundary relations among people along the Mekong have 
existed for a long time, regionalization was intentionally created and 
institutionalized only a few decades ago as a result of the political 
projects of the states, so-called regionalism. While there had been a 
polarization in global politics between ‘the East’ and ‘the West’ right 
after the Second World War, Southeast Asia had also become divided, 
particularly in the area along the Mekong. Insurgencies and civil wars 
spread out in French Indochina (Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam), where 
nationalists and communists were competing in the struggle for 
independence. When the French were defeated by the communists in 
North Vietnam, the United States realized that communist movements 
would potentially expand throughout Southeast Asia if it would not act.  
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 Next to political and military action, leading to the establishment of 
the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) in 1954 as a collective 
defence mechanism similar to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(NATO) in Europe and North America, the start of development 
cooperation in the Mekong Basin was strategy for securing popular 
support and strengthening forces that were opposing the communists. 
At the time, all states in the Mekong Basin were fragile, having suffered 
from political conflicts during the 1940s and early 1950s. In China, the 
communists prevailed in the civil war with the nationalist fraction in 
1949 and later crucially supported communist rebellions in Southeast 
Asia. Thailand had never been colonized but had encountered 
communist insurgencies both internally in the rural areas as well as from 
neighbouring countries. Burma, Laos, Cambodia and (North and South) 
Vietnam had just gained their independence. The US strategy was to 
promote regional development in the Mekong Basin, responding to the 
governments of the states that urgently needed reconstruction and 
development.    
 To utilize the economic potential of one of the world’s biggest 
untamed rivers, the Committee for Coordination on the Lower Mekong 
Basin, simply known as the Mekong Committee (MC), was founded in 1957 
supported by the United Nations Economic Commission for Asia and 
the Far East (UN-ECAFE),19 and receiving major sponsorship from the 
US. It was the first river basin development initiative and the largest 
single project funded by the UN. The early plan of the MC focused on 
the large-scale development of irrigation, navigation, and especially 
hydropower on the mainstream of the Mekong (MRC 2012).  
 From the 1960s through to the 1980s the Lower Mekong was 
compared to an iron curtain in the confrontation between the 
communist and the capitalist world. The MC was an attempt to prevent 
the spread of communist influence in the region by promoting economic 
development in the four Lower Mekong countries, i.e., Laos, Cambodia, 
South Vietnam and Thailand, which were  the US allies, while excluding 
self-isolated Burma (now Myanmar) and communist China on the Upper 
Mekong (Nguyen 2006: 61). In 1967, Thailand and its allies – the 
Philippines, Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore – founded a regional 
organization, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), which 
                                                          
19 This is now the United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the 
Pacific (UN-ESCAP) 
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clearly was meant to be a counteraction to the threat of communist 
movements that eventually were victorious in Laos, Cambodia, and 
Vietnam in 1975.  Throughout the 1980s, two groups of closed 
regionalism were formed in Southeast Asia: the socialist camp in Laos, 
Cambodia and Vietnam, and the capitalist camp of ASEAN.  
However, political turmoil hindered both the ASEAN and the 
communist states in their pursuit of regionalization. In the communist 
group, while Laos and Vietnam were pro-Soviet, the Cambodian 
communist regime, Khmer Rouge, was an ally of China, which had been 
hostile to both Vietnam and the Soviet Union. Vietnam finally invaded 
Cambodia in 1978 and replaced the Khmer Rouge with a pro-
Vietnamese regime. The ousted Khmer Rouge and other anti-Vietnam 
movements were supported by China, Thailand and other members of 
ASEAN. Although the founding document of ASEAN highlighted 
economic and social cooperation, the group had spent most of the time 
on political-security issues. While the Cold War had led to a closed 
regionalism of the two political pacts, it severely impeded regionalization 
across the Mekong Basin.  
During the period of old regionalism from the 1960s to the 1980s, the 
countries in the Mekong region were heavily fragmented by civil wars or 
insurgences. It meant that the governments usually lacked the capacities 
or attention to develop their economies. Under these circumstances, the 
old regionalism in the Mekong Basin was characterized by a political-
security led agenda, closed protectionism, and intervention by the great 
powers like the US, the Soviet Union, and China. The Cold War and the 
Cambodia issue had deferred the cooperation in the Mekong Basin for 
two decades. Between 1978 and 1995 the MC was suspended and the 
Interim Mekong Committee was formed without the participation of 
Cambodia. Unsurprisingly, as noted by Nakayama (2002: 277), there 
were no significant projects carried out; data collection and the 
implementation of studies became the major activities of the committee, 
while some small domestic projects were implemented mostly in 
Thailand.  
 
4.1.2 New regionalism: turning the battlefield into a market place 
 
The end of the Cold War in the late 1980s was a turning point for 
regionalism in the Mekong region. Regional cooperation recovered and 
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expanded, along with the reform in socialist states that faced economic 
catastrophe after the collapse of their major sponsor, the Soviet Union 
(Stubbs 2012). The transition had started even before the end of the 
Cold War. In 1986, Laos launched a reform of its economic policies in 
order to open up its market: this was the ‘New Economic Mechanism’. 
Vietnam, in a similar vein, adopted its ‘Doi Moi’ (‘Renovation’) policy in 
the same year. Both cases primarily implied an embrace of the market 
system and the opening of the door to foreign trade and investment. In 
Cambodia, the tragic civil war ended in 1991 and the first democratic 
elections were held in 1993 with the support of the UN. A year later, the 
first bridge in history across the Lower Mekong was opened between 
Thailand and Laos. The MC, which was a UN-affiliated body, was 
transformed into the independent Mekong River Commission (MRC) in 
1995. Together, these changes signified the rise of new regionalism with 
the collapse of ideological barriers and re-engagement in the fragmented 
region.  
 There also have been attempts by actors within the Mekong region to 
stimulate regionalism (see Osborn, 2000; Nguyen, 2006; Sisowath, 2006; 
Taweesit et al., 2008). After its period of booming economic growth in 
the 1980s, the Thai government launched its policy of ‘Turning the 
Battlefield into the Market Place’ initiated in 1988 to benefit from 
economic opportunities in the newly opened markets of neighbouring 
countries. The Quadrangle Economic Cooperation (QEC), backed by 
Thailand and China, was an early framework to increase trade and 
tourism based on cooperation in northern Thailand, south-western 
China, north-eastern Myanmar and north-western Laos. Meanwhile, the 
external influence on Mekong regionalism had not completely faded out 
but moved towards more economic issues. The Greater Mekong 
Subregion Economic Cooperation (GMS), promoted by the ADB, 
commenced in 1992 and covered all six countries in the Mekong Basin. 
Moreover, Japan’s Forum of Comprehensive Development in Indochina 
(FCDI) was created in 1993 and underlined the importance of Japan as a 
major trade partner in the region.  
 The skyrocketing economic growth of ASEAN in the 1990s allowed 
the members to pursue their interests for mutual development based on 
the comparative advantage of subregions. Such sub-regions were called 
‘growth areas’ – one of them is the ASEAN-Mekong Basin 
Development Cooperation (AMBDC) announced in 1996. AMBDC was 
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regarded as the first formal cooperation scheme that tied the Mekong 
countries to all ASEAN members except Thailand. The significance of 
AMBDC lay in the development of a railway route across Southeast Asia 
from Singapore to China, as well as the construction and renovation of 
damaged routes in Cambodia, Laos, Vietnam, Myanmar and Thailand. 
The Asian financial crisis of 1997 delayed those projects, which were 
backed financially mainly by Singapore and Malaysia (Chongkittavorn, 
2004: 25).  
 
Figure 4.1 Major Regional cooperation frameworks in the Mekong Basin 
 
The most important move in the reconciliation between ASEAN and 
non-member countries in the Mekong Basin was that Vietnam decided 
to join ASEAN in 1995, with Laos and Myanmar following in 1997, and 
Cambodia in 1999. Accession of the new members to ASEAN indicated 
that the old contestations had ended. In addition, it signified that these 
countries had a strong intention to pursue cooperation (Narine, 2002). 
Major drivers of regional integration included investments, assistance 
from the more prosperous ASEAN members and the intention to build 
up the regional bargaining power in the international arena, as well as 
draw in investments and assistance from organizations and countries 
dealing with ASEAN (Mya Than 2006: 129-130).  
As noted by Hettne and Söderbaum (2002), new regionalism was part 
of the structural transformation of world politics in four ways: the move 
away from the bi-polar system of the Cold War to a multi-polar world, 
the decline the role of the US as a world hegemon, the erosion of the 
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Westphalian state system with the expansion of interdependence and 
globalization, and the changing attitude in developing and post socialist 
countries towards neoliberal economic development and political 
systems. These conditions are relevant in the case of Mekong 
regionalism. As earlier presented, the end of the Cold War changed the 
political landscape in the Mekong region, with all states embracing the 
liberal market economy, though not the liberal political system. 
However, the puzzle in this case is how regionalism as a political project 
has led to the process of regionalization. The next section focuses on the 
GMS as an example of the approach to enhance cooperation within the 
framework of regionalism. This approach provides more insight into the 
dynamics of regionalization, and sheds light on the degree of regionness 
in the Mekong Basin – as the emergence of a region in the making. 
 
4.2 GMS and ASEAN: Building of the regional market  
  
4.2.1 The Greater Mekong Subregion (GMS) 
 
Though it is named after the Mekong, the GMS is essentially a different 
idea for the river basin. The name ‘greater’ implies that it is not only 
aimed at spatial development for the whole basin but goes far beyond 
that geographical area. According to the ADB (2012), the GMS is an 
economic area bound together by the Mekong River, covering 2.6 
million km2 and a combined population of around 326 million people 
from six countries across the whole Mekong basin: China (Yunnan 
Province and Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region), Myanmar, Laos, 
Thailand, Cambodia and Vietnam. Initiated in 1992, the GMS is the first 
and the only regional cooperation scheme covering the entire Mekong 
Basin, comprising both the Upper Mekong (China and Myanmar) and 
the Lower Mekong (Laos, Thailand, Cambodia, and Vietnam).20 The 
GMS has been a milestone marking the end of the Cold War in 
Southeast Asia and the transformation of the Mekong from an iron 
curtain to a market place.  
The GMS rationale for economic cooperation among bordering 
countries has long been recognized as a stepping stone to creating larger 
markets for national producers and consumers and to establishing 
                                                          
20 In March 2016 China initiated the ‘Lancang-Mekong Cooperation (LMC)’. It is the 
second formal regional forum of the entire Mekong development. 
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economies of scale by reducing barriers to trade, capital and labour 
through the development of regional infrastructure networks and the 
management of spill-over of costs and benefits across borders. The ADB 
(2010: 1) claims that regional cooperation is particularly relevant for 
land-locked areas – i.e., Laos and southern regions of China – by 
enabling them to get access to international markets.  
The GMS is a loosely structured framework based on 
intergovernmental cooperation in various forums, from the heads of 
governments’ summit and ministerial meetings down to operational 
levels. Unlike ASEAN, the GMS does not have a regulatory body or 
charter, but rather has a ten-year strategy as its main cooperation 
framework. The ADB is technically the GMS’s secretariat, and mainly 
provides technical assistance to development projects funded by both 
the ADB itself and other international donors.  
The mandate of the GMS includes the implementation of sub-
regional projects in transport, energy, telecommunications, environment, 
human resource development, tourism, trade, private sector investment, 
and agriculture. Priority infrastructure projects are targeted on economic 
corridors such as the East-West Economic Corridor that is meant to 
extend eventually from the Andaman Sea in Myanmar via Thailand and 
Laos to central Vietnam, bridging the Indian Ocean and the Pacific coast 
(ADB 2010). It is an attempt to create a larger and linked market in order 
to stimulate trade and investment, from both intra- and extra-regional 
capital owners. 
This vision of the GMS is attractive to governments and investors in 
ASEAN and China, who see opportunities for expanding markets. It 
aims to merge the economy of the Mekong countries in ASEAN with 
southwest China, which is complementary to the Chinese central 
government’s policy for the development of the Western region 
(Badenoch 2002: 7). Intra-GMS trade almost doubled from 4% in 2000 
to 7.4% in 2013 (ADB 2013: 17). Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) flows 
to the GMS have increased more than two times between 2000 and 2012 
and intra-GMS FDI has grown even faster, at around ten times during 
the same period. Graph 4.1 shows the growth of extra-regional FDI 
inflows, from e.g., Japan, EU and the US. Graph 4.2 underlines that FDI 
generated within the group is growing much faster, though it concerns 
smaller amounts. 
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Graph 4.1: Total FDI inflow: extra-regional to GMS (billion USD) 
Source: ADB (2015) Greater Mekong Subregion Statistic on Growth, Connectivity and 
Sustainable Development. p.18. 
 
 
 
 
Graph 4.2: Total FDI inflow: intra-GMS (million USD) 
Source: ADB (2015) Greater Mekong Subregion Statistic on Growth, Connectivity and 
Sustainable Development. p.18. 
 
 
 
The expansion of capital flows has produced a dramatic change in 
energy demand. According to the ADB (2012c: 2), peak energy demand 
in the Mekong region is predicted to triple from about 83 GW21 in 2010 
to more than 227 GW in 2025. The biggest share comes from Thailand, 
which accounts for around 29% of the whole region followed by 
Vietnam and southern China (Guangxi and Yunnan). By 2030 the three 
countries would account for about 96% of peak power demand, while 
Cambodia, Myanmar and Laos may account for only 4%. Nonetheless, 
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the latter three countries possess great reserves of natural resources for 
electricity production, especially in natural gas and hydropower, which 
potentially will generate income from exportation to the neighbouring 
countries. The relationship between Thailand and Laos is the best 
example. The former is the biggest importer of electricity while the latter 
is the smallest country in terms of population and power demand but the 
biggest exporter in the region, as shown in table 4.1.  
 
Table 4.1: Intra-GMS Power Trade in 2010 (GWh*)  
Source: ADB (2012) GMS Power Trade and Interconnection: Two Decades of Cooperation. p,12. 
 
Country Export Import Net Import/Export 
Cambodia - 1,546  - 1,546 
Laos 6,944 1,265 5,688 
Myanmar 1,720 - 1,720 
Thailand** 1,427 6,938 - 5,511 
Vietnam 1,318 5,599 - 4,281 
China*** 5,659 1,720 3,939 
 
* Gigawatt-hour 
** Excluding Thailand’s import from Malaysia 
*** Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region and Yunnan Province, excluding power trade from/to 
other parts of China 
 
The GMS Regional Indicative Master Plan on Power Interconnection 
provides a framework for GMS power connection projects to be 
implemented during the 2004–2020 period. Its long-term goal is to 
create a competitive and efficient subregional power trade market (ADB 
2005) as well as to promote private sector investment in a model of 
independent power producers (IPP), facilitated by the Inter-
governmental Agreement on Regional Power Trade in the GMS (ADB 
2012c). Cross-border transmission lines are developing and potentially 
support an integrated power system. Laos, for instance, has been 
exporting hydroelectric power generated from its Mekong’s tributaries to 
Thailand since 1998. It is the biggest exporter in the region and plans to 
expand supplies to Vietnam and Cambodia.  
The total power grid is still a distant vision. In order to move from 
one-way cross-border supply to a region-wide power system, the 
governments will have to pool sovereignty to regulate and institutionalize 
a common liberalized and competitive power market. The Road Map for 
GMS Expanded Energy Cooperation (ADB 2012: 1) states that: 
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…Regional cooperation is an effective way to ensure cost-effective energy 
supply with focus on cross-border electricity trading, and the 
interconnection of transmission networks to connect strong energy demand 
growth centres with rich indigenous energy resource centres….the 
integration is also an effective way to mitigate climate change by enhancing 
efficiency on the entire regional energy system and exploiting resources in 
an optimal manner with least environmental impacts.  
 
The rationale for the integrative power market are stated in this road 
map, focusing on four major strategic objectives: (1) enhance access to 
energy for all sectors, particularly the poor; (2) develop and utilize more 
efficient, indigenous, low carbon and renewable resources while reducing 
imported fossil fuels; (3) improve energy supply security through cross-
border power trade; and (4) promote public-private partnership and 
private sector participation, particularly from SMEs, for energy 
development (ADB 2012b: 2).  
However, the GMS Energy Cooperation Work Plan (2009-2015) has 
defined renewable energy sources as biofuel/biomass, solar, wind and 
micro-hydro22 (ADB 2012b: 5), not large hydropower dams. The extra-
regional actors have instead focused more on other developments; e.g., 
the World Bank on micro-hydro and the US on petroleum. The decline 
in support from extra-regional capital to the hydropower business has 
been compensated by intra-regional investment, usually with 
participation by governments and transnational firms mainly from China 
and Thailand.23 
Although the GMS is not a formal-legal regional development 
framework, its large capacity both in terms of financial and technical 
assistance has substantial influence towards building developmental 
regionalism, involving non-state actors such as transnational companies 
that are seeking opportunities  in a larger regional market. In order to 
expand the market in the Mekong Basin, the GMS has been promoting, 
e.g., the building of cross-border transport infrastructures and the 
establishment of economic corridors.  The ADB’s GMS strategy 
framework (2011: 10) clearly states its roles in regionalism as follows 
 
                                                          
22 small hydropower project with capacity of 5 to100 kW generated by natural water 
flow for using in remote areas away from the grid (IRENA 2012: 11) 
23 Personal interview with Witoon Permphongsachareun, Mekong Ecology and Energy 
Network (MEE-NET), Bangkok, 9 April 2013. 
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GMS Program is firmly rooted in a broad evolving structure of Asian 
regionalism that already includes 54 regional institutions. These institutions 
fall into four broad categories: (i) overarching, with the purpose of 
convening summits that provide normative and declaratory frameworks that 
legitimize and support regional cooperation and integration; (ii) functional, 
with a specialized technical agenda on a focused topic; (iii) facilitating, 
through the provision of advisory, administrative, technical, and financial 
support to a given area; and (iv) security. 
 
 Seen from this perspective, ASEAN, would seem to fit in categories 
(i) and (iv), which relate to the provision of regional norms and security, 
and revolve around political will. The GMS plays a more technocratic 
role in categories(ii) and (iii), which are more technical and resource-
driven. More specifically, functional organizations such as the MRC may 
contribute across all categories but at a smaller scale and based on more 
limited capacity. Although it does not have a solid, well-structured 
governance structure, the GMS can still influence regionalism, driving 
regionalization in order to boost development, through its capacity in 
hard-infrastructure development while avoiding sensitive political issues 
such as state sovereignty over transboundary watercourses. 
 
4.2.2 Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)  
 
Since the enlargement of ASEAN to the Mekong Basin in the 1990s, the 
disparity in socio-economic development between the former members 
and the newcomers has been one of the biggest challenges (ASEAN 
Secretariat, 2005a). In 2003, the ASEAN leaders signed the Declaration 
of ASEAN Concord II or Bali Concord II, agreeing to establish the 
ASEAN Community in 2020 (this was later changed to 2015),  consisting 
of three pillars:  
1) ASEAN Political Security Community (APSC) 
2) ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) 
3) ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community (ASCC) 
Of the three pillars, the one related to economic integration is the most 
prominent. The database of ASEAN legal instruments 24  provided by 
                                                          
24 Legal documents include agreements, protocols, conventions etc., which have been 
accepted by member states through signing, acceptance or ratification. Statements and 
declarations expressing aspirations and political will are excluded. 
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ASEAN  legal services (ASEAN Secretariat 2015) shows that there are 59 
agreements under AEC, compared with 14 for APSC and only 8 for 
ASCC. The distribution across the  three pillars seems to reflect a 
preference for a regionalism of the free market, which separates ‘the 
market’ from ‘the state’, and implies regional governance with limited 
supranational authority. Since its establishment in 1967, ASEAN 
governance has been characterized by the “ASEAN Way”, which implies 
cooperation among states based on consensus decision making, 
informality, non-confrontation and non-intervention in other states 
affairs (Acharya 2001).25  
The foundation of AEC is rooted in schemes that were established 
since the 1990s, including the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA), the 
ASEAN Framework Agreement on Services (AFAS), and the ASEAN 
Investment Area (AIA). The AEC is a further step to establish a single 
market in Southeast Asia by allowing the free circulation of goods, 
services and investments. In the case of people, even though citizens of 
ASEAN generally can travel throughout the region for tourism and visit 
other countries without a visa, only some skilled labourers are allowed to 
work in other member states.  Policy makers fear that the wide economic 
development gap among countries may cause excessive transborder 
migration beyond control of the member states (Hew, 2005: 55).    
Comparatively speaking, the ASEAN framework is more 
institutionalized but is less concrete than that of the GMS, which focuses 
more on economic infrastructure, and the MRC, which plays a specific 
role in water-related development. There is a division of labour related to 
Mekong development, according to which the MRC is responsible for 
transboundary water management while the ADB sponsors energy 
planning and development of smaller projects on the Mekong’s 
tributaries as well as studies for the impacts of hydropower development 
on the mainstream. Usually, the ADB just makes sure that national 
government comply with its standards in development projects, e.g., 
concerning safeguards on resettlement, environment and indigenous 
groups.26 
                                                          
25  Some observers have criticized the focus on market-led regionalism in ASEAN 
because it has resulted in a lack of attention to domestic politics, in particular the 
absence of democracy (Juego 2015). 
26  Personal interview with Barend Frielink, Deputy Country Director, ADB – Lao 
PDR, Vientiane, 27 March 2014. 
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As part of its ambitions for regional market building, ASEAN has set 
out to establish an integrated energy system, called the ASEAN Power 
Grid (APG), a policy framework with modalities for power 
interconnection and trade, as well as enhanced energy infrastructure 
facilities in ASEAN with the commissioning of power interconnection 
projects (ASEAN Secretariat 2007). The ASEAN Work Plan of Action 
on Energy Cooperation (APAEC 2010–2015) mentions that is wishes to 
enhance energy security, and contribute to accessibility and sustainability 
of the ASEAN region with due consideration to health, safety and 
environment, through accelerating regional development including by 
the establishment of the APG and a Trans-ASEAN gas pipeline 
(ASEAN Secretariat 2012c: 11).  
The APG is a flagship program adopted in 1997 under the ASEAN 
Vision 2020, aiming to ensure regional energy security while promoting 
the efficient utilization and sharing of resources. The intention is to link 
up the power lines in the 10 ASEAN countries by 2020. Its strategy 
encourages the establishment of interconnections among fifteen 
identified projects, first on cross-border bilateral terms, then gradually 
expanded to a sub-regional level and, finally, to a totally integrated 
Southeast Asian power grid system. Currently, three APG projects are 
under construction, all of them involving Laos as a central point of 
connection with Thailand, Cambodia and Vietnam (ASEAN Secretariat 
2012c: 12-13).  
According to the ASEAN Master Plan, member states should 
basically rely on a so-called ‘three pronged strategy’ consisting of 
physical, institutional and people connectivity. Energy and transport are 
the main elements in the physical connectivity, while trade, investment 
and service liberalization and facilitation are highlighted in the 
institutional aspect of connectivity (ASEAN Secretariat 2011). Even if 
offering less significant potential than natural gas, hydropower is seen to 
play an important role as an alternative and renewable source of energy 
(ASEAN Secretariat 2010). Based on these logics, developers are able to 
legitimize the growth of hydropower industry, something that also 
responds to the desire of global institution like the World Bank to 
promote renewable energy  
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Map 4.1: The ASEAN Power Grid 
source: www.aseanenergy.org 
 
 
 
4.2.3 Regional governance of the energy market  
 
It is clear that both the GMS and ASEAN have promoted the idea of 
establishing an integrated power system through cross-border trade and 
investment in various sources of energy, notably natural gas and 
hydropower. It seems that the regional power market is attractive to 
public and private businesses alike. A survey done in 2010 showed that 
more than 3,000 opinion economic leaders in Asia prioritize energy and 
related infrastructures as the most compelling sector for regional 
integration (Capannelli 2011: 8). 
 Efforts to create forms of regional governance of energy are loosely 
structured, though institutionalized in accordance with the formal 
regional structures of ASEAN and the GMS. Regional governance of the 
electricity sector in the Mekong Basin has focused more on the 
facilitation of regional power interconnection than on regulation of 
energy-related activities. This is related to the domestic governance of 
states in the region. So far there have been independent regulatory 
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agencies for power services only in China and partially in Thailand (ADB 
2013). This is probably because most of the Mekong countries, except 
China and Thailand, established or rebuilt their infrastructure after the 
long period of civil wars and recurring regime changes. So, the provision 
of services and the promotion of investment in electricity infrastructure 
seem to be the top priority. 
As part of the pillar of AEC, the ASEAN Ministers of Energy 
Meeting (AMEM) and the Senior Official Meeting on Energy are the 
main platforms for regional energy policy. The ASEAN Centre for 
Energy is a technical support body to facilitate and coordinate the two 
arms of energy cooperation in Southeast Asia. First, the ASEAN Gas 
Consultative Council and the ASEAN Council on Petroleum, which 
include national companies agencies in the gas and oil industries, are 
major consultative forums for the Trans-ASEAN Gas Pipeline project 
(TAGP), which is mainly implemented by the maritime countries of 
Southeast Asia(Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, the Philippines and 
Brunei). Second, policy and research activities of the ASEAN Power 
Grid, which concentrates on mainland Southeast Asia, are supervised by 
the Meeting of Heads of ASEAN Power Utilities/Authorities (HAPUA), 
comprising national electricity agencies and state enterprises such as the 
Electricity Generating Authority of Thailand (EGAT) and Electricité du 
Laos (EdL).  The goal of HAPUA was to realize the APG by removing 
the barriers to cross-border mobility, such as legal questions, technical 
standards and financial institutions by 2015 (Suyardi 2015). 
The institutional setting of the GMS is similar in nature, though it is 
less formal. The sub-regional Electric Power Forum (EPF) was created 
in 1995 as a regular platform for this cooperation. Half of the members 
include representatives from government energy policy and planning 
agencies and the other half are representatives of power utilities. The 
Experts Group on Power Connection and Trade was founded in 1998 to 
prepare the regional master plan.  The Intergovernmental agreement 
(IGA) on regional power trade in the GMS was signed in 2002 and 
provides the legal framework for the project; it established the Regional 
Power Trade Coordination Committee (RPTCC) to oversee and 
coordinate the implementation (ADB 2012c: 6-7). The establishment of a 
Regional Power Coordination Centre (RPCC) for regulating cross-border 
power trade has also been on the agenda since 2011, but has not been 
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finalized yet because of different views among member states on the 
appropriate host country for the centre.27 
Because of differences in transmission infrastructures and regulatory 
frameworks among countries, the implementing strategy for the regional 
power market is arranged into four phases (ADB 2012c: 39). The first step 
is the current period in which the regional transmission network has not 
yet been put in place. This implies that power trade is executed on the 
basis of bi-lateral power purchase agreements between government 
agencies or takes the form of electricity sales by independent power 
producers in one country to national power utilities in other countries. 
Practically, electricity transmission in the Mekong countries is exclusively 
operated by national power utilities or state enterprises such as EdL and 
EGAT.28 Hence, states agencies continue to be the sole buyers of cross-
border power trade in cooperation with private producers. 
The cross-border transmission and regulatory arrangement can be a 
further step in regional power trade. As noted by Aalto (2014: 95), the 
second step is possible when the bi-lateral infrastructure and regulatory 
frameworks are in place and limited surplus capacity is tradable to the 
third country. In the third phase, cross-border transmission should be 
developed and third (private) parties other than national power utilities 
are allowed to trade. Finally a regional electricity market should be 
established. The market is supposed to provide a competitive space for 
traders, either public or private, across borders in the region. The energy 
market in the Mekong Basin currently is in between the first and the 
second steps.  
Although the regional plan and policy are evidently grounded, all 
countries have different systems and the governments concentrate on 
their bi-lateral projects even though they are not cost-efficient compared 
to regional/multilateral arrangements.  In order to achieve full 
integration huge investment are required to harmonize business 
regulations, technical standards and physical systems that affect the 
interconnection of national power grids. As commented by an EGAT 
officer, although the frameworks of ASEAN and GMS have not made 
many commitments and have not yet produced tangible results for 
transboundary power linkage, the regional platforms have provided 
                                                          
27 Personal interview with Thongphet Douangngeune, Deputy Managing Director  
of  Electricité du Laos (EdL), Vientiane, 24 June 2013. 
28 Ibid. 
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opportunities for formal and regular multilateral negotiations and 
legitimize their bilateral transboundary projects.29 
In brief, the hydropower industry has concentrated in Laos that is 
located at the centre of the region and is surrounded by all other Mekong 
countries. This is one of the most important factors for the expansion of 
the hydropower industry in Laos – this is not only based on its national 
policy, but also on the recognition by neighbouring governments and 
foreign companies of the opportunities offered by of this regional 
ambition. Opening access to natural resources and realizing a free flow 
of economic factors to the market, especially in the energy sector,  is a 
clear objective of the GMS, while ASEAN has tried to institutionalize 
regional policies such as on the ASEAN Power Grid in order to support 
a common market within the AEC. Those projects link to the other side 
of the same coin, the issue of regional water governance led by the MRC. 
Both ASEAN and the GMS do not have a clear mandate on this issue, as 
this  falls within the remit of the MRC. This is another sign of Mekong 
regionalism. 
 
4.3 The Mekong River Commission (MRC) and hydropower 
development 
 
4.3.1 The MRC: governance and riparianization  
 
The regionalization of natural resource development has been more 
pronounced during the new wave of regionalism after the Cold War. An 
explanation may be found in the following three elements. Firstly, though 
economic and social development was mentioned in the policies of old 
regionalism such as SEATO, the Mekong Committee and ASEAN before 
the end of the Cold War, it was overshadowed by security issues. 
Subsequently, the more peaceful and stable political context since the late 
1980s has paved the way for regionalism beyond the political-security 
sphere. Secondly, there are fewer political barriers than in the past between 
early capitalist countries in the region such as Thailand, which has greater 
demand for natural resources, and newly marketized economies such as 
Cambodia, Vietnam and Laos, which have an underexploited reservoir of 
                                                          
29Personal interview with Paruhas Vongthaned, Director of Energy Economic Division, 
Electricity Generating Authority of Thailand (EGAT), Bangkok, 3 April 2013. 
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resources. Finally, the economic development of the newcomers has 
concentrated in extraction of natural resources so as to integrate their 
economies into regional and global markets.  
Transboundary water governance (TWG) of the Mekong Basin is 
based on the ‘Agreement on the Cooperation for the Sustainable 
Development of the Mekong River Basin’ signed on 5th April 1995 in 
Chiang Rai, Thailand. The agreement replaced former legal documents 
related to Mekong governance, including the Statute of the Committee 
for Coordination of Investigations of the Lower Mekong Basin from 
1957, the Joint Declaration of Principles for Utilization of the Waters of 
the Lower Mekong Basin from 1975, and the Declaration Concerning 
the Interim Committee for the Coordination of Investigations of the 
Lower Mekong Basin from 1978. The agreement endorsed the 
establishment of Mekong River Commission (MRC), an independent 
structure replacing the former UN-affiliated Mekong Committee. The 
MRC Secretariat (MRCS) was set up to implement the agreement with 
technical and day-to-day administration as well as coordination among the 
member governments of Cambodia, Laos, Thailand, and Vietnam. 
Governance of the MRC is based on a structure of intergovernmental 
cooperation comprising: 
(1) The Council of Ministers: the ministerial meeting that meets 
annually to take policy and strategic decisions; 
(2) The Joint Committee (JC) of senior government officials, who are 
permanent secretary or director-general in a relevant ministry, e.g. the 
Ministry of Environment and Natural Resources: this committee 
meets as a board  several times per year to make operational decisions 
and to oversee the international secretariat; 
(3) Four National Mekong Committees (NMCs) that liaise between 
the respective national government and the MRCS as well as 
coordinate national policies and actions among national departments 
regarding the Mekong water resources; 
(4) The Secretariat (MRCS), headed by a Chief Executive Officer 
(CEO), which runs the administration, performs technical studies and 
is responsible of capacity development of the system.  
In 2014, around 150 staff worked in two MRC Secretariat offices, one 
in Vientiane, Laos and another in Phnom Penh, Cambodia. The offices 
are staffed by riparian national officers, i.e., Cambodian, Lao, Thai and 
Vietnamese citizens, as well as international employees and technical 
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consultants. Vientiane may be seen as the capital of hydropower 
development in the Lower Mekong Basin. Not only because it is the 
capital of Laos where most dams in the region are located, but also 
because the hydropower section of MRCS is there.  
As indicated before, the MRC is the basin organization only for the 
Lower Mekong Basin (LMB) since the governments of China and 
Myanmar in the Upper Mekong Basin (UMB) have never been joined the 
Commission, although they are currently dialogue partners. The MRC 
has engaged them since 1996, but their accession is not foreseen yet. 
Cooperation takes two main forms: information sharing and joint 
capacity building for water-related activities such as navigation, 
hydropower, and environmental protection. China signed an MoU with 
the MRC in 2002 to provide daily water flow and rainfall data in Yunnan 
province (southern China) during the wet season in order to support the 
MRC’s flood management downstream. As discussed in the former 
chapter, China also launched the ‘Lancang Mekong Cooperation’ (LMC) 
in March 2016 as a competing intergovernmental framework for 
economic and water-related development that includes all of the MRC’s 
members. The host claims that the LMC is supplementary to China-
ASEAN relations as well as a model for South-South cooperation (China 
Daily 2016). At this early stage, it is unclear whether the LMC will be 
supportive or competitive to the MRC. 
Another consultative but influential forum for MRC policies is the 
group of development partners comprising international donors, both 
governments and international organizations. While the MRC has been 
funded for a  minor part by its member states, the major contribution 
comes from financial and technical assistance provided by donors. In 
2012, the MRC received 23.35 million USD in contributions from its 
development partners30 and 1.8 million USD from the riparian states 
(MRC 2013: 5).  The current partners include Australia, Belgium, 
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Japan, Luxemburg, New Zealand, 
Sweden, Switzerland, the Netherlands, the US, as well as the European 
Union (EU) and the World Bank Group. Some international 
organizations work closely with the MRC in co-funded projects or 
studies and have obtained observer status at the MRC’s meetings. They 
are the ADB, ASEAN, the International Union for Conservation of 
                                                          
30 Top 5 contributors to the MRC budget in 2012 are Finland, Belgium, Australia, 
Switzerland and Sweden.  
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Nature (IUCN), the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), 
the United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the 
Pacific (UNESCAP), and the World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF).  
The rapid economic growth in the region has brought about an 
increase of tensions and led to competition for water resources, in 
addition to the occurrence of noticeable seasonal draught and flooding 
crises in the Mekong Basin. These issues have raised public expectations 
regarding the MRC. The Basin Development Plan (BDP) described the 
MRC’s mandate in article 2 of the Mekong Agreement 1995 as follows:  
 
To promote, support, cooperate and coordinate in the development of the 
full potential of sustainable benefits to all riparian States and the prevention 
of wasteful use of Mekong River Basin waters, with emphasis and 
preference on joint and/or basin-wide development projects and basin 
programmes through the formulation of a basin development plan, that would 
be used to identify, categorise and prioritise the projects and programmes to 
seek assistance for and to implement at the basin level. 
 
The BDP is one of the most concrete products delivered by the MRC 
so far. The BDP 1 (2001-2005) and the BDP 2 (2006-2010) were not 
integrated plans for all member states but were essentially based on 
accumulated information given in national plans and the Mekong sub-
areas reports. The BDP 3 (2011-2015) has provided basin strategies and 
water management scenarios to its members. The important dilemma of 
the BDP is how to balance the twin roles of the MRC in ‘water 
management’ and ‘water development’. The management side seems to 
be more the raison d’être of the MRC while the development side is 
engaged more with other regional frameworks, including the GMS and 
ASEAN.31 
Nonetheless, a challenge to the MRC was that the BDP 1 and 2 were 
not closely linked to other regional development frameworks, such as 
GMS and ASEAN. According to an MRC officer, the BDP 3 tries to 
integrate more into the regional context but yet more interaction is 
needed. This is also the case for multi-stakeholder engagement, which is 
often limited. Frequently MRC forums are held for water specialists, but 
there are usually just a few participants from other related sectors, e.g. 
                                                          
31 Personal interview with Anoulak Kitthitkoun, Programme Coordinator, Basin  
Development Programme – Mekong River Commission, Vientiane, 7 April 2014. 
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energy, agriculture, law and so on. Public participation seems to be one 
of the top strategic goals of the BDP, but it has been still far from being 
realized. The MRCS has a limited role in organizing public participation 
because it is within the remit of member governments  to choose the 
information they wish to publish, define who are the stakeholders and 
select the participants in MRC related activities.32 
A dilemma of MRC governance, therefore, is its promotion of a 
basin-wide approach for water governance, emphasizing the 
international paradigm of integrated water resources management 
(IWRM) on the one hand, and its reliance on national/state-centric 
governance on the other hand. As indicated above, this reflects a 
contradiction between the management side of the MRC, which is aimed 
at minimizing transboundary impacts and unsustainable uses of water at 
the regional level, and its development side, which seeks to maximize 
economic benefits of water, something that is highly prioritized by the 
member states. This tendency has emerged even more clearly in the 
recent development of the MRCS. In 2015, the MRC kicked-off the so-
called ‘riparianization’ of the secretariat, which implies that many 
implementation functions such as fisheries, navigation and irrigation are 
transferred to riparian governments (Cambodia, Laos, Thailand, and 
Vietnam) and are coordinated by regional working groups under the 
MRC framework.  
 According to an officer of the MRC, there are at least four reasons 
for this riparianization. Firstly, there is less support from international 
donors, which tend to give more priority to other regions such as sub-
Sahara Africa. Secondly, their fast growing economic development has 
made the Mekong countries more affluent, and thus able to support their 
own cooperation schemes. Thirdly, the long experience with cooperation 
has generated more competence among staff and know-how among 
national agencies of member states. Fourthly, riparianization is a strategy 
for achieving more efficient governance with a smaller organization and 
more focused mandates. The decentralization of project implementation 
makes the MRCS smaller both in term of manpower and functions. The 
MRCS concentrates more on its core functions such as coordination and 
                                                          
32 Personal interview with Privan Limpanboon, Basin Development Programme –  
Mekong River Commission, Vientiane, 4 April 2014. 
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technical support.33 However, all these conditions seem to significantly 
reduce the role of the MRCS. 
The core functions of the MRCS identified by the Strategic Plan 
2011-2015 (MRC 2011c: 21) include: (1) secretariat administration; (2) 
river basin management (data acquisition and exchange; modelling and 
assessment; planning support; forecasting, warning and emergency 
response; implementing MRC procedures; promoting dialogue and 
communication; reporting and dissemination); (3) capacity building and 
tools development; and (4) consulting and advisory services. The biggest 
project expenditure, or around 20% of the budget, relates to the   
Information and Knowledge Management Programme (MRC 2013: 11), 
which is well expressed in the MRC’s core competence of technical 
support. 
The role of development partners significantly contributes to these 
core functions. International paradigms in water governance such as 
IWRM and sustainable development at the regional level have been 
promoted by the MRCS for many years but its regulatory roles have been 
very limited. This may be explained by the fact that the agency has 
depended on international assistance from non-members much more 
than its own member states, who tend to focus on their national 
development. For instance, foreign donors like the EU members really 
pushed environmental concerns in regional cooperation (Dosch 2010: 
21). The tension between international donors and member states is 
noted in the World Bank and ADB’s joint paper (2006: 19): 
 
…Some development partners retain reservations with respect to the MRC 
involvement in project development and want it rather to strengthen its 
regulatory and conservation roles.  The countries on the other hand 
increasingly call for the MRC to assist in the facilitation of sustainable 
development. 
 
This debate seems to weigh more on the latter when the 
riparianization is going to take place. In practice, the number of 
international officers (from non-MRC countries) will be reduced 
significantly and many will be replaced by riparian nationals. This 
                                                          
33 Personal interview with Voradeth Phonekeo, Initiative for Sustainable Hydropower  
– Mekong River Commission, Vientiane, 17 March 2014. 
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includes the new CEO, a position for which only riparian national 
applicants are eligible in the announcement (field observation 2014).34 
Riparianization seems to reflect a tendency of regionalism instead of 
internationalism, which means that governments in the region try to 
control policies and governance of the MRC and reduce international 
donors’ influence. Similar to the current hydropower investment, where 
private funds and developers from within the region become much more 
important players than outsiders,  TWG in the Mekong Basin seems to 
become more regionalized in order to facilitate exploitation and trade of 
water resources on a regional basis.  
 
4.3.2 The MRC: regulatory role and hydropower mission  
 
As noted in the previous section, Mekong regionalism has moved from 
being an expression of the competition of political ideologies during the 
period of old regionalism to cooperation aimed at conflict resolution in 
water use, as represented by the Mekong Agreement 1995. Öjendal 
(2000: 182-85) has provided some interesting observations on the 
position of member states in the 1990s. Thailand, a country in the mid-
stream of the Mekong and the fastest growing economy in the region, 
preferred to have fewer restrictions on water use, making possible inter-
basin diversion for domestic use, coupled with a new model of 
governance, and inclusion of upstream China and Burma (now 
Myanmar) among the members. By contrast, downstream countries 
Cambodia and Vietnam proposed more protective TWG since they were 
the most vulnerable to ecological changes. Laos has a relatively more 
complicated position. More flexible rules would benefit Laos, as the 
country possesses one-third of the total flow in the Lower Mekong and 
has a large hydropower potential. However, the government of Laos 
(GoL) was politically closer to Vietnam and Cambodia and tended to be 
afraid of Thai domination of the basin.  
 The 1995 agreement seems to have been a compromise between 
those positions. Unlike the 1957 statute that considered the Mekong as a 
common resource and required consensus for any decision on 
development, the 1995 agreement contains principles of international 
customary law in water governance but provides a broader and loose 
                                                          
34 Until 2015, all CEOs since the establishment of the MRC were westerners. The first 
riparian CEO from Vietnam takes the office in 2016. 
525758-L-bw-Chattranond
Processed on: 29-10-2018 PDF page: 115
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 4 
  
  
104
regulatory framework. Five principles for water governance are 
mentioned in the preamble of the Mekong agreement including sovereign 
equality and territorial integrity, equitable and reasonable utilization, 
respect for rights and legitimate interests, good faith and transparency 
(MRC 2011a). 
 It seems like these principles essentially imply a model of international 
relations focusing on protection of member states’ power over their land 
and water more than on enhancing efficient water use for common 
interests in the region. The agreement is operationalized in five procedures 
of the MRC, which are the general rules for water governance, . They 
comprise the Procedures for Water Use Monitoring (PWUM), the 
Procedures for Water Quality (PWQ), the Procedures for the 
Maintenance of Flows on the Mainstream (PMFM), the Procedures for 
Data and Information Exchange and Sharing (PDIES), and the 
Procedures for Notification, Prior Consultation and Agreement 
(PNPCA). The final set of procedures, summarized in table 4.2, will be 
discussed more in depth as they are relevant to this study 
 
Table 4.2: Rules for Water Utilization and Inter-basin Diversion 
According to the Mekong Agreement 1996, Article 26 
 
Scope Use Notification prior 
consultation 
Specific 
agreement 
Tributary     
Wet season intra-basin use  
inter-basin diversion 
√ 
√ 
  
Dry season intra-basin use  
inter-basin diversion 
√ 
√ 
  
Mainstream     
Wet season intra-basin use  
inter-basin diversion 
√  
√ 
 
Dry season intra-basin use  
inter-basin diversion 
 √  
√ 
 
 
The PNPCA, adopted by the MRC in 2003, directly engages with how 
decision making on water use should take place among riparian countries.  
This procedure is primarily based on Article 5 of the 1995 Mekong 
agreement in which the Member Countries agree “to utilize the waters of 
the Mekong River system in a reasonable and equitable manner in their 
respective territories”. The Rules for Water Utilization and Inter-basin 
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Diversion provided in Article 26 provide for a different treatment of the 
Mekong mainstream and its tributaries. Mere notification to the joint 
committee of the MRC is enough for any development on the 
tributaries, which are generally domestic rivers, but a prior consultation 
process and agreement are required in the case of the mainstream, which 
is considered an international watercourse.  
The ASEAN Report on Water Resource Management (ASEAN 
Secretariat, 2005b: 2-3) stated that the water situation in the Mekong 
basin is complex because the agreement contains no specific provision 
for water sharing based on the general principle on international water 
law known as ‘reasonable and equitable utilization’, and it does not 
include any formal sanctions. The net result of this water sharing 
approach is that riparian states are faced with uncertain expectations 
regarding the water volume, a situation that is occasionally more 
sensitive when water crises occur.  
It should also be noted that the mentioned provision excludes 
upstream China which is not an MRC member and has planned to have 
at least 8 large hydropower dams on the Mekong/Lancang River 
mainstream, which is expected to contribute 24% of China’s hydropower 
potential by the end of 2020 (Tana 2008: 108-109).  Moreover, tributary 
rivers are not included in the agreement, and conflict potential remains, 
since the MRC members neglected the importance of these tributaries as 
they are actually a significant factor in providing the water volume on the 
mainstream.  
Two hydropower projects on the Mekong mainstream have resulted 
in applications under the PNPCA so far. The Xayaburi dam underwent a 
prior-consultation process in 2010–2011, which was concluded with an 
ambiguous agreement. The second one is Don Sahong dam, for which 
member states requested prior consultation after it was notified in 2015 
(MRC 2016). Both projects were proposed by and are located in Laos. 
In 2016, the GoL has allowed the two projects, developed by Thai and 
Malaysian companies, to be implemented. 
The expanding development of hydropower projects significantly has 
challenged the MRC. The late 2000s saw a hydropower revival in the 
Lower Mekong Basin, as well as a reorganization of the MRCS. In 2008, 
the Initiative for Sustainable Hydropower (ISH) was created as a cross-
cutting hydropower-related policy and planning unit involving related 
MRC programmes, i.e. fisheries, agriculture and irrigation, environment, 
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navigation, flood management and basin planning. The ISH is a unit 
within the Planning Division of the MRCS and replaced the former 
Hydropower Programme in order to integrate work related to 
hydropower development beyond the engineering and energy sectors. 
According to a MRCS officer, the name change is significant because 
hydropower often has a negative connotation for the general public.35 
The ISH assists member countries in relating decisions on hydropower 
development to basin-wide integrated water resources management 
(IWRM) perspectives and supports regional consultations on mainstream 
hydropower development proposals through the MRC’s PNPCA 
process, as demonstrated for the first time in the case of the Xayaburi 
project.  
Initially, the main functions of ISH focused on engineering and dam 
safety. Beyond engineering, the ISH currently focuses more on 
governance-related work, including the preparation of policy papers, 
engaging stakeholders, and contracting strategic environmental 
assessment (SEA) and impact assessment tools for hydropower 
development at the regional/basin level. The ISH has updated the 
database of new hydropower projects originally launched by MRCS since 
2009 and has employed this data in scenario assessments of current and 
future hydropower projects. Studies for individual projects are 
conducted by their international developers/consultants and are 
expected to be consistent with the ISH guidelines.36  In 2014, the ISH 
unit had ten staff members, comprising six Laotians (including the chief), 
two Cambodians and two Australians.37 After most policies, studies and 
technical tools had been put in place, there were only two staff members 
left in 2016 (field observation). 
The MRCS basically has not obtained any regulatory power from the 
riparian governments, as is obvious in the work of the ISH. Studies and 
technical assessment tools for hydropower development are well 
developed; however, their implementation is totally dependent upon the 
decision of member states which hold the exclusive power to endorse 
MRC documents. The MRC’s lack of regulatory power can be witnessed 
                                                          
35 Personal interview with Voradeth Phonekeo, Initiative for Sustainable Hydropower  
– Mekong River Commission, Vientiane, 17 March 2014. 
36 Personal interview with Sophearin Chea, International Cooperation and  
Communication Section – Mekong River Commission, Vientiane, 18 March 2014 
37Perhaps because Thailand has less interest in hydropower development domestically 
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from the PNPCA procedures as applied in the case of the Xayaburi 
project. According to an MRCS officer38, there was no compulsory or 
unified “format” for public consultation process of the Xayaburi project 
because nothing was written about that in the Mekong Agreement 1995. 
Therefore, member states may apply the agreement according to their 
own interpretation and may design domestic processes differently. 
Most likely, hydropower development is more complicated in its 
politics than in its engineering. For an ISH technical advisor, the tools 
created by the MRCS are international standards, some of them even 
more progressive, but national bureaucrats may see them as barriers to 
national development.39 The sensitivity of the MRC’s work may be 
observed in other practices, e.g., the requirement in human resource 
management that all positions in MRCS, starting from the level of 
Programme Coordinator, need to be approved by the four riparian 
governments in order to prevent any dispute between members.40 As an 
intergovernmental organization, the MRCS is highly aware that it needs 
to avoid any intervention in the domestic affairs of the member states.41   
 
4.3.3 MRC and the case of Xayaburi HPP 
 
Unlike dams on domestic tributary rivers, the international dimension of 
the Mekong mainstream dams has made the process of hydropower 
development more complicated. The Mekong Agreement 1995 is the 
only formal-legal rule on basin development. The Xayaburi HPP was the 
first case submitted to the PNPCA process, as prescribed by the 
provision of intra-basin use on the mainstream of the Mekong River in 
Chapter III, article 5.B of the Mekong Agreement 1995. As indicated 
earlier, the prior notification of the project and consultation with all 
members of the MRC (Laos, Thailand, Cambodia, and Vietnam) are 
required.  
 The project host, the GoL in this case, had to submit the project to 
the MRC joint committee. The consultation process took six months and 
                                                          
38 Personal interview with Sophearin Chea, ICCS-MRC, 18 March 2014 
39 Personal interview with Simon Krohn, ISH-MRCS, Vientiane, 23 March 2014 
40 Personal interview with Voradeth Phonekeo, ISH-MRCS, Vientiane, 17 March  
2014. 
41 During the visiting research at the MRCS, the researcher was clearly asked to do any 
contact with Lao government personally, never officially through the MRCS as it is 
sensitive for its protocol with the member governments. 
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was concluded with a recommendation from member states without 
voting or approval and technical advices from the MRC Secretariat. 
Because the Xayaburi project does not involve any inter-basin diversion 
on the mainstream in the dry season, a specific agreement between 
member states, as meant in the Guideline on the implementation of 
PNPCA (MRC 2011), was not required.  
The GoL claimed that the consultation process of the Mekong River 
Commission (MRC) was completed in April 2011 and that the project 
complied with all MRC’s rules (MEM 2012: B-4). This technically meant 
that the project was accepted by all countries. However, Cambodian and 
Vietnamese governments as well as some NGOs were still sceptical and 
demanded more research on the project. As explained by International 
Rivers (2012): 
 
The Xayaburi’s current environmental impact assessment only examines 
impacts 10 kilometers downstream from the dam site. More, Pöyry 
Company from Finland42, the engineering consultant for the project, also 
claims that it can rely on unproven technologies to mitigate any harm the 
dam might cause. In brief, the full extent of the dam’s impacts remains 
unknown… 
 
The lack of the MRC’s regulatory power is visible in the PNPCA of 
the Xayaburi HPP. An ICCS officer at the MRCS noted that there was 
no compulsory or unified format for the public consultation process of 
the Xayaburi project, as he Mekong Agreement 1995 did not contain any 
provision about it.43 This implies that member states may apply the 
Agreement according to their own interpretation and may design 
domestic process differently.  
The MRC’s PNPCA, which has been used for the first time in the 
Xayaburi case, provides evidence of state-centric governance and 
fragmented TWG. There were two consultations in Cambodia and 
Vietnam, while three were held in Thailand. During the process, as 
shown in diagram 4.1, the MRCS provided some financial and personal 
support. Interestingly, while Thai NGOs are the most active 
campaigners against the project, the Thai authorities employed the term 
                                                          
42 It is noted here that Finland is no.1 budget contributor to the MRC. 
43  Personal interview with Sophearin Chea, International Cooperation and 
Communication Section – Mekong River Commission, Vientiane, 18 March 2014. 
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‘public hearing’ instead of ‘public consultation’, which may signal that 
public involvement has a less formal role in the project, which was in 
fact developed by Thai companies and supported by Thai government. 
 
Diagram 4.1: the Xayaburi HPP’s prior-consultation process 
Source: Mekong River Commission, http://ns1.mrcmekong.org/PNPCA/PNPCA-
technicalprocess.htm 
 
 
  
In December 2011, the MRC’s four members declared to postpone 
the Xayaburi project and indicated they needed further research on the 
sustainable development and management of the Mekong River 
including impact from mainstream hydropower development projects. In 
a special meeting during the ASEAN Summit, they also agreed to 
approach the government of Japan and other international development 
partners for support to do a further study (MRC 2011). For the GoL, 
those decisions were only optional and not legally binding.   
However, when the governments of Cambodia and Vietnam were still 
questioning the potential impacts from the dam after the PNPCA 
process had been completed in 2012-2013, the GoL strongly protected 
its sovereignty by continuing the project and responded by requesting 
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the company to adjust the dam’s design time after time.44 The developer 
also claims that the ‘run-of-river’ design of the Xayaburi dam tends to 
have less impact on upstream water levels and the downstream flow, as it 
would require minimal alterations to the river and riverside habitat 
(XPCL: 2012).  
The government gave the green light for the construction of the dam 
in November 2012 and invited Cambodian and Vietnamese 
representatives to the ground-breaking ceremony of the Xayaburi Dam 
(Herbertson 2013: 23). This seems to have implied symbolic approval by 
the neighbouring governments, although the Thai government still kept 
a low profile. Nevertheless, this positive claim may be challenged, since 
the GMS, ASEAN and the MRC can be viewed as exclusive clubs of 
state actors that allow minimal participation by their people. 
Regionalization here seems to be increasingly driven by the states in 
collaboration with the private sector. 
 
4.4 Conclusion 
 
The ongoing hydropower development in the Mekong Basin represents a 
combination of market-driven and state-centric approaches to Mekong 
regionalism. The market logic plays a pivotal role in driving the 
transformation of water for energy purposes, while transforming the 
state to facilitate the making of regional market. The case of hydropower 
development on the Lower Mekong mainstream reveals the 
contradiction in the relationship between regionalism and transboundary 
water governance (TWG).  
First, while deep marketization seems leading the process of new 
regionalism in the Mekong Basin, its water nationalism has been shaped 
by state-led developmentalism originating from the Mekong 
development plan rooted in the old regionalism of the Cold War. 
Second, the mandate of TWG in the Mekong Basin includes both water 
development and water management, which are often contradictory, 
even for different actors within the same state. It is the states, therefore, 
that try to control the TWG in order to support their interests through 
                                                          
44  Personal interview with Daowong Pornkaew,  Director of Energy Policy and 
Planning Department, Ministry of Energy and Mines, Vientiane, 25 June 2013. 
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centralizing TWG at the national level instead of pooling their power to 
international/regional levels of governance. 
This study proposes that the Mekong development is in a transition 
from the ‘old’ to a ‘new’ regionalism. It is a mixture of a market building 
process with a structure of states believing in the centralized control of 
their natural resources. While regionalism is a formal inter-state and rule-
based integration project, regionalization is more informal, market-led 
and based more on non-state actors, while the state plays a less 
important and often complementary role (Chen 2005: 32).  
This chapter discussed the lack of formal regional governance in the 
form of supranational authority. The GMS is just a cooperation 
framework run by sectoral government agencies with support from the 
ADB. ASEAN is much more organized but is strongly committed to 
non-intervention and consensus in decision-making: the so-called 
ASEAN Way (Acharya 2004). The MRC is a consultative forum and 
technical supporter rather than an independent regulator. Political 
sensitivity to the violation of sovereignty, as a scare of old regionalism 
since the Cold War, has weakened development of formal regional 
governance. All of the current regimes in Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam 
have been established just in 1975 and introduced the market economy 
only in the late 1980s.  
Ironically, the name of ASEAN itself contains the term ‘association’, 
instead of ‘organization’ because of its preference for informality of 
integration. This governance style differs from the western style, which 
welcomes more debates, a majority orientation and a legal approach to 
decision making (Acharya, 2004: 64).  The informality is considered 
necessary, however, for solving problem related to differences in 
thinking and interests. The form of cooperation may also boost the trust 
among members, whereas official agreements, such as treaty, might 
reflect a lack of trust (Locknie, 2004: 38). The historical context of 
chronic conflicts and hostility, which was discussed in the early part of 
this chapter, brings along a high degree of distrust in particular forms of 
governance. 
Regional governance in the energy sector is influenced by those 
factors but it also displays empirical expressions of ‘regionness’, 
comprising regionalism in development policies and regionalization of 
the sector through regional projects such as the regional power grid. 
These projects directly serve the interests of the state and the market at 
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the same time. The market provides a space for tradable hydroelectricity, 
yet, as demonstrated by the case of transboundary hydropower, it is 
regulated by the state’s dominance of the TWG structure of the MRC. 
Despite the fact that the MRC promotes integrated water resources 
management, other parts of the Mekong Agreement 1995 clearly aim to 
use water development for economic purposes.  
The recent riparianization of the MRC Secretariat essentially reflects 
attempts by the member states to retain their power vis-à-vis a regional 
body that is sometimes contradicting their development goals. The form 
of regionalism in the Mekong Basin is based on national control of states 
over regional governance. It seems that regionalism here can be 
interpreted as a means to protect state autonomy from growing market 
influences (Hout 1999: 27), embraced by states itself. While the state 
pursues marketization as a strategy for economic growth and 
development, it is struggling to maintain control over decision making 
and regulatory processes. Private sector actors technically have little 
direct power, but often can informally influence the process of 
governance  
The above-mentioned issues reveal the vulnerability of regionalization 
with fragmented regionalism. This means that the market-led 
development facilitated by the state, built on an alliance of governments, 
state-enterprises and private companies, is oriented to official national 
development goals and is not open to all societal groups. Regionalism 
seems to serve the national interests as far as it reflects the state’s 
priorities.  
 Eventually, the implications of regionalism may vary for  different 
sectors and actors. In 2016, Laos held the rotating chairmanship of 
ASEAN, just after the group symbolically kicked off the ASEAN 
Community on 31 December 2015. A statement by a Lao leader noted 
on this remarkable step of Southeast Asian regionalism that: 
  
ASEAN’s successes during the past nearly five decades have been 
remarkable. We are now living in a region of peace, stability and prosperity. 
From tomorrow onwards, ASEAN will officially form a single market and 
production base with a total population of 622 million people with 
combined GDP of almost USD 2.6 trillion, ranking as the 7th largest world 
economy….ASEAN has also become a unique example of ten diverse 
nations who have come together under the ASEAN Community. In this 
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light, the Lao PDR is proud to be part of this Community of ASEAN 
(Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Lao PDR 2016). 
 
The statement leads to two conclusions about Mekong regionalism. 
On the one hand, after half a century of regional turmoil, the 
establishment of a common market and well-developed production base 
is a high priority in this emerging region. The logic of the market seems 
to prevail in regional governance and water is considered as an economic 
resource or natural capital by state and non-state developers. On the 
other hand, Southeast Asia is a region that attempts to accommodate the 
diverse interests of all member states, democratic or authoritarian, rich 
or poor, and big or small. Part of the reason why member states are 
committed to regional frameworks is that they have never had any 
supranational pretension. Yet, regionalism has come to the rescue of 
weak states with limited capacities in development and governance. To 
explore this issue, the next chapter will present a case study of Laos. It 
will explain why and how regionalism has been transplanted at the 
national level through vibrant hydropower development in the country. 
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5 
 
Transformation of the State:              
Laos and the Governance of 
Hydropower Development          
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
It is common for countries to display monuments,  dams and buildings 
as the symbols of successful modernization and nation-state building. 
However, in Laos, dams have become much more than just a symbol. A 
hydropower dam is depicted in the national emblem of Lao People’s 
Democratic Republic, in conformity with the Constitution (2003 article 
90). Dams are displayed on bank notes, in public advertisements, and are 
shown even in music videos of the national anthem. Electricité du Laos 
(EdL) seems to be one of the most important state agencies. Its 
headquarters is located in one of the tallest and most modern buildings 
in Vientiane, and is frequently visited by foreign officials, businessmen, 
consultants, and other professionals in the power sector. 45  The 
Department of Energy Business, which is the main agency for the 
promotion of power trade and investment in cooperation with the 
private sector, uses the term ‘poweringprogress.org’ as its website’s 
domain name, signifying how the country expects to benefit from its 
hydropower potential.  
 Hydropower has become a source of national pride in Laos as 
expressed in a message from Minister of Energy and Mines on the 
fiftieth anniversary of the EdL: 
 
Based on the potential strength and competitive advantages we have in our 
country for development. The Party46 always considers electricity industry as 
top priority. To realize this, the Party has determined and formulated the 
long-term strategy. The government has defined suitable policies for 
promoting, supporting and facilitating the domestic as well as foreign 
                                                          
45 Observation during fieldwork. 
46 Lao People’s Revolutionary Party (the communist party). 
525758-L-bw-Chattranond
Processed on: 29-10-2018 PDF page: 126
 
 
 
Chapter 5 
 
 
 
 
115 
investment. EdL has been assigned as the main executing agency to execute 
and coordinate in all of these investments (EdL 2011: 13-14). 
 
This message makes it easy to guess how a leader in the government 
of Laos (GoL) views hydropower development, which is one of the 
growth industries and major sources of income in Laos. This chapter 
discusses the hydropower potential of Laos and the governance 
framework of the hydropower industry. The country’s relations with 
Thailand, the biggest and oldest partner in the hydropower industry of 
Laos, as well as the case of Xayaburi project demonstrate the structure 
and process of governance in hydropower development particularly at 
the national level. Through the case study, this chapter mainly argues 
that states in the Mekong do not simply embrace regionalism by 
transferring power to regional institutions, but take advantage of 
regionalism as a strategy to keep states relevant as developmental actors 
by collectively creating and enforcing the regulations that favour their 
interests. 
 
Figure 5.1 Bank notes of Lao PDR, displaying hydropower dams 
Photo by: Ome Chattranond 
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5.1 Laos and hydropower development  
 
5.1.1 The hydropower hope 
 
Lao PDR, popularly known as Laos47, is a relatively small country in 
Southeast Asia with an area of 236,800 sq. km. and an estimated 
population of 6.8 million in 2014, ranked 8th out of 10 countries in 
ASEAN, just above micro-states like Singapore and Brunei (CIA 2015a). 
It is a lower middle-income country with a GDP of 11.68 billion USD in 
2014, ranked 132 among 188 countries in the world, but the smallest 
economy in ASEAN. Its GDP per capita was 4,987 USD in 2014 (IMF 
2015). In terms of human development, the UNDP (2014) has 
categorized Laos as having medium human development, globally ranked 
139 out of 187 countries. These figures depict the relatively poor 
position of Laos in the world and the region. The figures are used as well 
as to legitimize the national development agenda as the top priority of 
the state to overcome its least developed country (LDC) status as 
defined by the United Nations.  
Laos is the only land-locked country in Southeast Asia and comprises 
70% massive mountainous areas and plenty of watercourses. The 
country has the highest mean annual rainfall in the Lower Mekong Basin 
(LMB) with an excess of 2,500 mm. in areas of high elevation (MRC 
2011e: 51). The basin covers around 80% of the total area of Laos,  
through which the Mekong mainstream flows for 1,835 kilometres, next 
to 140 tributaries that originate 35% of total water flowing into the 
Mekong mainstream (EdL 2011: 20). These characteristics have created 
both advantages and disadvantages at the same time. While the landscape 
brings very high costs for infrastructure development and international 
trade, abundant water flows through steep valleys provide a high 
potential for hydropower development.  
Laos has the obvious vision to use hydropower, from both the 
Mekong mainstream and its tributaries, as a prime driving force of its 
national development. The hydropower industry is a backbone sector of 
the economy of Laos, with an estimated total potential of 26,500 MW, 
including 18,000 MW technically exploitable, but excluding the potential 
                                                          
47 This dissertation generally employs the name ‘Laos’ and ‘Lao PDR’ interchangeably 
but strictly uses ‘Lao PDR’ when it refers to the political regime after the revolution in 
1975. 
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on the Mekong mainstream. Only 15% of that potential has been 
realized so far but the government of Laos (GoL) has signed MOUs or 
conducted studies on a total of more than 70 hydropower projects, 24 of 
which are either operational or under construction (MEM 2017). 
However, the estimate was drawn from some studies conducted three 
decades ago and represents just the upper limit, so changing technical 
information and higher standards of evaluation on socio-environmental 
impacts associated with hydropower development would affect the real 
potential at the present time (Pholsena and Phonekeo 2004). Map 5.1 
shows that apparently most of the hydropower projects in the Mekong 
Basin, both on the mainstream and the tributaries, are located or 
expected to be in Laos. 
 
Map 5.1 Hydropower projects in the Mekong Basin 
Source: Mekong Flow, http://mekongriver.info/hydropower 
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The economy of Laos has relied heavily on the export of natural 
resources. Next to hydropower, the mining of gold, copper, tin, and 
gypsum are important activities. However, the majority of the labour 
force is still employed in agriculture, which accounts for around 25% of 
GDP but 73% of employment (CIA 2015a). The Asian Development 
Bank (ADB 2014: 220-223) has described Laos as one of the fastest 
growing economies in Asia with an economic growth of more than 7% 
for nine consecutive years. This significant economic growth has helped 
to halve the national poverty rate from 46% in 1992 to 23% in 2013. 
Specifically, the industrial sector grew by 8.5%, with significant 
contributions resulting from foreign direct investment (FDI) in 
hydropower projects, most of which exported electricity to Thailand. In 
this respect, the ADB has highlighted the economic prospect of Laos as 
follows: 
 
Investment in power projects will generate much of the growth over the 
forecast period. More than 20 power projects are under construction, 
including the $3.5 billion Xayaburi hydropower plant, scheduled for 
commissioning in 2019 with capacity to generate 1.3 gigawatts. Power 
generation will get a boost when the large Hongsa lignite power plant, 
able to generate 1.9 gigawatts, comes on stream later this year and is fully 
operational in 2016. Total electricity production is projected to rise by 
6% in 2015, accelerating significantly in 2016 when six new plants come  
online (ADB 2014: 221). 
 
The GoL aims to graduate voluntarily from the Least Developed 
Country (LDC) status by 2020. Although there are some worries about a 
substantial decline in preferential trade treatment and foreign aid – this is 
because 25% of the total budget in the government’s 2011-2015 
development plan is funded by donors and international development 
agencies – the hydropower industry could significantly contribute to 
mitigating possible negative impacts. The UN Resident Coordinator and 
Resident Representative of the UN Development Programme (UNDP) 
in Laos has commented: 
 
We are confident that, given the build-up of foreign direct investment in the 
country over the years, particularly in hydropower energy, the revenues 
generated in this investment will more than make up for any phasing out of 
development assistance (IRIN 2012). 
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For the mentioned reasons, hydropower has become an important 
element of the national strategy for poverty reduction. It is envisaged to 
provide the infrastructure for the development of other sectors and 
transform Laos into the ‘Battery of Asia’, as an exporter of 
hydroelectricity to energy-thirsty neighbours, including Thailand, 
Vietnam, Cambodia and China.48 The expansion of hydroelectricity and 
transmission lines can help meet the twin objectives of supplying 
electricity for domestic use and generating substantial income from 
power export to its neighbours, which contributed 9.97% of total 
exports in 2009 (Ministry of Planning and Investment, Lao PDR 2011). 
The hydropower export has exceeded that of timber and textiles, which 
used to be major exports of Laos since 2001 (ADB 2004 as cited in 
Pholsena and Banomyong 2006: 87), but the history of hydropower 
development in the country began much earlier than that. 
 
5.1.2 Realizing hydropower development in Laos 
 
The Lao economy in general may lag far behind that of its neighbours 
such as Thailand and Vietnam but its hydropower industry has been 
flourishing for a long time. Actually, Laos has been developing its 
hydropower industry since the 1960s with substantial technical support 
from the Mekong Committee and the US, as discussed in the third 
chapter, but chronic political conflicts and insurgencies critically halted 
that development until the 1980s.  However, Doran and Christensen 
(2014: 69) note that Laos has been one of the most experienced 
countries in export-oriented hydropower development, when compared 
to other Asian countries. These authors have noted that the hydropower 
industry in Laos developed relatively early and have distinguished four 
phases in its history. 
The first phase was characterized by state ownership for domestic 
supply, financed by international financial institutions (IFIs) such as the 
World Bank as well as bilateral grants and loans in the 1970s and until 
1998. All of the dams built in this period were developed by the state and 
state-owned. The government started to open up the hydropower sector 
                                                          
48 Personal interview with Daowong Pornkaew,  Director of Energy Policy and   
Planning Department, Ministry of Energy and Mines, Vientiane, 25 June 2013. 
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to foreign investment in 1988 after the launch of Laos’ economic reform 
program in 1986. 
Second, a transitional phase took place in the 1990s through the early 
2000s with more private and less state ownership, export of electricity 
with financing from both IFIs and commercial lenders alongside political 
risk guarantees (PRG) from IFIs. During this phase the investments by 
private companies, so called ‘independent power producers’, has started 
to become important.  
Third, since the late 2000s, the role of IFIs and need for PRG have 
decreased, while the role of commercial lenders in electricity export has 
been increasing. The first project (Nam Ngum 2) was entirely financed 
by Thai lenders with no involvement of IFIs, next to  smaller dams for 
domestic supply sponsored by Chinese banks.  
Presently, Laos seems to be at the forefront of the export oriented 
hydropower industry, while most Asian countries have just reached first 
or second phase of development. The following table shows that there 
were only four hydropower projects in Laos before its economic reforms 
in 1986. The number has increased almost eight times over the 
subsequent three decades. 
 
Table 5.1: Existing hydropower dams in Lao PDR by 2015  
Adapted from:  EdL (2015) Power Development Plan of Lao PDR 2015-2025   
 
No. Project Commissioned Installed 
capacity (MW) 
Developer 
  1 Selabum 1970 5 EdL 
2 Nam Dong 1970 1 EdL 
3 Nam Ngum 1 1971 155 EdL 
4 Nam San 1978 0.11 EdL 
5 Xeset 1 1991 45 EdL 
6 Nam Ko 1996 1.5 EDL 
7 Theun-Hinboun 1998 220 IPP 
8 Houay Ho 1999 152 IPP 
9 Nam Sad 1999 0.25 EdL 
10 Nam Leuk 2000 60 EdL 
11 Nam Mong 2000 0.8 EdL 
12 Houy Sae 2000 0.8 EdL 
13 Nam Ngay 2001 1.2 EdL 
14 Nam Mang 3 2005 40 EdL 
15 Xeset 2 2009 76 EdL 
16 Nam Theun 2 2009 1,088 IPPe 
17 Nam Lik 1-2 2010 100 IPPd 
18 Nam Nhon 2011 3 IPPd 
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19 Nam Phao 2011 1.7 IPPd 
20 Nam Tha 3 2011 1.25 IPPd 
21 Nam Song  
(Extension) 
2012 6 EDL 
22 Nam Ngum 2  2012 615 IPPe 
23 Nam Ngum 5 2012 120 IPPd 
24 Theun Hinboun 
(Extension) 
2013 220 IPPe 
25 Nam Gnoung 8 2013 60 IPPd 
26 Nam Long 2013 5.5 IPPd 
27 Tad Salen 2013 3.2 IPPd 
28 Xenamnoy 2013 14.8 IPPd 
29 Nam Sana 2014 14 EdL 
30 Xekaman 3 2014 250 IPPe 
31 Sugar 2015 105 IPPd 
 
EDL: 75 – 100% owned by EDL (state-enterprise) 
IPP (Independent Power Producer): more than 50% owned by private companies  
IPPe: Export oriented project 
IPPd: Domestic use project 
 
The first three dams mentioned in table 5.1 were built during the 
former regime (Kingdom of Laos) before the communist revolution in 
1975. Nam Ngum 1, in particular, was developed for export of electricity 
to Thailand, at a time when the Lao and Thai governments had been 
close allies and received much support from the US.  Nam Ngum 1 was 
the first cross-border power trade arrangement in Southeast Asia and it 
is still active today.  
The political tensions and economic stagnation at the dawn of the 
new regime impeded any hydropower development in the 1980s but 
economic reforms since 1986 have provided opportunities for more 
foreign investment and aid from IFIs and capitalist countries. Except 
Nam Ngum 1, all large dams with more than 100 MW of installed 
capacity have been developed under the IPP model. Since the 2000s, the 
IPP projects have also been identified as export oriented (IPPe) or for 
domestic use (IPPd). This pattern obviously shows the vibrant private 
participation in hydropower sector.  
An example of the IPP model is Theun-Hinboun, the first IPP 
project in Laos, which was built with financial support from the ADB 
and several foreign commercial banks. Theun-Hinboun Power Company 
is owned by three companies, with 60% of the shares held by EdL-Gen 
(a commercial subsidiary of the EdL state enterprise), and 20% each by 
GMS Lao (a subsidiary of GMS Power Company from Thailand) and 
525758-L-bw-Chattranond
Processed on: 29-10-2018 PDF page: 133
 
 
 
Chapter 5 
 
 
 
 
122
Nordic Hydropower Company from Norway. 95% of the generated 
energy has been exported to Thailand and 5% was for domestic use. 
When commissioned in 1998, the ADB called this project a ‘winner’ 
because there was little criticism of the environmental impacts. However, 
International Rivers, an international NGO, claims that more than 
30,000 people in at least 66 downstream villages have lost fresh water 
supplies, fisheries, rice fields and vegetables gardens (International Rivers 
2014). 
Nam Theun 2 is another showcase of the IPP model, which was 
realized decades after the last World Bank-financed dam in Laos. The 
project is famous because of two aspects. First, it was the largest foreign 
investment (around 1.5 billion USD invested by French, Thai and US 
investors) and the biggest dam in Laos before the construction of the 
Xayaburi HPP. Second, the dam has been praised by its major sponsors, 
the World Bank and the ADB, as the first mega project which exceeded 
international standards including in social and environmental issues. The 
Nam Theun 2 project and underscored the IFIs’ influence on the Lao 
government to institutionally reform its hydropower sector to comply 
with international standards (Doran and Christensen 2014: 69).  
To maximize the market and benefit from the hydropower potential 
of Laos, regionalist frameworks as GMS and the ASEAN regional grid, 
offer more chances for hydropower export and connectivity in remote 
areas as well as better opportunities to attract foreign investment. 
Because of the recent economic crisis, Thailand, the major importer of 
Lao’s electricity, has imported less power from Laos than expected. The 
regional framework could support Laos’ policy aimed at achieving more 
flexibility and finding alternative markets, including China and Vietnam, 
as it is aspires to ‘change Laos from land-locked into a land-linked 
country’. Moreover, as shown in the MRC consultation process on the 
Xayaburi dam, regional forums can somehow balance the interests of 
their members. As confirmed by Lao officials, when neighbouring 
governments in Cambodia and Vietnam hotly debated the potential 
impacts from the dam, the GoL strongly protected its sovereign rights 
but positively responded by adjusting of its dam’s design time after 
time.49  
                                                          
49  Personal interview with Daowong Pornkaew,  Director of Energy Policy and 
Planning Department, Ministry of Energy and Mines, Vientiane, 25 June 2013;  and 
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To realize its hydropower plans, the role of private actors in 
hydropower development is vital for the GoL because public resources 
are limited and there may be insufficient public funding available for new 
infrastructure and the maintenance of existing infrastructure. Moreover, 
Laos’ domestic market is too small to attract foreign investors for 
domestic infrastructure construction. However, Foran et al (2010: 10) 
indicate that Laos is becoming more attractive for investment because its 
hydropower does not serve only domestic demand, but is oriented to the 
regional market, including Thailand, Vietnam, and possibly Cambodia.  
It is logical for Laos to export its surplus hydroelectricity to Thailand 
and to a lesser extent Vietnam, as well as avoid importing fossil fuels. 
Total foreign direct investment for the twelve mainstream hydropower 
projects, ten of which are planned in Laos, will be roughly 25 billion 
USD. With the concession agreements, power export will bring in 
around 2.6 billion USD per year to Laos, for at least 25 years (SEA, 
2009). These could be crucial financial resources for poverty eradication 
and the national strategy for socio-economic development. Nevertheless, 
Gajasei (2011) has argues that even without the construction of 
mainstream dams, Laos would still have sufficient hydropower potential 
on the Mekong tributaries to continue healthy export earnings and 
encourage investment in the medium term.  Although Thailand and 
Vietnam welcome trans-boundary electricity supply from Laos, 
mainstream schemes will have a minor impact, of less than 1.5%, on 
their domestic electricity prices and only limited effects on the energy 
supply strategies. 
At this point, hydropower clearly has become a high hope for the 
national development of Laos and its ambition to become the Battery of 
Asia. The high potential of hydropower, its low domestic demand, and 
its strategic location surrounded by countries with higher energy demand 
make Laos particularly attractive to international investors especially 
from neighbouring countries who wish to take advantage from regional 
proximity and the facilitating regulations for cross-border power trade. 
The IFIs and donors also support Laos to put market-facilitating policies 
in place, especially in opening the hydropower sector for private 
developers.  
                                                                                                                                        
Komonchanh Phet-Asa, Director of Business Department, EdL,  Vientiane, 25 June 
2013. 
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It sounds difficult, hence, to imagine any significant change in the 
vision apart from being the Battery of Asia. It is absolutely not only 
because the GoL has limited choices and posted a high ambition in 
hydropower but there are complementary interests among its 
neighbouring countries, which are thirsty for energy and eager to expand 
overseas investment to sustain their economic growth. One of those 
countries is Thailand, once a hostile neighbour during the Cold War but 
currently the biggest electricity importer from just the other side of the 
Mekong. 
 
5.2 Laos and Thailand: the hydropower ties  
 
5.2.1 Love-hate neighbours 
 
Similar to many neighbouring countries in the world, Laos and Thailand 
do not share only their long border of 1,754 km., mostly along the 
Mekong River, but also close cultural and historical ties. Although their 
official languages are different both in speaking and writing, Lao and 
Thai are basically intelligible to both Thais and Laotians, especially the 
local people in the Mekong Basin in Laos and northeastern Thailand. It 
is because the ethnic majority in both countries is a branch of ‘Tai’, 
which constitute a broad ethnic group dispersed over mainland 
Southeast Asia, southern China and north-eastern India and 
concentrated in modern Laos and Thailand (Pholsena and Banomyong 
2006: 60). Due to cultural proximity and the limited availability of 
domestic media and manufactures, Thai media and products are very 
popular in Laos.  
Thailand, formerly known as Siam, has played a significant role in the 
history of Laos. In the nineteenth century, there was no unified state of 
Laos, but several Laotian kingdoms mostly ruled as vassal states of Siam. 
French colonialists had unified those kingdoms and founded the modern 
state of Laos as a protectorate in French Indo-China, along with 
Cambodia and Vietnam, in 1893. The French empire and Siamese 
government had demarcated their border along the Mekong, unnaturally 
dividing the Lao people who had traditionally lived along the both sides 
of the river (Ivarsson 2008).  
The Cold War immediately effected Indo-China after the Second 
World War and the end of the French rule in 1953. Then the 
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government of Kingdom of Thailand, firmly allied with the US and 
South Vietnam, supported the royalist government in the Kingdom of 
Laos where there were enduring conflicts among the royalist, the 
neutralist, and the communist fractions. The communist movement, 
named ‘Pathet Lao’ was supported by North Vietnam, the Soviet Union 
and China; hence, the struggle was considered an extension of the 
Vietnam War. In 1975, communist regimes took over power in 
Cambodia, Vietnam and Laos. Then the Kingdom of Laos was replaced 
by the Lao People’s Democratic Republic (Lao PDR), the socialist state 
led by the Lao People’s Revolutionary Party (LPRP) as the only legal 
political party in the country (see Stuart-Fox 1997; 2003). Lao-Thai 
relations had deteriorated; and the Mekong River was ironically labelled 
the ‘iron curtain’ of Southeast Asia.  
The relations did not revive until Laos reformed its economy in 1986 
by introducing the ‘New Economic Mechanism’, following the Soviet 
Union’s Perestroika, leading to an opening of its market to international 
trade and investment, claiming a return to capitalism as an intermediary 
step to socialist development. This step was matched with the Thai 
policy of reconciliation with its hostile neighbours, initiated in 1988. On 
this basis, since the 1990s, Laos and Thailand have continuously 
expanded their economic ties in various sectors, both bilaterally and 
multilaterally through regional cooperation frameworks such as the 
Quadrangle Economic Cooperation of 1992, the Greater Mekong 
Subregion Economic Cooperation (GMS) of 1992 and the accession of 
Laos to ASEAN in 1997. Laos’ economic growth closely relates to Thai 
prosperity. The country’s land-locked location makes international trade 
and investment in Laos much more dependent on its neighbours than on 
distant countries, e.g. the US or Japan, which have expanded their 
activities in other Southeast Asian nations. So far, Thailand has been the 
biggest trade partner of Laos both in imports and exports, followed by 
China and Vietnam respectively. In 2013, Thailand was responsible for 
56% of Laos’ total imports and 33% of the country’s total exports (CIA 
2015).  
Laos’ ASEAN membership really signified the end of the Cold War, 
as ASEAN was originally a regional organization of by anti-communist 
states in Southeast Asia. After the first Friendship Bridge was opened in 
1994, four bridges were constructed across the Mekong between 
Thailand and Laos so far, and three more are planned. The bridges 
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symbolize the end of the Mekong as the iron curtain between the two 
countries and the transmission of the market economy to Laos. 
 
5.2.2 Thailand and hydropower development in Laos 
 
Compared with its neighbours, Thailand has been relatively more 
peaceful and has developed its market economy more consistently. After 
the Second World War, the country experienced neither colonial struggle 
nor large scale civil wars and economically benefited from large amounts 
of foreign assistance as a strategic ally of the US in the Cold War, 
especially since 1961 when the first National Economic and Social 
Development Plan was launched. In the power sector, the Electricity 
Generating Authority of Thailand (EGAT) was founded in 1969 as a 
restructured state enterprise with a mission to seek, produce and provide 
new sources of electricity from natural resources to meet the national 
demand for energy that has grown  rapidly since the 1960s (EGAT 
2013).50  
Keeping access to cheap electricity for Thai consumers and industries, 
with 3-7% growth in demand over the past three decades, has been one 
of the most important elements on the agenda for every government in 
Thailand (Jarvis 2010). Hence, the import of power from foreign sources 
became one of options. For the national energy policy of Thailand, the 
current official Power Development Plan (PDP) 2010, Third Revision 
(2012-2030) was endorsed by the Cabinet on 19 June 2012. Thailand has 
experienced an increasing demand for electricity but a decreasing 
potential for electricity production because it has few feasible sources 
and is faced with strong opposition to hydropower dam construction by 
civil society. The over-exploitation of natural resources and degradation 
of the environment in Thailand have led to growing resistance of local 
                                                          
50 Since 1989, the Thai government has supported private actors to participate in this 
sector on the basis of conditionalities attached to structural adjustment loans from the 
IMF and the World Bank. EGAT has changed from being the sole power generating 
agency anymore into the biggest purchaser of electricity from private companies, which 
sell their electricity either to EGAT power networks or directly to public communities 
(EPPO 2013). The government also pushed the partial privatization of EGAT by 
establishing the Electricity Generating Public Company Limited (EGCO) to substitute 
some operations. However, EGAT has remained influential through its share-holding 
and former staff that came on the boards of some IPPs (Wisuttisak 2012).  
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communities with support from NGOs as well as increasing demand for 
regulations to protect environment. This movement has pushed the 
power-generating industry to search for new alternatives that are cheap, 
stable and more viable (Pholsena and Banomyong 2006: 87).  
Although Thailand’s Power Development Plan (PDP) 2012-2030 
proposed to purchase foreign power to a maximum of 15% of total 
generating capacity, electricity from Laos mainly supplies the eastern part 
of Thailand and substitutes for the risk of domestic power generation in 
the western part of the country that depends on natural gas acquired 
from sources in Myanmar (EPPO 2012: 7). Moreover, the import also 
serves to diversify sources of electricity in Thailand away from its 
dependence natural gas, which is one of the most important agendas in 
Thai energy policy.51  
According to EGAT (2013: 96), Laos is Thailand’s number one origin 
of imported electricity and almost its entire source is hydropower. The 
bulk of hydroelectricity is generated by dams not too far from the Lao-
Thai border, mostly demarcated by the Mekong. EGAT currently 
purchases electricity from six projects with a total capacity of 2,404.6 
MW. Supplies of 3,316 MW are being purchased from Laos during the 
2014–2019 period, including from the Hongsa-Lignite project (operating 
from 2015/16), the Xe Pian-Xe Nam Noy HPP (from 2019), Nam 
Ngiep 1 (from 2019), and the Xayaburi HPP (from 2019).  
Power trade between the two countries is also outstanding at the 
regional level. Laos is the biggest exporter of electricity in Southeast Asia, 
counting around 13 billion kWh 52  in 2014, thus making the country 
fourteenth in the world (CIA 2015a). Thailand, meanwhile, is the biggest 
electricity importer in the region with amounts of 12 billion kWh in the 
same year, something which makes the country rank twentieth globally 
(CIA 2015b).  
So far, however, Laos has been still a net importer of electricity from 
its neighbour because of the late development of the power grid and 
poor transmission in remote areas. EdL (2011: 109-110) indicated that 
Laos imported 998.98 million kWh and exported 341.29 million kWh in 
2010, mostly from and to Thailand. These figures may change soon as 
many hydropower projects in Laos are nearing completion and are ready 
                                                          
51 Personal interview with Samerjai Suksumek, Deputy Director-General, Energy Policy  
and Planning Office, Ministry of Energy, Bangkok, 11 April 2013. 
52 Kilowatts per hour. 
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to operate.53 The complementary policies of Thailand and Laos have 
paved the way for the transnational power trade and further investment 
in the hydropower.54 
Nonetheless, critics from NGOs such as International Rivers 
conclude that Thailand does not need to purchase electricity from the 
controversial Xayaburi dam to meet its domestic demands (Bangkok 
Post, 2012). Activists claim that ordinary Thai people are not aware that 
the energy demand in Thailand is frequently over-estimated by the state 
authorities as compared to real usage. Greacen and Greacen (2012) 
comment that the generation capacity of the dam is also expected to be 
lower than the estimation and that, together with the unrealistic demand 
forecast, the Xayaburi dam will become a liability for the Thai 
government rather than a future asset.  
Moreover, the heavy reliance on its exports to Thailand – in the range 
of 80 to 90% of all exported hydroelectricity – makes the hydropower 
industry in Laos sensitive to external influences. Given the continuous 
growth of the Thai economy in the 1990s, Laos had a secured market for 
its products. Nevertheless, the Asian financial crisis, which started in 
Thailand in 1997, demonstrated already that Laos may be too dependent 
on a single buyer, something which significantly decreases the bargaining 
power of the seller in pricing negotiation (Pholsena and Banomyong 
2006: 87).  
For Thailand and Laos, the multilateral regional power trade and 
interconnection plans are also complementary to their regional 
integration policies. Although most of the current power trade is based 
on bilateral cooperation, the GMS and ASEAN have provided 
opportunities for an integrated system through a regional power grid, 
aiming for the most efficient use of energy and investments for 
narrowing regional the economic gap. EGAT, as a state enterprise of the 
government of Thailand, has a clear vision of the regional power hub for 
the transborder trade of electricity, linking to ASEAN Power Grid (APG) 
scheme.  While the APG is still at an early stage of development, EGAT 
                                                          
53  Personal interview with Paruhas Vongthaned, Director of Energy Economic 
Division, Electricity Generating Authority of Thailand (EGAT), Bangkok, 3 April 2013. 
54 There are four MoUs on cross-border power trade between Laos and Thailand since 
the 1990s after the end of Cold War and Laos has opened its door to the international 
market. From 1,500 MW in 1993, the latest MoU signed in 2007 targeting 7,000 MW by 
2020, including the generation from the coming Xayaburi dam, the first project on the 
Mekong mainstream. 
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has cooperated bilaterally with Laos since the 1970s. Although an EGAT 
officer commented that ASEAN and the GMS have not shown much 
commitment and that tangible results of cross-border power linkage are 
limited so far, the regional platforms have provided constant multilateral 
negotiations that legitimize the transboundary project.55  
Although the ADB and ASEAN have pushed the regional power grid 
as one of their regional agendas, each country in the region still has a 
different transmission system. Compared with multilateral regional 
cooperation, the power trade on a bilateral basis has been so far more 
effective. Because of their long-standing cooperation in the energy sector, 
Laos and Thailand currently share some standards in their transmission 
systems. Nevertheless, regional power grid and cross-border power trade 
could benefit Laos more. Its geographically central location, surrounded 
by Thailand, China, Vietnam and Cambodia could lead to diversification 
of its market for hydroelectricity. For this to be realized, support is 
needed both in the hard infrastructure of an integrated transmission-line 
system and the soft infrastructure of integrated regulations and 
governance for cross-border power trade. The Lao-Thai experience 
could serve as a model at the regional level in the long run.56  
In brief, two factors have mainly driven the relations between 
Thailand and Laos regarding hydropower development. Firstly, 
geographical proximity provides an opportunity. Secondly, the disparity 
between the two countries leads to a division of labour in the regional 
market where hydropower-rich Laos becomes a power source for 
energy-thirsty Thailand. Moreover, since Thailand is the biggest trade 
partner of Laos, the hydropower investments and energy exports 
significantly relieve the existing trade deficit. Thai investment is similar to 
the relocation of industries from Japan and other NICs to Southeast Asia 
in the 1980-90s, which were driven by the availability of natural 
resources and low-cost labour (Dixon 1999: 30). In the case of Thailand, 
its hydropower potential is almost depleted and new development would 
likely bring very high costs as a result of the strong resistance by Thai 
civil society.  
 
                                                          
55  Personal interview with Paruhas Vongthaned, Director of Energy Economic 
Division, Electricity Generating Authority of Thailand (EGAT), Bangkok, 3 April 2013. 
56 Ibid. 
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5.3 Regulatory governance and hydropower development in 
Laos  
 
5.3.1 Laos and market reform  
 
As indicated above, it was not until 1986 that capitalism was revived in 
Laos. Actually, the market economy was not well established in the 
country even before the communist revolution because it had 
experienced chronic political conflicts since its independence from 
France in 1953. Like for its close political ally, Vietnam, the early years 
after the revolution were tough, with economic catastrophes deriving 
from the massive costs of post-war reconstruction, the failure of 
collectivization, the brain-drain of skilled labourers, as well as external 
sanctions and containment by hostile capitalist countries.  
Eventually the communist party and the GoL decided to change the 
strategy and transform the socialist economy. The regime officially 
admitted this direction in the seventh resolution of the Supreme People’s 
Assembly in 1979 and prepared for the reform policy that was issued in 
1986 as the ‘New Economic Mechanism’. The collectivization and some 
restrictions on private property and production were abolished, while 
foreign trade and investment were promoted (Pholsena and Banomyong 
2006: 81). Sombounkhan (2012: 4) indicated that the party accepted the 
reform as it could not rely only on the revolutionary achievement but 
needed to increase employment and development through the 
industrialization, modernization, and regional integration. Thipmountaly 
(2012: 26-27) legitimizes this turning point as follows: 
 
According to socialism, international integration and competition is the right 
direction to solve economic contraction. On the other hand, even though 
Laos has a strong potential to improve our country’s competitiveness, it is 
still lacking basic development needs and international economic 
integration. It also has a small market for industrialization, an old-fashioned 
infrastructure, and low quality of labor. The centrally planned economy has 
still not suitably expanded as a core leader while a mixed economy has 
slowly expanded, and the private economy has still not expanded to reach its 
potential in order to support Laos’ centrally planned economy. 
 
In 1989, the GoL concluded an agreement with the World Bank and 
IMF for enhancing market reform. Key structural reforms included 
525758-L-bw-Chattranond
Processed on: 29-10-2018 PDF page: 142
 
 
 
Chapter 5 
 
 
 
 
131 
changes to the country’s public expenditure policy and management, its 
financial infrastructure, trade, and private sector development. After two 
decades, the World Bank (2012: 17) evaluated Laos’ reform process as 
follows: 
  
...the government (of Lao PDR) continues to make solid progress in efforts 
to have a more predictable and rules-based legal framework for trade and 
private sector development. However, continued gaps in implementation 
between the de jure regulatory framework and de facto practices pose an 
increasing risk that the private sector will see less than anticipated benefits 
from improved laws, regulations and procedures. 
 
The IFIs and other donors have strongly supported the hydropower 
development in three common ways, i.e. by formulating policies, 
building human capacity and financing projects. The World Bank is a 
good example of this approach. In 2013, the Bank’ International Finance 
Corporation (IFC) announced its plans to work with the GoL in 
developing draft laws for governing hydropower development. It 
supported EdL-Gen, a private subsidiary of EdL, to improve the 
company’s management on environmental and social issues. The IFC 
also recruited international consultants and specialists to support social 
engagement and stakeholder communication for hydropower and 
forestry sectors in Laos. The Ministry of Energy and Mines wanted to 
have consultants to conduct a detailed review of the power market 
structure, and the institutional framework that governs and reforms the 
power sector (Hydro world 2015). Some official development assistance 
(ODA) also contributed to the Data Collection Study on Energy Sector 
(funded by JICA, Japan) and Energy, and Environment Partnership-Data 
Training and Scenarios for Sustainable Energy Planning in Lao PDR 
(funded by INES, Finland). 
Although the IFIs, the UN agencies and bilateral governmental 
donors have long played a role in pushing forward hydropower 
development, current dams are being developed and financed much 
more by the private sector, primarily from countries within the region. 
New financiers are based in developing countries, including state-owned 
institutions such as the China Export-Import Bank, the China 
Development Bank, the Thailand Export-Import Bank and Thai 
commercial banks such as the Siam Commercial Bank, the Bank of 
Ayudhya, the Kasikorn Thai Bank, the Bangkok Bank, the Siam 
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Commercial Bank, the Thai Military Bank, and the Thanachart Bank. 
Few of these banks have the technical capacity to serve as lead arrangers 
of finance for large hydropower projects (Foran et al. 2010: 10). In the 
case of the World Bank, its strictness partly reflects greater knowledge 
about the impacts of large dams, and partly the related political 
controversies of the 1980s. This process is reflected in the regulatory 
framework of hydropower governance in Laos, which has applied 
international standards, guided by the IFIs and international consultants, 
and was designed to promote the domestic interests of several 
government agencies, especially in securing national development as a 
legitimizing element of the raison d’être of the state. 
 
5.3.2 The emerging regulatory state  
 
The economic reforms were clearly reflected in the increase of the 
number of laws and regulations in Laos. The lack of a constitution and 
formal written laws after the revolution in 1975, when the constitution of 
the former regime was abolished, until 1989 seriously discouraged 
international development agencies and foreign investors to engage with 
Lao economy (Macalister and Zasloff 1994). The country had mainly 
functioned with Prime Minister’s Decree no.53 launched in 1976 as a 
basis for state orders, while only four basic laws – i.e., Criminal Law, 
Criminal Procedure Law, Law on People’s Prosecutor, and Law on 
People’s Court – were adopted by the Supreme People’s Assembly (now 
the National Assembly) in 1989. The country’s first constitution was 
adopted on 15 August 1991, signifying Laos’ re-establishment of the rule 
of law and re-engagement with the international community (Legal 
Research Group for Criminal Proceedings 2015: 1).  
After three decades of reform, the GoL has created or amended 
various laws to integrate the country with the regional and global 
economy as well as to respond to social issues resulting from rapid 
economic growth. The number of laws has significantly increased since 
the 2000s (see graph 5.1), after Laos had acceded to ASEAN (1997), 
normalized trade relations with the US (2005), and gained full 
membership of the WTO (2013). The total number of laws adopted by 
the National Assembly has risen from eight in 2000 to 135 in 2016. Only 
in the period from 2012 to 2016, 51 more laws were adopted (GoL 2016). 
Although the LPRP (communist party) and the government strongly 
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support the economic reforms, they firmly maintain political power 
though the model of the ‘market economy regulated by the state in the 
direction of socialism’, which is legally confirmed in the constitution. 
 
Graph 5.1 Total numbers of laws adopted by the National Assembly  
    of the Lao PDR, 1990–2016 
source: applied from Government of Lao PDR (2016) Legal documents. 
 http://www.laogov.gov.la/legaldoc/pages/document.aspx 
 
 
 
In accordance with the reforms, the constitution was amended in 
2003 by the Decree of the President on the Promulgation of the 
Amended Constitution of the Lao PDR, which included several new 
articles clearly reflecting national development towards the market 
system, especially in the part on the Socio-Economic regime (Chapter 2):  
 
Article 13. The national economy of the Lao PDR relies on a stable multi-
sectoral economy which is encouraged (by the government) to expand 
manufacturing capacity, broaden production, businesses and services, 
transform the natural economy into a trading and manufacturing economy, 
and modernize; [while] combining with regional and global economies to 
stabilize and develop the national economy continuously and to improve the 
material and spiritual living conditions of the multi-ethnic people.  
All types of enterprises are equal before the laws and operate according 
to the principle of the market economy, competing and cooperating with each 
other to expand production and business while regulated by the State in the 
direction of socialism.  
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Article 15. The State promotes foreign investment in the Lao People's 
Democratic Republic, [and] creates favorable conditions for the injection of 
capital, for the use of technology and for introducing modern types of 
management into production, businesses and services.  
The lawful assets and capital of investors in the Lao People’s Democratic 
Republic shall not be confiscated, seized or nationalized by the State. 
 
This study argues that Laos has transformed into the direction of a 
regulatory state, though it has embraced the goals of a socialist state. The 
regulatory state tends to downsize its interventions in welfare provision 
and support a leading role of the private sector. The state may pursue its 
regulatory approach either because it believes in the market system, or 
lacks the capacities to provide public goods by itself. The latter factor 
seems to be a main reason for the emergence of the regulatory state in 
Laos. At the policy level, the national policy frameworks of Laos 
currently rely on the Seventh National Socio-Economic Development 
Plan (2011-2015) and the National Growth and Poverty Eradication 
Strategy, which emphasize the importance of hydropower development 
and the participation of the private sector. The Ministry of Planning and 
Investment (2011: 61) indicated in the national development plan that: 
 
The government has made efforts to ensure the business and political 
environment is conducive for promoting the domestic private sector and 
attracting investment from overseas. This has been carried out through 
improvements in regulations, laws and enterprise establishment processes. 
Business enterprises are partially administered by the government, but the 
enterprises are fully self -managed in terms of finance, planning and 
marketing. This is to reduce excessive government intervention in the 
market. 
 
The government also issued the National Policy on the 
Environmental and Social Sustainability of the Hydropower Sector 
(NPESSHS) in 2005. It aims to adapt and apply the principles developed 
under the Nam Theun 2 hydropower project, acclaimed as a showcase 
by the World Bank, to the whole hydropower sector. The Power 
Development Plan 2015-2020 is designed to achieve the policy targets of 
the NPESSHS. In light of this, the GoL has signed an MOU with the 
government of Thailand for the provision of 7,000 MW of electricity to 
Thailand by 2020. Another MOU was signed with Vietnam for the 
supply of 5,000 MW by the same year (EdL 2015). 
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The Electricity Law was concluded in 1997 and later revised in 2010 
and 2012. The original law of 1997 identified different types of 
investment in Article 10 (“Investment in Operations Relating to 
Electricity”), including (1) The State invests by itself; (2) The State 
invests with other domestic or foreign parties; and (3) Domestic 
cooperative or private investment. In the amended electricity law (2012, 
Article 26), different models were mentioned, including (1) Build, 
Operate and Transfer (BOT); (2) Build and Transfer (BT); (3) Build-
Own-Operate (BOO); and (4) state enterprise operation. These models 
are commonly based on the principle of ‘project finance’ and are 
generally applied for large, complex and expensive projects in which 
loans are secured by the assets and revenues from an individual project 
under control of its project developer/company (BIS 2005).  
The BOT is the most popular model in Laos. This model implies that 
when a developer obtains a concession from the government, it forms an 
independent company to manage the project. The company is governed 
by the majority of private shareholders (usually the developer itself hold 
the largest part) while the government, via its state enterprises, holds a 
minority share. The project company builds and operates the project 
during the concession period, which usually lasts between twenty and 
thirty years. After that, the project is transferred to and owned by the 
government. 
The main idea behind the revision of the electricity law is the 
expansion of nation-wide electrification through the national grid and 
the encouragement of investment in power generation by the public-
private partnership in order to address the risks of inadequate, 
unpredictable revenue and high reliance on foreign aid. It has been 
boosted by the Law on the Promotion of Foreign Investment of Lao 
PDR (2004), which contains investment incentives for foreign 
companies, especially in hydropower projects that are usually developed 
in the remote mountainous areas with no or less infrastructure. 
While there have been several efforts to promote international and 
private participation in economic activities, the state agencies still firmly 
control the governance process. For electricity services, unlike in 
Thailand where generation and distribution of electricity are separated 
between the national producer, EGAT, and two other state 
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enterprises, 57 the EdL has monopolized the functions. It owns and 
operates the main generation, transmission and distribution assets in 
Laos, and manages electricity imports to its grids and electricity exports 
from its generating stations.  
Established in 1961, the EdL was under the auspices of the Ministry 
of Public Works and operated a few small electricity businesses in major 
towns. After the revolution, it became a state agency under the Ministry 
of Industry and later the Ministry of Energy and Mines. It was only in 
1997 when the EdL was corporatized; yet, it remains state-owned and 
answers to a board appointed by the government. In 2010 the GoL also 
founded EdL-Generation Public Company (EdL-Gen), which operates 
seven of fourteen hydropower plants in Laos and joined the newly 
opened stock market in 2011 (EdL 2011: 105). This trend well reflects 
the market-oriented policy of hydropower in the socialist state. 
The EdL is the sole buyer in the national grid and it manages the use 
of IPP-generated electricity in the grid as well as cross-border exports. 
IPP production will be an increasingly important source of power 
generation because more commitments from new projects are planned. 
The EdL’s General Manager is a member of the Coordinating 
Committee for the Development of Electric Power (CDEP), responsible 
for negotiations with foreign power purchasers on tariffs for export-
oriented IPP projects. Generally, the EdL operates smaller hydropower 
projects that serve domestic demand, while larger dams are developed 
and run by IPPs,  including all export-oriented projects. An executive of 
the EdL expressed that its major roles are transformed from hydropower 
development to more of a monitoring and coordinating agent for the 
protection of domestic interests. To apply this principle, the GoL hold 
its shares in IPP investments via EdL or LHSE, a special state holding 
enterprise, such as in the Nam Theun 2 project.58 
The Ministry of Energy and Mines (MEM) oversees the EdL. The 
ministry is the central agency responsible for electricity supply and power 
sector development. Three departments of MEM practically focus on the 
hydropower industry. First, the Department of Energy Policy and 
                                                          
57 The Provincial Electricity Authority (PEA) and  Metropolitan Electricity Authority 
(MEA), which are distributers in provincial and capital city areas 
58 Personal interview with Komonchanh Phet-Asa, Director of Business Department, 
EdL, Vientiane, 25 June 2013. 
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Planning (DEPP) develops national energy policy and plans for energy  
generation, transmission and distribution, and rural electrification, 
renewable energy and energy exports. Second, the Department of 
Energy Business (DEB) is mainly responsible for the promotion of 
private investment in the energy sector; it monitors project 
implementation in accordance with the policies. DEB oversees the 
process of project development ranging from feasibility studies, project 
development agreements, concession agreements, and memorandums of 
understanding to power purchase agreements with support from DEPP. 
Third, the Department of Energy Management (DEM) is in charge of 
drafting energy-related laws, regulations, guidelines and safety standards, 
providing technical consultants and monitoring government agencies, 
state enterprises and private developers to ensure that they comply with 
the regulations. The three departments are the result of the recent 
reorganization of the former Department of Electricity and the 
Department of Energy Promotion and Development under MEM in 
2011. 
Nonetheless, there is no independent regulatory agency for the 
electricity sector in Laos, which means that regulating and regulated 
entities are often overlapping such as in the case of EdL, and the 
expected countervailing role of the regulator seems ambiguous. MEM 
becomes the key agency responsible for the sector’s policy and 
governance, supported by technical information from the EdL. DEPP is 
also responsible for the promotion of environmental and social 
safeguards, including public participation and information disclosure.  
Other than MEM, the Ministry of Planning and Investment is 
indirectly involved in the hydropower sector, through the provision of 
regulations for foreign investment that cover hydropower investment 
from foreign companies. The Lao Holding State Enterprise (LHSE) was 
established in 2005 to facilitate investments in the energy sector by 
managing the state’s holdings in IPP hydropower projects, which are 
financed by foreign and private investors, as well as in non-hydro 
projects such as regarding transmission development. 
As hydropower development has affected other uses of water and has 
environmental effects, the Water and Water Resources Law (1996) and 
the Environmental Protection Law (1999) require water users to comply 
with water resource management regulations, including the requirements 
to implement environmental and social impact assessments and to obtain 
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approval for small-scale hydropower reservoirs. These laws are in the 
process of rapid improvement because the governance of the water and 
environment sector has been entirely reorganized recently.  
The Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment (MONRE) was 
established only in 2011 by merging the Water Resource and 
Environment Administration (under the Prime Minister Office) with 
departments of the National Land Management Authority and other 
related agencies such as the Geology Department and the Forest 
Conservation Department and Divisions within the Ministry of 
Agriculture and Forestry. The new ministry and its Department of Water 
Resources are in charge of revising the Law on Water and Water 
Resources with support from the World Bank-funded Mekong 
Integrated Water Resources Management Project (M-IWRM) and the 
IFC-funded Environmental and Social Standards in the Hydropower 
Sector of Lao PDR Program (MONRE 2013).59  
For development projects on the Mekong mainstream and its 
tributaries, a special agency is dealing with its environmental aspects, 
separated from Department of Water Resources, which concentrates on 
domestic water regulations. This agency is the Lao National Mekong 
Commission Secretariat (LNMCS), the national coordinator of the 
Mekong River Commission and the main office dealing with 
transboundary water management in Laos. It should be noted that this 
Lao agency seems to be more important and higher in organizational 
status than its Thai counterpart as it is an independent department within 
MONRE. The Thai National Mekong Commission Secretariat (TNMCS) 
is only a division under Department of Water Resources within the 
MONRE in Thailand. This probably reflects the importance that Laos 
attaches to its Mekong water resources.  
The LNMCS has two main functions. First, it is in charge of all policy 
planning and regulation related to the management of the Mekong and 
its tributaries in accordance with the MRC. Although general regulations 
on water resources are the responsibility of the Department of Water 
Resources, it needs to coordinate with LNMCS to achieve integration 
with the Mekong Agreement. In 2014, the Law on Water Resources of 
Lao PDR (1996) was being modified. The law had been improved in the 
                                                          
59 During the field observation in 2013, I noted that the reorganization created much 
confusion among officials, due to the relocation of offices, communication and the 
administrative process. 
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past with support of the ADB but it had not been approved by the 
National Assembly.60 Second, the LNMCS is the coordinator between 
the MRC and the GoL as well as among national agencies regarding 
issues of the Mekong Basin. It also has a working group in charge of 
coordination with the GMS and ASEAN, although LNMCS focuses on 
water resources rather than economic development. The chairperson of 
LNMC is the Minister of MONRE and the vice chairperson is the Vice 
Minister of MEM who is in charge of hydropower development. This 
simply reflects again how significant the hydropower sector is for the 
state.61  
Large hydropower projects in Laos mostly apply quite a similar model. 
The GoL holds a minority share in most projects and works through 
corporatized entities such as LHSE and the EdL in case of Xayaburi 
HPP. DEB serves to promote and monitor IPP investments on behalf of 
the GoL and ensure that they comply with the general regulation on 
hydropower development, related laws of Laos and the Mekong 
Agreement.62 The Xayaburi project, for instance, will be supervised by a 
steering committee set up among public agencies from related ministries 
such as MONRE (by LNMCS), the Ministry of Planning, the Ministry of 
Finance, while DEB performs the secretariat.63  
In the case of the Xayaburi HPP, the development process consisted of 
five stages. The hydropower investment process typically begins with 
developers bidding with the host government for exclusive rights to 
investigate potential sites, involving a feasibility study. For the Xayaburi 
HPP this stage began in 2007. With the consideration of the GoL 
through EdL, the Ministry of Energy and Mines, the Ministry of 
Planning and the Ministry of Finance, the developers then proceeded to 
                                                          
60  Group discussion with Thongthip Chandalasang, Viengsay Sophachan, and 
Luckdavone Valangoun, Lao National Mekong Committee Secretariat (LNMCS), 
Vientiane, 13 May 2014 
61 Ibid. 
62  Personal interview with Chanthaboun Soukaloun, Deputy Director General, 
Department of Energy Business, Ministry of Energy and Mines, Vientiane, 23 March 
2014 
63  Personal interview with Aksorn Khamsawad, Head of Contract Division, 
Department of Energy Business, Ministry of Energy and Mines, Vientiane,  21 March 
2014 
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generate more refined knowledge of the impacts, costs, and returns, after 
which a project development agreement was concluded.64 
Second, after the project agreement had been negotiated, the GoL 
nominated the project and its developer, the Xayaburi Power Company 
Limited (XPCL), to the buyers, in this case EGAT on behalf of the 
government of Thailand. On the Thai side, the purchasing power 
proposal was prepared by EGAT and the Ministry of Energy before it 
was submitted to the Sub-Committee on Electric Power Cooperation 
between Thailand and Neighbouring Countries (S-ECTN) that created 
the working group to negotiate with the GoL and the developer. After 
this negotiation, a draft tariff MoU was approved by S-ECTN, the Board 
of EGAT, the National Energy Policy Council (NEPC) and the cabinet, 
while the legal text was verified by the Office of the Attorney General. 
The same process was completed for the power purchasing agreement 
(PPA) between EGAT on behalf of Thai government and EdL on behalf 
of the GoL for pricing negotiation. 
Third, when the PPA between the two countries had been approved, 
a concession agreement was concluded between the GoL and the 
developer, XPCL. With the PPA, the developer can claim potential 
benefits from the project and raise more funds for its investments from 
financial institutions, for instance commercial and state-owned banks in 
Thailand. 
Fourth, because the construction of any mainstream dam is subject to 
the provisions of the Mekong Agreement 1995, the project needed to be 
submitted to the Prior Consultation process in the MRC, including the 
arrangement of public hearings in all four countries (see chapter 4). 
Fifth, after the MRC process had finished, the National Assembly of 
Laos approved the project and the construction was started officially. 
Nevertheless, this stage is disputed outside Laos since Cambodia, 
                                                          
64 Foran et al (2010: 21) comment that this stage is significant to commitment for 
further development as: “A developer has typically invested 1-2 million US dollars to 
complete the feasibility study stage for a large project. Just at the stage of public 
consultations, the wider public is beginning to participate, and may raise fundamental 
questions….such questions at that stage are not welcome to the developer, resulting in 
frustrations for all parties and as the amount of resources invested increases, willingness 
to withdraw declines.” 
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Vietnam and NGOs in Thailand disagreed with the Lao interpretation of 
the Mekong Agreement and the MRC process. The governance complex 
of these steps is summarized in diagram 5.1. 
 
Diagram 5.1 Governance structure of the Xayaburi HPP 
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5.3.3 From the regional plan to local challenges  
 
The transformation of relations does not happen only in regional and 
national governance, but also at the local level, as this is increasingly 
integrated into the transnational market. Promoters of hydropower 
development and regionalism usually promise prosperity for the states 
and their people. Nonetheless, implementation of that vision is always a 
challenge, especially at the local level where development impacts are felt 
directly. Because of the mountainous environment and difficult road 
conditions, it takes around nine hours to reach Xayaburi by bus from 
Vientiane, although the distance is not more than three hundred 
kilometres. However, on the border between Vientiane Province and 
Xayaburi Province65 the road has been all paved on the Xayaburi side by 
the Thai company for the transport of people and construction materials 
from the Thai border to Xayaburi town and the dam. According to local 
people, infrastructure has been much improved and many Thais have 
come to Xayaburi, which was once a remote and sleepy town, after the 
dam construction had begun (field observation 2014). 
 
Figure 5.2 The Mekong crossing point between Vientiane Province and 
Xayaburi Province in Laos66  
Photo by Ome Chattranond, May 2014 
 
 
                                                          
65  This part of the Mekong locates entirely in Lao territory, not the border with 
Thailand. Vientiane Province is not a part of Vientiane Capital but its greater region. 
66  The bridge is being built by a Chinese company, partly with grants from the 
government of the Netherlands. 
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Because the run-of-river design of Xayaburi HPP needs no large 
reservoir, the developer claims that there will be fewer flooded areas and 
less resettlement compared to large dams in general. Of fifteen villages, 
with approximately three-thousand inhabitants, only one has been totally 
resettled. Most of the inhabitants have just moved (‘relocated’) from 
lower to higher areas. The terms Yok Yai (resettled) and Yab Yai 
(relocated) are differentiated in Lao regulations:  affected villagers who 
completely lose their dwellings and lands are entitled to different levels 
of compensation in the case of resettlement and relocation.67  
For instance, in Ta Lan, the biggest and nearest village to the dam, 
not all households, but only those in flood-prone areas had been moved 
just a few hundred meters away. On a population of 500, only 58 out of 
103 families, including a community temple, were relocated in 2013. 
Most of the villagers used to be rice and corn farmers but are now hired 
as labourers at the dam construction, similar to the situation in most of 
the other villages. The resettlement program has provided vocational 
training focused on activities such as live stocking and commercial skills, 
supported by local departments of the government. 
 
Figure 5.3 Relocated Ta Lan village on the new road to Xayaburi Dam 
Photo by: Ome Chattranond, May 2014 
 
 
                                                          
67 Agreement of the Chairman of Resettlement Management Committee of Xayaburi 
HPP on Policy, Compensation and Rehabilitation 2012, based on Decree on 
Compensation and Resettlement of People affected by Development Projects of Lao 
PDR, September 2006. 
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The Resettlement Management Unit (RMU) of the Xayaburi HPP is 
the coordinating office that represents the GoL at the local level. It 
works closely with PT Development, a Lao private company and a 
minor shareholder of XPCL, which is generally operating all social affairs 
of the project. The role of local governments is mainly focused on 
resettlement activities. After the concession agreement was signed 
between the GoL and the developer, two RMUs were set up in two 
affected provinces: six villages in Xayaburi and nine villages in Luang 
Prabang Province on the other side of the river. In addition, officials 
representing the energy departments of the two provinces have a small 
coordinating office at the XPCL office near the construction site. 
Besides hydropower development, public-private collaboration seems to 
be also a model linking national and local development.  
The RMU work is led by a local branch of the Ministry of Planning68 
while its committees are composed of local line agencies at provincial 
and district/town levels, e.g. for energy, environment, agriculture, culture 
and tourism as well as mass organizations including the Lao Women’s 
Union,  the Youth Union, and the Lao Front for National Construction 
(socialist solidarity affiliation). All activities have been run within the 
framework of the Decree on Compensation and Resettlement of People 
affected by Development Projects of Lao PDR 2006 and the specific 
Agreement of the Chairman of Resettlement Management Committee of 
Xayaburi HPP on Policy, Compensation and Rehabilitation 2012.  
According to an official at the RMU, the resettled villagers need much 
knowledge and many skills to adapt to their new lives, especially when 
changing from a self-reliant lifestyle to a life under the market system.69 
Moreover, communities have not been moved in their entirety in some 
villages, so there were disparities within communities. Many villagers 
want to relocate and get similar benefits as their relatives or neighbours. 
Nonetheless, because of limited budget and land availability, the 
government may not be able to honour all requests. While Laos is the 
least densely populated country in Southeast Asia, it is also the hilliest 
with a relatively limited surface of arable land. The limits of available 
                                                          
68 But the secretariat at national level of Xayaburi HPP is performed by the Ministry of 
Energy and Mines. 
69 Personal interview with Phouvang Kongsap, Deputy Chief of Resettlement 
Management Unit of Xayaburi HPP, Xayaburi,14 May 2014. 
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land pushed the program to merge some villages from three to one.70 
Because the country’s poverty alleviation strategy attempts to move 
people closer to urban areas where there is better infrastructure and 
more employment (MRC 2011e:15), the relocation may be a by-product 
of this policy by gathering the scattered rural population into more 
urbanized areas and integrating them into the market economy.  
Hydropower development also seems to embed the market economy 
into local livelihood. Relocated villagers are compensated with new 
houses, electricity, food and money allowances, land and plants as well as 
new public buildings, e.g., schools and temples. 71  However, their 
livelihood has been changed significantly. In a village, many self-reliant 
fishermen are trained to be farmers in rubber plantations. They also 
plant a small amount of rice for household consumption since rubber 
trees are still small and some space is available.72 This will be impossible 
when the rubber trees grow up and their lives will become more 
dependent on the market. 
 In the absence of active social movement dealing with the impacts 
from hydropower development in Laos, most of the movements are 
based in Thailand. For example, Chinag Khong, a border town on the 
Mekong River bank in Northern Thailand, hosts a well-known local 
NGO named ‘Rak Chiang Khong’, which deals with development issues 
on the Mekong. This NGO has contributed to educating people and 
campaigned against large dams on the Mekong in China since 2002.73 
The anti-dam campaigns have attracted attention from Thai and 
international media during the seasonal water crises in the Mekong 
Basin, especially in 2010.  
 However, the international cooperation between Thai and Lao local 
authorities across the Mekong has been limited because of the 
centralization of foreign affairs at the national governments. Local 
authorities in Thailand such as in Chiang Khong do not have much 
impact on the ongoing dam projects on the Mekong. According to local 
informants, it is because all decisions involving the Mekong River are 
usually made in Bangkok and Vientiane. Therefore, the local 
                                                          
70 Personal interview with Vilaysak Thor, PT Development, Xayaburi, 15 May 2014. 
71 Field observation, 2014. 
72 Personal interview with  Lang Inthavong, Na Tor Yai village, Xayaburi, 15 May 2014 
73  Personal interview with  Jeerasak Inthayos, Rak Chiang Khong Group, Chiang 
Khong, 13 March 2013 
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governments are more concerned with local issues at hand, e.g., land 
grabbing, migration and tourism.74  
Local public participation in decision-making processes on 
hydropower seems to be limited both in Laos and Thailand. According 
to some Thai NGOs75, in the case of the Xayaburi dam the Thai 
government claims that the project is under Lao sovereignty; hence, the 
Thai authorities have no legitimacy to interfere. An International Rivers 
coordinator in Thailand has commented that information on the project 
was publicly released only in 2011 while its feasibility study had started in 
2007. For civil society, time was too short to get familiarized with the 
project’s costs and benefits. In 2011 three public consultation forums 
were held in Thailand in accordance with Thai law and the Mekong 
Agreement 1995. According to a coordinator of International Rivers in 
Thailand, the forums did not sufficiently consult the public as she notes: 
 
Around two-hundred questions were asked by participants but just a few of 
them were answered by the organizer. In each forum, there were a few 
officers from the Thai National Mekong Committee (TNMC) and the MRC 
giving some information to people but there was no one from the company. 
It looks like the government agencies want to keep themselves in a safe-
zone and let it be the affairs beyond their responsibility. It seems now the 
government has collaborated mainly with the companies.76 
 
In order to cope with the complexities of hydropower development, a 
Thai political ecologist argues that the activists should learn more about 
the regional context of transboundary development but rather 
concentrated on struggles at the domestic level as intervening into 
foreign affairs would be too problematic.77 Some local NGOs propose 
that a realistic option for counter-balancing the development of large 
                                                          
74  Personal interview with  Chalerm Tawiya, Mayor of Vieng Chiang Khong 
Municipality, Chiang Khong, 14 March 2013;  and Orathai Hongprayoon, Mayor of 
Vieng Municipality, Chiang Khong, 14 March 2013. 
75  Personal interview with Teeraphong Phomhan, Director of  Living River Siam, 
Chiang Mai, 27 March 2013; and Witoon Permphongsachareun, Mekong Ecology and 
Energy Network (MEE-NET), Bangkok, 9 April 2013.  
76  Personal interview with Pianporn Deetes, International Rivers Thailand, Bangkok, 
20 April 2014. 
77 Personal interview with Chinarong Setthacheu, Mahasarakahm University, 
Mahasarakham, 5 February 2014. 
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dams probably is “countering first our own government and companies 
which are promoters of the dams in our neighbouring countries.”78 
Social movements challenge the centralized governance of the state, 
though to a limited degree. International and local NGOs support the 
creation of the Thai People’s Network for the Mekong and the Save the 
Mekong Coalition to be a centre for the movement. They have sent 
letters to the MRC’s Development Partners and the Prime Ministers of 
the member states, asking for a sustainable approach to the Mekong 
mainstream dams.79 In November 2012, during the 9th Asia-Europe 
Summit in Vientiane, the movement gathered in boats on the Mekong 
River in Nong Khai, a Thai border town opposite to the capital of Laos, 
to protest against the Xayaburi dam. The protest was organized by the 
Network of Thai People in Eight Mekong Provinces and the Network of 
Community Organization Councils in Seven Northeastern Provinces 
(Herbertson 2013). These campaigns significantly pressured the Thai 
government to disclose its policy. Officials in TNMC and EGAT agree 
that they have to prepare more and better information for the public 
hearing forums which usually are fierce debates.80  
Some NGOs have commented that environmental laws in Thailand 
are relatively progressive compared to those in neighbouring countries. 
Nonetheless, the story seems much different when Thai developers can 
transfer their capital to hydropower projects in neighbouring countries 
where the functioning of social movements is strictly limited. In 2012 the 
network of Thai local communities along the Mekong initiated a lawsuit 
to an Administrative Court against Thai authorities who deal with 
Xayaburi dam investment because they arguably did not comply with the 
Thai constitution and the MRC agreement by failing to properly notify 
the public about the project and conduct an adequate environmental 
impact assessment. The court finally refused the case for the reason that 
these people did not really have an interest in the project because it is 
                                                          
78  Group discussion with Jeerasak Inthayos, Nopparat Lamul  and Malee 
Pattanaprasitporn, Rak Chiang Khong Group, Chiang Khong, 19 December 2013. 
79  Personal interview with Teeraphong Phomhan, Director of  Living River Siam, 
Chiang Mai, 27 March 2013. 
80  Personal interview with Nirat Phuriphanpinyo, National Mekong Committee 
Secretariat, Department of Water Resources, Bangkok, 21 February 2013; and Paruhas 
Vongthaned, Director of Energy Economic Division, Electricity Generating Authority 
of Thailand (EGAT), Bangkok, 3 April 2013. 
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developed outside Thailand.81 However, on 24 June 2014, after the 
villagers appealed to the Supreme Administrative Court, the court agreed 
with their argument and accepted the case (Nijhuis 2014). 
Although it was just an initial step, EnLaw (2014) has highlighted 
some elements of the court’s decision. Firstly, according to a Thai law – 
the Rule of the Office of the Prime Minister on Public Consultation by 
Public Hearings 1996, Article 7 – for any development of ‘the 
government project’ that may cause adverse impacts to the environment, 
culture, occupation, safety, way of life of individual, community or 
society, and serious arguments among interested parties, the concerned 
agencies may organize public hearings.  The court applied a broader 
definition that includes purchasing agreements between Thai 
government agencies and companies that lead the development of a 
private project, instead of a narrow definition that delimits government 
projects merely to those developed directly by the government or are 
related to concessions and subcontracting to private companies. 
Therefore, the Xayaburi HPP was defined as a government project and 
the requirement for open information access, public hearings and a 
consultation process had to be honoured. This was the first time that a 
Thai court seriously referred to an international agreement – in this case, 
the Mekong Agreement 1995 – particularly on the public consultation 
process binding to domestic practices. Finally, the potential 
transboundary impacts from the project were mentioned as a reason why 
the court accepted the case. For civil society, it was the first time that 
Thai authorities officially recognized that the Xayaburi project would 
seriously affect local livelihood.  
The account in this section shows that the complexity of transnational 
investments has made the public responsibility over the project unclear. 
Although the project is primarily financed by Thai capital to serve a 
demand in Thailand, the Thai government can claim that the project is 
taking place under Lao sovereignty. In this way, transnational developers 
may possibly capture transboundary water resources in situations of 
fragmented regional governance with even fewer restrictions than in the 
case of domestic development.  
 
                                                          
81  Personal interview with Jeerasak Inthayos, Rak Chiang Khong Group, Chiang 
Khong, 13 March 2013. 
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5.4 Conclusion 
 
Although it is the smallest country in the Mekong Basin in terms of its 
population and economy, the hydropower issue makes Laos weightier in 
the regional forum as a major supplier of hydroelectricity. Meanwhile, 
national economic reforms since 1986 have led to the establishment of a 
market economy and currently promote public-private partnership as a 
popular model of large-scale hydropower development in Laos. New 
laws and regulations are being introduced with support from the IFIs 
and international donors, pushing various global agendas but essentially 
contributing to the country’s marketization. Complementary policies of 
Thailand, the major destination of hydropower export and the origin of 
developers in the hydropower industry, have significantly motivated 
Laos’ ambition to become the Battery of Asia. 
Despite the high, but decreasing, dependence on international donors, 
the GoL has selectively applied the policies supported by foreign 
assistance. Hydropower development on the Mekong mainstream, 
illustrated by the case of Xayaburi HPP, by nature is neither a domestic 
nor a bi-lateral project between Laos and Thailand, but a bundle of 
activities involving public-private partnerships and regionalization 
pushed by ASEAN and the GMS. The project is an important step 
toward the realization of a regional power grid and transborder power 
trade and will likely be a showcase for subsequent hydropower projects 
on the Lower Mekong mainstream.  
The Xayaburi project is an illustration of the process of state 
transformation, including power shifts in location, actors, and ideology 
of governance (Hameiri and Jayasuriya 2012: 179). The location shift took 
place when decision-making on a (geographically speaking) domestic 
project was organized across national borders by a complex of bi-lateral 
relations involving a power trade agreement, multi-lateral relations in the 
MRC, and public-private relations in the project development process of 
the Xayaburi HPP. Multilevel (and multinational) governance has 
actually not been implemented through hierarchical-formal regional 
institutions but in a complex of, rather, informal regional governance. 
Different actors exercise power in the location shift of governance 
beyond the state agencies. The IFIs such as the World Bank and the 
ADB have supported Laos in this transformative process through their 
multilateral financial and technical assistance, promoting public-private 
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partnership. New developers such as construction companies and 
financiers from China and Thailand usually supported by their 
governments though public policy instruments such as national power 
development plans and cross-border power trade agreements, have 
importantly contributed to the growth of transnational hydropower 
development. 
Being the Battery of Asia by blocking a transboundary watercourse 
may complicate the relations between Laos and its neighbouring states as 
well as between public and private actors, both at domestic and 
international levels. Although the MRC promotes integrated water 
resources management with multi-stakeholder participation, the region’s 
governments still play a decisive role in decision-making. They seem to 
prefer public-private partnerships with transnational private developers 
because these supposedly provide solutions in view of the lack of capital 
and state capacity that are needed in pursuing national development 
goals.  
Non-state actors are often marginalized in decision-making processes 
but expanding transboundary developments have urged them to 
reconsider their struggles. While the development of civil society in Laos 
is limited, public awareness has been raised by an active civil society in 
Thailand both at local and international level. However, the changing 
power relations between the state and the private sector under the 
influence of emerging public-private partnerships and transnational 
investments critically challenge civil society because of unclear public 
responsibilities and the relocation of conflicts in water resources to other 
countries. The controversial lawsuit on the Xayaburi HPP involving 
social movements and state agencies in Thailand has become a good 
example of this. 
The shifts in the locations and actors of governance are ultimately 
outcomes of the shift in ideology. Traditionally the state tries to claim its 
sovereignty over water usage while intervening in the market by 
providing public goods and regulations. The emphasis on water 
nationalism, which is reflected in state policies and propaganda, was 
heightened when Laos opened its door to the global and regional 
economy in the late 1980s. The hydraulic mission gave rise to centralized 
national-based governance and large-scale hydropower development, for 
which it received much investment from international funds and 
developers. For a state that cannot control its international watercourses 
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effectively and provide sufficient public welfare on its own, the regional 
market becomes a sound option. That state saw the opportunity to 
transform from being a development provider to a market facilitator, by 
using its power in regulatory governance. This demonstrates that. 
Although neoliberal reforms enhance the participation of private actors 
in the economic system, state actors can still legitimize their function in 
the provision of development through public-private collaboration in a 
model of the regulatory state.  
Meanwhile, international development agencies and donor agencies 
have constantly promoted global ideologies such as sustainable 
development through the integrated water resources management 
approach in the MRC. Multilevel governance, theoretically enhanced by 
regionalism, is the favoured mode of governance for this approach of 
TWG. Nonetheless, the emerging regulatory regionalism, which bypasses 
the regulatory power of supranational institutions, practically impedes 
multilevel governance. This is the case because regulatory regionalism 
implies that decision-making power is exercised by national governments 
that implement ‘regional’ policies with ‘national’ regulations to facilitate 
hydropower development through the rising involvement of ‘regional’ 
capital from the neighbouring countries of Laos.  
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   6   
  
Conclusion: 
 Towards Regulatory Regionalism in 
the Mekong Basin 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
After the construction of the Xayaburi Dam officially started in 2012, the 
government of Laos (GoL) has proposed three other hydropower 
projects on the Mekong mainstream to the MRC.82 The Xayaburi project 
has become the pioneer model for other dams to follow. Although they 
are smaller in size, all of the ongoing mainstream dams in Laos share 
fairly similar characteristics with the Xayaburi, including that they are 
built for export-oriented production, receive the majority of their 
investment from foreign private funds, and are co-developed by the GoL 
and foreign companies from neighbouring countries. Even though these 
projects are based on bi-lateral international cooperation, they are 
planned to contribute to the regionalization of energy trade and the 
building of a regional market. Apart from current plans, in total, twelve 
dams are planned on the Lower Mekong. 
This study has attempted to understand the transboundary water 
governance (TWG) of hydropower development in relation to 
regionalism in Southeast Asia, particularly in the Mekong Basin. In the 
former three chapters, the dissertation has discussed the dynamic context 
of hydropower development from the global level to the Lower Mekong 
Basin (LMB); the formation of regionalism and regionalization within 
relevant frameworks of the Greater Mekong Subregion Economic 
Cooperation (GMS), the Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
(ASEAN), and the Mekong River Commission (MRC) in connection 
                                                          
82 Don Sahong project (260 MW) in southern Laos was proposed in October 2013 and 
developed by a Malaysian company. Pak Beng project (912 MW) and Pak Lay project 
(770 MW) were proposed in November 2016 and June 2018 respectively. They are in 
northern Laos and developed by Chinese companies.  
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with the hydropower issue; and the resulting governance dynamics and 
state transformation in the case of Laos.  
The major argument formulated in previous chapters is that 
regionalism in the Mekong Basin is driven essentially by the 
transformation of the state, while the idea of regionalism has been 
incorporated into national governance through pro-market and 
regulatory policies without establishing strong centralized supranational 
institutions. It is a kind of regionalism that states do not simply embrace 
by transferring their power to regional institutions; rather, they employ it 
as a strategy to keep themselves relevant and able to achieve 
developmental goals through adopting a model of regional governance 
that favours, or at least does not challenge, the interests of the state. The 
outcome of development would be uneven for actors, as those closer to 
the interests of the state, including private firms as subcontractors to the 
state in development, may benefit more than others. 
This concluding chapter functions as a synthesis of the argument on 
TWG and the political economy of regionalism, which links the logic of 
water marketization to the building of regulatory regionalism. It starts 
with answering the research questions, framed as four propositions   
regarding the politicized marketization of revived hydropower 
development on the Lower Mekong mainstream, the emerging and 
uneven development of the regulatory state and regulatory regionalism, 
and the transformation of the state. The second part follows up with 
implications of the findings and lessons learned in terms of theoretical 
and policy perspectives. Finally, the third section proposes a potential 
research agenda crystallised from the major findings of this study.  
 
6.1 Responses to the Research Questions 
 
To answer the research questions on the relationship between 
regionalism and the TWG in hydropower development, this research 
project has applied the analytical framework built on the concepts 
discussed in chapter 2, including TWG and water marketization, the 
regulatory state, and new regionalism. Applying international political 
economic and governance lenses, the logics of water, market and state 
are interconnected in an explanation of regional governance embedded 
in so-called regulatory regionalism.  
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6.1.1 Politicized TWG of hydropower development  
 
Chapters 3 and 4 have highlighted how hydropower development on the 
Lower Mekong mainstream reflects the changing landscape of global and 
regional political economy. Changes in hydropower development have 
triggered a revival of the hydropower industry and stimulated the 
regionalization of energy markets through transnational investment and 
cross-border trade in electricity. Water is being exploited in response to 
patterns of demand and supply across national boundaries that have 
been generated by economic growth and capital accumulation, but the 
exploitation of water also serves  the logic of states in their struggle to 
control territorial resources and take advantage of the emerging regional 
market. 
Regional politics has affected the uncertain fate of hydropower 
development in the LMB. Although the Mekong Committee (MC) had 
studied and proposed large dams on the Lower Mekong mainstream 
since the 1960s, none of them were implemented until 2012, when the 
Xayaburi HPP became the first main dam project. The plans for this 
dam seem to have created more public awareness about hydropower 
development in the region. The construction has started in 2012 and the 
dam is planned to be operational by 2019, mainly serving for electricity 
export to Thailand.  
The revitalization of hydropower reflects the emergence of a regional 
energy market, matching the demand for and the supply of energy, as 
well the increase of economic ties with expanded capital flows within the 
region. The specific geographical location of Laos surrounded by the 
growing economies of China, Thailand, Vietnam, and Cambodia, makes 
Laos an emerging strategic point for regional power trade. The Upper 
Mekong dams built in China technically make the proposed projects 
downstream in the Lower Mekong, including the Xayaburi dam, more 
technically feasible and attractive to developers because they lead to a 
more stable water flow all year round. 
The IFIs and other international donors have also pushed for 
regulatory reforms, related to environmental standards and transparency 
of the hydropower industry, especially through the MRC. However, their 
influence seems to be limited in comparison with the increasing role of 
transnational companies in the region, which have gradually become 
major players in Mekong hydropower projects through both private or 
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public-private partnership investment. These developers have been 
facilitated by economic integration frameworks, i.e. ASEAN and the 
GMS, which were promoted by the ADB and have been aiming to 
stimulate regional development in electricity infrastructure and trans-
border power links to support other development sectors.  
The politics of legitimacy plays an important role. The state in Laos 
has tried to create instrumental legitimacy – based on the perceived 
effectiveness of service delivery by the state – by stimulating economic 
and infrastructure development, coupled with regionalization aimed at 
attracting foreign investment and expanding hydroelectricity exports.  
Meanwhile, the state has tried to enhance its substantive legitimacy – or 
the perceived right of the state to exercise social control – by  
emphasizing the potential of regionalism to contribute to values such as 
regional stability, prosperity, and cooperation. Although Laos depends 
on Thailand for much of its hydropower investment and exports, the 
project’s infrastructure is seen by the national government as a 
contribution to its hydraulic mission and water nationalism.  
The ongoing process of regionalism has served state building in the 
Mekong region. Unlike in the case of the EU, where most states have a 
long history and a relatively robust governance framework, 
modernization and marketization have arrived relatively late in most of 
the Mekong states. The latter are highly influenced by external forces: 
global institutions, foreign aid agencies and transnational companies. 
With limited governance capacity and poor or non-existing infrastructure, 
public-private partnerships such as in hydropower projects seem to 
accelerate the centralization or recentralization of state control over 
natural resources, which are often located in remote areas and are 
generally subject to little intervention by the state.  
The state and its legislative and judicial bodies, regulatory agencies, 
and enterprises, traditionally try to control water resources by providing 
public or private rights of access. In the case of international 
watercourses, states tend to claim their sovereign rights or territorial 
integrity over water usage, which often leads to international tensions. 
Meanwhile they intervene in the market through regulation and the 
provision of public goods. Regulation includes the creation, facilitation 
and monitoring of markets, conflict resolution, and sometimes (in)direct 
intervention in the market in the form of public-private partnerships. In 
this case, the international market is formed to match demand and 
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supply with pricing and institutionalization of hydropower across 
national borders as well as to provide states with resources and income 
through trade and investment.  
While globalization has been conducive to the rise and expansion of 
the regulatory state, regionalization has shaped its implementation with 
distinct characteristics. As discussed in chapter 4, the regional 
governance of hydropower, and the energy sector more broadly, in the 
Mekong Basin has encouraged regionalization through several projects, 
including the construction of a regional power grid and transmission 
lines, and led to efforts to push integrative regulations for cross-border 
power trade. The market provides a space for tradable water in the form 
of hydroelectricity, which is technically more efficient when 
implemented at the regional scale, unbound by national borders. This 
requires a facilitating structure that creates and sustains the transnational 
market, and regionalism seems to have provided a sensible strategy. 
 
6.1.2 Emerging regulatory regionalism and regionness  
 
The case of hydropower development on the Lower Mekong 
mainstream reveals the contradictions between regionalism and TWG. 
While marketization and integrated water management at the regional 
scale have become core elements of the leading paradigm of regionalism 
in the Mekong Basin, TWG has been shaped by a state-centric approach 
influenced by the old form of regionalism rooted in the Cold War. The 
states still try to control TWG in order to serve their interests, and 
attempt to dominate TWG at the national level instead of transferring 
their power to regional institutions. 
Therefore, the Mekong regionalism is a mixture of ‘old’ and ‘new’ 
regionalism, where a market building process takes place within a 
structure of states that attempt to maintain control over their natural 
resources. The main objective of Mekong regionalism is to facilitate the 
commodification of nature in order to enlarge the market and provide 
economic opportunities to states and the private sectors, which 
collaborate closely in many development projects though public-private 
partnerships. Laos is a clear example of how a relatively weak state can 
use regionalism to overcome the limits of its small market and lack of 
capital to exploit its large potential in hydropower. 
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The form of regionalism as applied in the Mekong Basin has not 
produced a cohesive region where regional governance mechanisms 
provide effective responses to regional problems. However, the region 
has evolved  in such a way that a certain degree of regionness has 
resulted. The evolution of regionness has not been even across periods 
and sectors, as is evident from the development of regional water and 
energy sectors in the Mekong basin. The analysis in previous chapters 
has emphasized that regional water governance has evolved much slower 
than the regional energy industry. 
Nevertheless, it may be an exaggeration to depict regulatory 
regionalism as the triumph of the neoliberal campaign for maximizing 
the market while minimizing the state. Both state and market may be 
enlarged and strengthened because of the regulatory reforms. Regulatory 
regionalism can be seen as an attempt to strengthen governance in light 
of the increasing roles in development played by private companies and 
civil society, where previously the state used to be the prime mover 
(Braithwaite, 2005: 35). This transformation inevitably generates 
changing structures and consolidation not only within individual states 
but also among states in the region, producing a form of ‘regionness’ in 
the Mekong Basin. 
 
Table 6.1 Regionalism, regionalization, and the degree of regionness 
 
 
 
Weak regionalism Strong regionalism 
Low 
regionalization 
Regional space 
 
Regional society 
 
High 
regionalization 
Regional complex 
 
Regional community  
 
 
The degree of regionness correlates with the degree of regionalism in 
terms of the commitment of states to manage their problems at the 
regional level with regional institutions, and regionalization in terms of 
the intensifying processes of social transactions and capital accumulation 
among state and non-state actors. Table 6.1 explains their relations (see 
Hettne and Söderbaum 2002). A regional space is the expression of weak 
regionalism and low regionalization, while higher regionalization in social 
and economic interactions, such as the shared use of water resources, 
potentially develops the space into a regional complex. When rule-based 
525758-L-bw-Chattranond
Processed on: 29-10-2018 PDF page: 169
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 6 
 
 
 
 
158
regional governance is established in the form of stronger regionalism in 
order to keep regionalization in check, the result is a regional society. 
The formation of a regional community or ultimately a regional state, 
which is a cohesive unit of integrated states, is rare but conceptually 
possible when both the degree of regionalism and the regionalization are 
intense. 
The findings of this research project imply that there are three 
instances of ‘regionness’ in the Mekong Basin. Firstly, a regional space, 
delimited by the  territorial boundaries of the Mekong Basin, has been 
transformed into a growth area dominated by economic regionalization 
under the influence of regionalist frameworks, such as ASEAN, the 
GMS and the MRC. The region is characterized by increasing 
interdependence among transnational actors, involved in the exploitation 
of resources that do not conform to the boundaries of territorial 
sovereignty, thus producing a regional complex of economic and social 
interactions. The increase of international investments on dams within 
the region is a good example of the coming into being of a regional 
complex in the Lower Mekong Basin.  
Although international trade and investment relations with countries 
such as the US and Japan are still important to the region, in some areas 
trade and investment have become decidedly focused on the region, as 
shown by the case of Laos and the hydropower sector. Regionalization 
could spill over from hydropower to other sectors, because of the 
increasing construction of infrastructure and the pressure to deregulate 
regional investment flows. It is unlikely that this regional complex will 
develop into a regional society because there is no rule-based pattern of 
relations governed by regional governance arrangements. The current 
situation is one of uneven regionness, where sectoral integration in some 
areas is combined with lower degrees of rule-based governance in others.  
Secondly, particularly in the water sector, MRC-led TWG forms some 
degree of a regional society, because it has led to the increasing use and 
management of shared resources, guided by some regional rules and 
organizations. However, this society has very limited capacity because it 
is dominated by state-centric governance. For example, while 
international donors are influential in policies traditionally prevalent in 
the MRC, the committee’s riparianization has implied a change of 
structure. Since its establishment, the MRC has depended much more on 
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assistance from donors from outside the region – the so-called 
development partners – than on the contributions from riparian states.  
The recent riparianization has reorganized TWG by relocating most 
of the implementation from the regional body to national agencies, 
downsizing the international secretariat, and placing higher financial 
burdens on the member states. This process reveals the contradiction 
between weak regionalism and strong regionalization. In other words, 
when the logic of the state dominates the market and the water sector, 
the degree of regionness is weakened and it becomes difficult to move 
beyond the level of the regional society. 
Thirdly, although regionness in the Mekong Basin is not rooted in 
strong supra-national governance, it is linked to the accumulation of 
capital – funding, technologies, man-power, and natural resources – 
concentrating on and operating within a regional space. At least in 
theory, regionalization potentially creates a more diversified economy 
and integrated market, which may overcome the limit of states’ 
boundaries in using and distributing resources. It potentially reduces 
tensions over water allocation among states and societies, as other public 
goods or benefits are produced in exchange. Nonetheless, the interests 
of actors with higher demand of electricity – e.g. industrial sectors and 
urban societies – will easily prevail over those of local people, who are 
dependent on water for food production to support their livelihoods. 
 
6.1.3 Regulatory regionalism and the state transformation  
 
The findings of this study indicate that arguments about the withering 
away of the state are not valid. State actors in the Mekong Basin seem to 
be able to adjust themselves to new political economy contexts by 
adopting strategies of regionalism. Nevertheless, at the same time, it is 
impossible for them to monopolize the space of the state since domestic 
and foreign private sector interests, decisions, and rules impact on the 
state’s regulations because of the adoption of forms of regulatory 
regionalism. The transformation of states does not only change the 
location where power is produced and exercised within a state but also 
creates a situation of uneven regionness. 
We can observe the transformation in three interrelated dimensions 
of state power (Hameiri and Jayasuriya 2012: 179). First, the 
transformation includes shifts in the location of actual governance 
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structures and spaces where state power is exercised, in this case across 
national borders to the transnational space of the Mekong Basin; in the 
kinds of actors who exercise that power, in this case moving from the 
dichotomy of public and private, or national and international to 
developers and non-developers; and third, in the ideology employed to 
legitimize the transformation, which in this case a tension between state 
sovereignty and the ideal approach of regional/multi-level governance. 
This study argues that these shifts express a combination of struggles 
between two types of governance, i.e., statism and regulatory regionalism 
(table 6.2). 
 
 
Table 6.2 Three shifts in the state power 
 
 
types of 
governance 
 
 
Location 
 
 
Actor 
 
 
Ideology 
Statism National 
boundaries 
State vs non-state/ 
National vs international 
actors 
State sovereignty 
Regulatory 
regionalism 
Transnational/ 
ecological 
boundaries 
Public-private developers 
vs non-developers 
Regional/ multilevel 
governance 
 
 
 This thesis has interpreted regionalism not merely as a process of 
regional integration, where states transfer part of their power to regional 
institutions for their common interests, and which would ultimately 
make states less dominant in international affairs. The transformation of 
the state into what has been called a ‘regulatory state’ is part of the 
process of market building. Especially in the case of developing states 
like Laos, regionalism has become a strategy aimed at enhancing the role 
of the state both in terms of economic development and governance 
capacity, as the state is collaborating closely with private, and in the case 
of hydropower development in Laos, also transnational actors. Such 
transnational actors advocate regulatory reform in the country in order 
to obtain predictable and effective governance structures that support 
open markets, which facilitate capital flows throughout the region. 
Regional frameworks, such as the MRC, appear unable to provide a 
counterweight to the forces of regionalization. While the commission 
has mandates related to both economic development promotion and 
environmental protection for sustainable development, the unclear text 
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in the Mekong agreement 1995 and the loose structure of the 
commission make its protection mandate legally weak. For instance, 
there appeared to be no compulsory or unified format for public 
consultation processes applicable to the Xayaburi project, as nothing had 
been included on this in the Mekong Agreement of 1995. Consequently, 
it was left to the member states to apply the Agreement on the basis of 
their own interpretation and design domestic process according to their 
own preferences.  
The former chapters have shown that real decision-making power is 
in the hands of national ministries; in the interplay between ministries 
the energy sector usually overshadows the water sector because of three 
reasons. First, the energy sector is important for governmental priorities 
of income generation to sustain economic growth and poverty reduction. 
In the case of Laos, for example, the GoL has formulated its vision to be 
the ‘Battery of Asia’ and to graduate from LDC status by 2020. Second, 
private companies in the energy industry are eager to support 
hydropower projects and provide other infrastructure, such as roads, 
bridges, electricity transmission lines, etc., mainly to facilitate the 
construction of dams, but also to provide basic services that the poor 
state is not capable of delivering adequately. Third, water simply seems 
to be an abundant resource in tropical Southeast Asia, and arguments 
regarding the risks of alternative water use can easily be discarded. 
Although disparities in economic and political development across 
countries in the LMB have an impact on countries’ position vis-à-vis 
formal regional institutions, regional governance in the water and energy 
sectors is influenced heavily by transnational sectoral networks of public 
and private agencies. The governance arrangements, as well as the 
ensuing regionalization, in each sector depend on the priorities set by the 
regional framework and national governments, and are facilitated by 
regulations regarding private domestic and foreign investment 
promotion. This process, however, makes the dichotomy between the 
regulatory state and the developmental state unclear, as developmental 
goals are essentially the primary motivation for the formation of the 
regulatory state.  
This research project has emphasized that the state uses regulations in 
order to control water resources and facilitate the process of 
marketization. The states in the Mekong Basin are confronted with 
private sector-driven transboundary hydropower development projects 
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and respond with political projects of regionalism. Meanwhile, 
regionalization creates economic growth and interdependence in foreign 
investment, energy trade, employment, infrastructure etc., which 
contribute to the developmental objectives of states in the region. Yet, 
regionalism, imposing regulations to regional governance, and 
regionalization all operate at different speeds. In the case of the water 
and energy sectors, economic development requires increasing regulation 
of the emerging national and regional markets. Because of regional 
interconnectedness, the development of projects on transboundary 
watercourses may escalate domestic issues to the regional level and put 
more pressure on both state and non-state actors. Among those non-
state actors, private developers and civil society groups undertake 
activities that result in the regionalization of social transactions or 
demand a higher degree of regionalism.  
 
6.1.4 Regulatory regionalism and uneven development  
 
The making of regulatory regionalism tends to create stronger market-
state collaboration but also leads to uneven development, affecting 
different actors differently depending on their relations to the state and 
the market. Regionalism in the Mekong Basin seems driven by two 
competing perspectives regarding hydropower development. The first 
perspective focuses on the maximization of benefits from water 
resources through investment and trade in hydroelectricity. The second 
perspective emphasizes the need for minimization of transboundary 
impacts from that development. 
Although this study has not focused directly on the environmental and 
social impacts deriving from hydropower development, it is important to 
keep in mind how such activities generate uneven benefits and threats for 
different actors and that different scales of governance are expected. 
Hydropower development transforms ‘water into capital’ and ‘a natural 
system of river basins into a market place’. The growth of trade and 
investment through regionalization highly depends on uneven 
development in the region, which comprises countries with highly 
different costs of labour, land and other resources.  
The changing context of the Mekong Basin, which has been much 
more stable after the end of the Cold War, constantly pushes regional 
capital accumulation by transnational investment from richer and energy-
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thirsty countries such as China and Thailand to capital-poor but resource-
rich countries such as Cambodia and Laos. Facilitating regulations created 
by regionalist frameworks that are established by states do not only 
accelerate this capital expansion but create uneven development outcomes 
across scales and related actors. 
Whereas the government of Laos positions itself in the uneven 
regional order as a main producer of hydropower or even the ‘Battery of 
Asia’, the complementary approaches of ASEAN and the GMS for the 
promotion of marketization and export-oriented strategies strongly 
support this ambition. Nevertheless, these positive claims may be 
challenged by the view that the GMS, ASEAN and the MRC have been 
exclusive clubs of state actors, and do not provide much access to 
citizens in decision making processes. For instance, criticisms of the 
GMS usually focus on its prominent market-oriented position, which 
tends to generate over-exploitation of natural resources, negative 
environmental impacts and uneven development among social classes 
(Glassman 2010). The transboundary trade of hydroelectricity, as a kind 
of ‘virtual water’, unavoidably affects ‘real water’ regulated by 
hydropower dams, including changes to water flows influencing 
sediments and fisheries. Roth and Warner (2008) note that the 
development of virtual water as in agricultural policies closely relates to 
the political economy of resource allocation that always benefits some 
and harms others. Besides national governance that decides on water 
allocation, regionalism also influences the process in this case.  
Based on the discussion in chapter 5, this research has identified four 
important problems in the process of hydropower development. First, 
there is an insufficiently strong regulatory framework to address the very 
dynamics of development: as an example of this, we may note that the 
concession agreement and power purchase agreement of the Xayaburi 
HPP were signed before the regulation on resettlement was concluded in 
2012. Second, although compensation and new infrastructure such as 
schools, roads, and electricity are provided for resettled villagers, it is 
unclear how knowledge and skills of local people would be developed to 
help them adjust to their new livelihood, which is significantly changing 
from self-reliant production towards the market system. Third, public 
participation in the decision making process of the Xayaburi HPP was 
organized, but it seems to have been insufficient. Centralization has 
made decisions involving the international river and transboundary issues 
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into an exclusive affair of the national governments in Bangkok and 
Vientiane. Fourth, the changing role of the state as the market facilitator, 
especially at the transnational level, may produce a democratic deficit of 
the state to its citizen. For instance, when the network of Thai local 
communities along the Mekong initiated a lawsuit to the Thai 
Administrative Court against the authorities that were dealing with the 
Xayaburi dam investment, the court initially refused to handle the case 
because the network was not really party to the project, as this was 
developed outside Thailand. 
Regulatory regionalism tends to contribute to the expansion of 
capitalism, causing uneven geographical development. The making of 
space as a result of regionalization creates unevenness among 
geographical areas because, as Harvey (1996: 295) has noted, “different 
places always compete with one another to attract investment. In the 
process they tend to amplify unevenness, allowing capital to play one 
local or regional or national class configuration off against others.”  
 
Table 6.3 Opportunities and threats of regulatory regionalism  
  
 Society  Market State 
Opportunities - Public awareness 
- Transnational 
networks 
-  Transnational  market 
- More competitive 
market 
- Effective and 
efficient state 
-  Interdependence 
and security 
community 
Threats - Transboundary 
impacts 
- Marginalization 
- Monopolistic market 
- Non-diversified market 
- Dependence  
- Regulatory/elite 
capture 
 
 
As summarized in table 6.3, regulatory regionalism has caused uneven 
opportunities and threats for society, the market, and the state. For 
society, large-scale hydropower projects potentially have transboundary 
impacts, and these are regulated only loosely by existing regional 
governance mechanisms, which tend to marginalize local people in the 
decision-making process. Nonetheless, increasing public awareness and 
pressure to form transnational networks are potential effects of the 
escalating water crisis, which is caused by intensive development 
affecting people across national borders.  
Next, regionalism facilitates the building of markets, which are larger 
transnational and competitive spaces for private actors in the region. In 
the hydropower sector, however, the monopolistic nature of big and 
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transnational funds and firms, as well as the great dependence on the 
extractive hydropower industry, possibly obstruct economic 
diversification in the long term.  Finally, the transformation of the state 
in the making of a regional market may encourage growing 
interdependence and create a favourable context for the evolution into a 
regional security community, which is an area where increasing economic 
and social transaction and institutionalized relations may produce the 
resolution of social problems without significant uses of physical 
violence (Deutsch et al 1957). At the same time, it would produce risks 
of too high dependence on the private sector and foreign markets. Such 
dependence may create an opportunity for regulatory capture by elites 
who try to influence regulations in ways that represent their interests 
more than those of their societies.  
 
6.2 The implication of the research 
 
This thesis agrees with the argument that the current process of market 
building in Asia has gone further than creating a free market and a 
facilitating state, and that it has holistically transformed the relations 
among the market, the state, and society (Carroll 2012). Especially the 
transformation of state affairs, which are increasingly privatized and 
transnationalized in this case, has made the state’s responsibility and 
legitimacy unclear to its citizens. The market building process has 
encouraged the establishment of a competitive society, where people 
need to be adaptive to the emerging marketized economy. The impacts 
of this would be positive if effective governance, accountable to the 
citizens of the state, were established. In contrast, accelerated market 
building in a situation of weak governance capacity tends to harm more 
marginalized groups of people. Such a situation would be challenging to 
the political legitimacy of the state in the long run.  
Studies of TWG, which generally focus on water conflict and 
cooperation, are not convincing if they do not pay sufficient attention to 
the political economy of that particular region beyond water related 
issues. While water is certainly central to TWG, in reality the usage of 
water is connected to other sectors such as trade in food and energy, 
which are prioritized differently by different actors. Although this study 
does not aim to provide specific solutions for problems of TWG in 
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hydropower or regionalism per se, the transformation of the state in 
relation to regional marketization may have some policy implications.  
This study has argued that regionalism significantly engages with 
some major problems of TWG, in particular those of scale and capacity 
mismatches. According to Karkkainen (2005), the two mismatches 
influence water governance in relation to the existing system of states. 
The scale mismatch refers to the incongruence between the political 
boundaries among states and the natural boundaries of water resources 
such as river basins. The mismatch may be complicated by states’ lack of 
resources and knowledge to manage the ecosystem beyond or even 
within their own boundaries. 
In relation to this study, the above-mentioned conclusion implies that 
the regionalization of water use, which is even encouraged by regional 
organizations, would theoretically enhance state capacity for TWG 
because the mismatch could be dealt with by a form of regional 
governance. However, the IPE analysis of this study shows that the 
limited governance capacity of states in the region has pushed them to 
adopt more inward-looking approaches to TWG as the prevalent form 
of weak regional governance. This form of TWG, which is subject to 
intra-regional power politics and dependent on support from outsiders 
such as international donors and IFIs, is not sufficient to manage valued 
water resources. Individually, each sovereign state is too small to manage 
common, basin-wide issues. Yet, at the same time, some states may not 
be sufficiently interested in TWG, because the international basin covers 
only a (small) portion of their territory. In both cases, national 
governments tend to have less interest in regional governance and pay 
more attention to problems that occur mainly at local or national levels.  
 
Table 6.4 Scale and capacity mismatches of the TWG 
 
 Supranational level of TWG Subnational level of TWG 
Strong capacity 
in TWG  
Regionalism 
 
Decentralization/ 
localization  
Weak capacity 
in TWG 
Fragmented/ 
Nationalization 
Fragmented 
 
Table 6.4 presents a typology of TWG, using two criteria: state 
capacity in TWG and its scale or the level at which TWG would be 
required (i.e., beyond the territory of the state or within the territory). 
This implies that a group of states with strong governance capacity, 
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faced with the need for high-level TWG, may set up regional frameworks, 
in order to pool their capacities to form stronger regional governance 
supported by a diversification of economic relations. If TWG is required 
at a low level, states may decentralize TWG to the local level, and 
collaboration may take place among some smaller parts of their 
territories. By contrast, TWG in a group of states with weak governance 
capacity tends to be fragmented, no matter whether water governance is 
required at lower or higher levels.  
Back to the basis of this study, water serves to meet basic needs for 
society, security for the state, and natural capital for the market. Tensions 
potentially occur when water is insufficient or misallocated over different 
users or areas at either the domestic or the international level. Under 
perfect conditions, regionalism would promote marketization by making 
water tradable and transmissible in the form of hydroelectricity, as virtual 
water, in a de-bounded regional market. Because of the mismatches that 
were addressed in this section, the establishment of suitable regional 
governance frameworks will depend on the degree to which problems 
concerning the governance capacity of riparian states are addressed.  
Presented in the findings, the IWRM approach to water management 
is highly contested, because states may hold stronger economic 
motivations for water development. In the case of the Mekong basin,  
MRC member states restrict the committee’s mandate so as to provide 
more opportunity for the market and, at the same time, facilitate national 
development policies of the states. For the MRC to retain its relevance in 
TWG, it needs to serve more stakeholders, especially civil society and 
local groups, by educating them about water resources and promoting 
their rights to water in national regulations. Knowledge management has 
traditionally been a significant strength of the MRC. The commission 
should emphasize information and benefit sharing of TWG in order to 
contribute to the potential solution of conflicts among stakeholders in 
water related sectors, next to working on impact mitigation and 
compensation. More specifically, Laos would benefit from the 
establishment of a river basin organization or commission at sub-
national level in order to generate skills and experiences for national 
agencies, which could thereby be assisted to develop more integrative 
approaches at regional/international level as well.  
In addition, the increasingly transnational nature of accumulation in 
the region makes Laos’ economy more vulnerable to external forces. 
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Liberalization and deregulation of the economy, with the purpose of 
attracting FDI for export-oriented production, is possibly harmful to 
domestic infant and import-substituting industries.83 Laos seemingly 
does not have the big market and diversified economy that would enable 
it to absorb external shocks and cushion it against increasing external 
risks. The benefits of hydropower development in Laos will depend on 
the country’s ability to use it for economic diversification and ultimately 
welfare distribution across society. Until now, the hydropower sector has 
relied heavily on the demand of energy from neighbouring countries, i.e., 
Thailand, Vietnam, and China, which pursue the same export-oriented 
strategy for economic growth as Laos and are therefore vulnerable to the 
global market as well.  
Next to the attention to states and formal organizations dealing with 
TWG, the focus should be on citizens who are impacted by large-scale 
hydropower development. Transnational networks of civil society seem 
to be on the rise in parallel to regionalization of the market for 
hydropower, but they obviously do not have an easy task in the Mekong 
countries. Groups that are vulnerable to the transboundary impacts of 
hydropower dams (such as resettled villagers, local fishermen and 
farmers living along the river banks), are supported by local and 
transnational civil society organizations, but these are increasingly facing 
difficulties with monitoring and contesting projects that are supported by 
their states and developed by foreign capital.  
The pressure from growing regionalization, however, may push civil 
society to form transnational coalitions of affected people and activists, 
who may try to use domestic and international mechanisms, such as 
courts and independent agencies, to impose stronger regulations on state 
agencies and companies. Empowering society with scientific knowledge 
and policy options may be as important as linking social movements in 
                                                          
83 The case of China provides a good lesson. Hart-Landsberg (2013: 86-88) notes that 
China has used export-oriented and FDI-attraction strategies, which have succeeded in 
transforming China into one of the fastest growing economies in the world. However, 
even though China has a huge domestic market, the country has been losing its 
planning and regulatory capacities because of its dependence upon global production 
networks and markets, largely in the US. The outward-oriented Chinese economy may 
have benefited relatively small groups of people, but has also affected negatively the 
unskilled laborers, who form the majority of the population.  
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different societies to share experiences and operate across national 
boundaries.  
 
6.3 Potential research agendas 
 
Regarding the rise of regulatory regionalism presented in this study, the 
analysis of the relationship between regionalism and TWG has revealed 
that increasing regionalization does not always mean stronger regional 
governance. More research is certainly needed in order to understand 
and improve the regional governance of hydropower development in the 
Mekong Basin. This research proposes three points that should have 
more attention, including water nationalism in its relationship with the 
politics of legitimacy, regulatory capture that possibly originates from 
regulatory regionalism, and the energy politics of the hydropower sector. 
Knowledge of all three issues may contribute to a better understanding 
of TWG, especially in terms of international water conflict and 
cooperation.  
As shown in the findings, hydropower has both symbolic and 
materialistic significances in Laos. Regionalism in the Mekong Basin 
seemingly contributes to water nationalism in Laos. Nonetheless, 
according to Menga 2016, the issue of water nationalism has received 
little attention in the study of water politics so far. Whereas economic 
diversification and the establishment of common political institutions of 
regionalism could theoretically contribute to achieving trade-offs in 
water-related issues, water nationalism has complicated TWG in the 
Mekong Basin with less-compromising positions of the riparian states in 
sharing of the international river.  
Although the state may support regionalism and try to attract 
international trade and investment through regionalization, they employ 
that strategy to avoid bilateral domination and globalization at the same 
time. Comparative case studies in other countries would be useful to 
explain this linkage of domestic and international water politics, 
particularly in the post-conflict states, in which utilization of natural 
resources is crucial for the legitimacy of newly established political 
regimes. These ideas may be applicable to other developing countries 
that are landlocked, pursue reforms, and have a small domestic yet bigger 
neighbouring market for a particular resource or sector that relies on 
regional markets and geographical proximity beyond water, such as 
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contract farming and health care services in border areas. It is interesting 
whether and how other models of state governance, besides the 
regulatory state, could exist in such context.  
 Even though the regulatory state in principle aims to facilitate 
marketization, this kind of state may possibly be harmful to the market 
in cases where there is a relatively weak governance framework. The 
main risk is that some influential actors in a particular sector collaborate 
with state agencies to manipulate regulations to their benefit. This 
scenario amounts to ‘regulatory capture’, a process through which some 
actors, who are particularly influential in the regulatory process and vis-à-
vis the regulatory agencies that are supposed to regulate them, may have 
undue influence on the nature of regulation (see Stigler 1971; Dal Bo 
2006).  
Certain circumstances may transform the state from being a protector 
of public interests into a facilitator of special (private or transnational) 
interests, especially in cases where the political system shows a 
democratic deficit (Bruszt 2012). Such capture possibly happens when 
the state creates and controls regulations for some actors, e.g., private 
companies sub-contracted to provide public goods on behalf of the 
state. Those actors are potentially influential because they have a 
significant stake in the specific nature of regulation, possess technical 
expertise, are well-organized, and often have close relations with people 
in regulatory agencies due to their long collaboration. In contrast, the 
general public is less influential in bargaining, because they generally have 
diffuse interests, are not well organized, have limited technical 
knowledge, and are subject to restricted participation in a non-
democratic context. Capture may harm a society by favouring private 
over public interests and bringing about a market order that deviates 
significantly from the original idea of the pro-market regulatory state. 
The study of energy politics, after an early boom at the time of the oil 
price shocks in the 1970s, seems to be underdeveloped, particularly 
beyond topics of energy security, geo-politics, and institutional 
cooperation. In Asia, the politics of energy resources has received little 
attention, and has largely been neglected in studies on regionalism 
(Carroll and Sovacool 2010). According to Hughes and Lipscy (2013: 
457-58), energy politics needs more attention in at least two ways: the 
changing roles of developing countries and the changing structure of 
energy demand and supply.  
525758-L-bw-Chattranond
Processed on: 29-10-2018 PDF page: 182
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 6 
 
 
 
 
171 
First, the rapid growth of populations, industrialization, and 
urbanization has led to a rising global demand for energy from 
developing countries. Development of those countries, and particularly 
China, has great impact on the energy sector because of their big markets 
and emerging opportunities for innovation. Second, there are changes in 
energy demand and in the energy sources to meet that demand. The 
focus on sustainability and the introduction of measures to mitigate 
climate change have led to more demand for renewable energy sources, 
such as biomass, solar, wind and hydropower. Although conventional 
fossil fuels, such as oil, coal, and natural gas remain the primary sources 
of energy, in some places alternative energy sources, such as hydropower 
in Laos, have become the primary ones. In order to combine water with 
energy politics, for example, Magee (2006) has proposed the concept of 
‘powershed’, linking the hydro-politics of energy to ‘watershed’ in China. 
This notion was later applied by Middleton and Allouche (2016) to the 
case of the Mekong Basin, and their research illustrates how we could 
define ‘regionalism’ on the basis of relations between nature and society 
in different ways from sector to sector. It remains interesting for 
researchers to explore how the construction of regions is determined by 
a complex of development projects that creates interconnections among 
transnational resources, capital, and territories.  
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